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There have been arguments to prove or disprove a purely ab­
solute being; and others which, if they proved anything, 
could only establish the existence or nonexistence of a 
purely relative and contingent God; but what is hard to find 
(until Schelling or later impossible) is an argument expli­
citly and clearly bearing on the question whether there is a 
God both absolute or necessary and (in another aspect) rela­
tive or contingent, that is, reflexively transcendenr. Such 
arguments are possible, and only when philosophers have con­
sidered them with something of the care they have bestowed 
upon arguments dealing with a less intelligible conception 
will it be time to say that the arguments for God's existence 
have been either validated or invalidated. The question we 
need to investigate concerns the existence of a being whose 
nature conforms to the formal structure of the idea: "sur­
passing self and all others."
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CHARLES HARTSHORNE'S GLOBAL ARGUMENT 
FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE:
AN ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
INTRODUCTION
Charles Hartshorne has long been known for his lively 
defense of the ontological argument. What few realize, how­
ever, is that the ontological argument is not the only rea­
son, or even the most important reason, that Hartshorne is a 
theist. Hartshorne says.
If 1 were asked, "Why do you believe in God?," 1 would 
not reply, "Because of the ontological argument." Rath­
er, 1 would say that it is because of a group of argu­
ments that mutually support one another so that their 
combined strength is not, as Kant would have it, like 
that of a chain which is as weak as its weakest link, 
but like that of a cable whose strength sums the 
strength of its several fibers.^
The nexus of arguments to which Hartshorne refers is called 
the global argument. Surprisingly, even some careful stu­
dents of Hartshorne's thought are ignorant of the important 
role the global argument plays in Hartshorne's theism. David
Charles Hartshorne, Forward to The Ontological 
Argument of Charles Hartshorne by George L. Goodwin (Mis- 
soula, Montana: Scholar's Press, 1978), p. xi.
Pailin, for example, criticizes Hartshorne's ontological 
argument on the grounds that it does not prove that the con­
cept of God is coherently conceivable.” This is a criticism 
Hartshorne, time and again, has acknowledged.^ Hartshorne 
never took the ontological argument to be a complete proof 
of theism.
In the twelve years since Hartshorne first expli­
citly formalized the global argument, not one article, book, 
or dissertation has dealt with the argument in more than a 
cursory fashion.^ Hartshorne admits that he may be partially 
responsible for the neglect of his argument. The 1970 pre­
sentation of the global argument is sketchy and brief.^ 
Nevertheless, the present work (see especially Chapter II) 
proves that the global argument has been part of Hartshorne's 
philosophy ever since his days at Harvard in the 1920s.
The misunderstanding of Hartshorne's position and 
the relative neglect of the global argument provide the 
raison d 'etre of this work. It is also my purpose to high-
2David A. Pailin, "Some Comments on Hartshorne's 
Presentation of the Ontological Argument," Religious Studies, 
4, 1 (1968), p. 114.
^Charles Hartshorne, "What the Ontological Proof Does 
Not Do," Review of Metaphysics, 17, 4 (June 1964), pp. 608- 
609.
^The global argument was published in The Monist, 54,
2 (April 1970), pp. 159-180 and as Chapter XIV of CS.
^In a letter dated February 2, 1981 Hartshorne writes, 
"The account of the arguments in Creative Synth. [sic] is very 
brief and, I now think, is one reason it has had so little 
attention."
light the fact that the global argument is a cumulative 
case. The case for God's existence is built on a series of 
interrelated arguments which support each other at their 
weakest points. Too many philosophers of religion labor u n ­
der the assumption that theism stands or falls with the suc­
cess or failure of a single argument. The global argument 
is a much needed remedy for this prevalent misconception.
Chapter I discusses the concept of a cumulative case 
and answers the few objections that have been raised against 
such an enterprise. Chapter II deals with the history and 
form of Hartshorne's cumulative case. Chapter III familiar­
izes the reader with Hartshorne's concept of God. Chapters 
IV through IX take up the elements of the global argument on 
an individual basis. Thus, there are discussions of the 
ontological argument, the design argument, the moral argu­
ment and so on. Chapter X attempts to show the interrela­
tions among the elements of the global argument and offers 
some critical observations of Hartshorne's position.
According to Hartshorne, an entire metaphysical sys­
tem can be spun from a sufficiently clarified concept of God 
CCS 39). The global argument, therefore, could be under­
stood as a restatement of some of the major themes of 
Hartshorne's metaphysics. Understanding this, I often became 
dizzy contemplating the complexity of the task before me.
To keep the work to a manageable length it was often neces­
sary to discuss problems with less thoroughness than they
deserve. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this overview of 
the global argument can serve as a basis for a better under­
standing of Hartshorne's thought and as an impetus for fu­
ture dialogue.
CHAPTER I 
THE IDEA OF A CUMULATIVE CASE
Rational support for theism has traditionally taken 
the form of offering one or more of the standard proofs of 
God's existence. The proofs are usually presented as if 
each one must bear the full weight of the theistic conclu­
sion, much as the center post of a tent must support the 
entire weight of the canvass. But is there any more reason 
to believe that theism stands or falls with the success or 
failure of one argument than there is to believe that a 
tent must have only one supporting post? Just as more than 
one post is often needed to support a large tent, more than 
one argument may be required to justify belief in God. Sev­
eral arguments, when taken individually, may be weak, but 
when considered as elements of one cumulative case, may be 
strong. The aim of this chapter is to explain and defend 
the idea of a multiple-argument strategy for theism.
Mitchell refers to the combining of several theistic
arguments as a cumulative case.^ He suggests that
What has been taken to be a series of failures when 
treated as attempts at purely deductive or inductive 
argument could well be better understood as contribu­
tions to a cumulative case. On this view the theist 
is urging that traditional Christian theism makes bet­
ter sense of all the evidence available than does any 
alternative on offer, and the atheist is contesting the 
claim.2
One need not, as Mitchell does, identify theism with Chris­
tian theism in order to understand the point. Since the 
time of Hume and Kant, philosophers and theologians have be­
come increasingly sceptical of the ability of a single argu­
ment to prove God's existence. Such incredulity is perhaps 
not surprising. For a concept as ambiguous as the concept 
of God and for a subject as complex as religion, one should 
hardly expect a single argument to settle major issues.
Thus, the assumption that the case for theism must rest with 
one argument cannot go unchallenged.
The various theistic arguments may be considered as 
elements of one cumulative case. Mitchell notes that
Prima facie the elements of the theistic scheme do tend 
to reinforce one another in a way that is recognizable 
both to theists and by their opponents.3
In the mouths of its more articulate defenders, theism pre­
sents a more or less coherent world-view. The universe is 
said to depend upon or be part of a greater unseen reality. 
The cosmological and design arguments for God's existence
'Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Be­
lief (New York: Seabury Pressl 197 3).
^Ibid., pp. 39-40 ^Ibid., p. 40.
serve to focus this claim by providing one way of explain­
ing the existence and order of nature. And, it may be, as 
Kant argued, that if the cosmological argument is sound, 
some form of the ontological argument must also be sound.
It is arguable that the reality upon which all else depends 
must be a necessary reality, necessarily existing, and there­
fore implied in the very concept of existence. The claims 
of some mystics to have been in direct contact with this 
higher reality reinforce the theist's belief in God. Many 
varieties of theism also maintain that God is personal and 
is actively concerned for the welfare of his creatures.
Thus, the existence of putative revelations from God tend to 
support the other elements of the theistic scheme. Add to 
these considerations the fact that those individuals recog­
nized by the religious community as being specially informed 
by the spirit of God exhibit rare qualities of courage, mor­
al fortitude, and charity, and the case for theism becomes 
even stronger.
The critic will be quick to point out that each of 
the arguments in the theistic scheme is subject to serious 
criticism. It may be argued, for example, that a call for 
explanation is legitimate only within the universe and that 
therefore there is no need to explain the universe itself. 
Thus, neither the cosmological nor the design argument can 
be successful explanations of the universe. Or again, the 
concept of a necessary being as employed in the ontological
argument has been called incoherent by some philosophers.
The critic could also raise the standard criticisms of the 
arguments from religious experience or revelation. In 
short, none of the elements of the theistic scheme is immune 
from attack. But such criticisms are not to the point.
What is at issue is whether the various pieces of evidence 
used to defend theism buttress each other so as to form a 
stronger case for theism than any one of them could provide 
in isolation from the others. The theist can agree with the 
critic that none of the arguments for the existence of God, 
when taken individually, justify theism. But he may still 
insist that, when taken collectively, a firm foundation for 
theism can be established.
Many are the attacks on theism which presuppose that 
it must be justified by arguments taken singly or not at all. 
For example, far too much weight has been given to Hume's 
criticism of the traditional design argument that it does 
not warrant the inference to an almighty, infinite and wise 
creator.^ Hume's criticism is correct. But if the design 
argument were to prove, or make probable the existence of 
some sort of intelligence behind the universe, the case for 
theism would have been strengthened. Even Hume concedes 
this much. The fact that the design argument does not prove 
that the designer has all the characteristics of God, as
^David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 
Norman Kemp Smith, edl (Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, 1947) .
traditionally conceived, is not a good reason for supposing 
that the argument cannot be useful to the theist in provid­
ing justification for his position. The same is true, 
mutatis mutandis, of the other theistic arguments.
In offering a cumulative case, the theist is not 
claiming to have dealt a fatal blow to his opponent. The 
theist can consistently acknowledge that there are pieces of 
evidence that tend to count against his position. Mitchell, 
for example, believes that the existence of apparently use­
less suffering counts against the existence of a loving God. 
But he does not believe that the problem of evil constitutes 
a conclusive refutation of theism.
. . . the theologian does recognize the fact of pain as
counting against Christian doctrine. But it is true 
that he will not allowit--or anything--to count deci­
sively against it. . .^
Although the theist may admit that evil is a problem for his 
position, he will insist that, when all else is considered, 
theism makes more sense of the evidence than any of the 
available alternatives. Mitchell notes that the theist is 
not in a unique position. The purely naturalistic metaphy­
sic adopted by the atheist is also subject to probing crit­
icism.
The atheist, too, is able to appreciate that, for in­
stance, conspicuous sanctity is a phenomenon which tells
From the University Discussion on Theology and Fal­
sification, in Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds.. New 
Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York: Macmillan,
1955), p. T031
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against his position, just as the existence of appar­
ently gratuitous suffering argues for it."
In this same spirit, Hartshorne has long pointed to what he 
sees as serious deficiencies in any purely naturalistic 
world-view.^ Neither theist nor atheist is in a privileged 
position with respect to the evidence. Neither position is 
so firmly established that counter-argument is unavailing.
The problem of evil and the problem of sanctity are merely 
examples to make a more general point: Whatever position
one takes, and no matter how reasonable the person believes 
it to be, there will invariably be counter arguments, recal­
citrant facts, and loose ends that do not fall neatly into 
place.
Recognizing that all world-views have their problems,
Hartshorne has suggested that the principle of least paradox
be adopted as a rule for evaluating competing world-views.
According to this principle,
. . . no position can be argued for merely on the ground 
that other positions present paradoxes. One must decide 
which paradoxes are the really fatal ones, in comparison 
with those of contending positions. (C^ 88).
The principle of least paradox can probably not be spelled 
out in more definite terms. Exactly how many problems a 
world-view can have before becoming implausible, unreason­
able, or indefensible is partly a subjective matter. This
45.
7
^Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief,
See, for example, BH.
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is not surprising in light of how complex metaphysical prob­
lems can be. Nevertheless, the value of the principle of 
least paradox is that it serves as a reminder that one's 
position need not be invulnerable to be defensible. As long 
as there is good reason to believe that, on balance, the 
problems of the opponent's arguments outweigh the problems 
in one's own, there is a justification for not surrendering.
An important consideration, raised by Mitchell, is 
that the alternatives to the theistic scheme must have some 
plausibility to be considered as genuine alternatives.® For 
example, it is no criticism of the argument from religious 
experience that there are, besides the theistic explanation, 
other possible explanations of religious experience. These 
other alleged explanations must be weighed in the balance 
with the theistic explanation to see which better accounts 
for the phenomena. We would consider it at best a bad joke 
if someone were to criticize modern theories of disease on 
the grounds that it is possible that diseases are caused by 
evil spirits in the blood. Such an explanation, while pos­
sible, is so completely out of tune with the rest of our 
knowledge and theories about the world that it carries no 
weight as an explanation. Similarly, it is not sufficient 
to say that alternatives to theistic explanation are possi­
ble. Most theists will concede this point but insist that
Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief, 
pp. 41-42.
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the theistic scheme best accounts for the phenomena under 
consideration.
The analogy between theories of disease and reli­
gious hypotheses suggests that theism must be an empirical 
issue. But some theists believe the issue is not empirical. 
According to Popper, a statement is empirical if it is fal- 
sifiable by some conceivable experience. Theists differ, 
however, about whether the existence of God is an empirical 
question. For example, Hartshorne says.
The bare question of the divine existence is purely non- 
empirical. Hence empirical existential proofs in nat­
ural theology are bound to be fallacious. (OT 52).
He goes on to say that "All the arguments are just as truly 
a priori as the ontological." S3). In his treatment of
the idea of a cumulative case, Mitchell is not sufficiently 
careful to distinguish empirical from nonempirical approaches 
to the theistic question. Care must be taken, however, not 
to exclude those who would elevate the existence of God be­
yond the status of an empirical question. There are non­
empirical as well as empirical cumulative cases.
The difference between an empirical and a nonempir­
ical or a priori cumulative case is a difference in the mo­
dality of the conclusion they seek to establish. Most the­
ists would agree that, if God exists, his existence is nec­
essary. But there is profound disagreement about how to 
interpret the concept of necessary existence. A minimal 
characterization of a necessary being is a being who was not
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brought into existence and who cannot be deprived of exis­
tence. Such a being would exist eternally, "from everlast­
ing to everlasting." This concept of necessity is called 
ontological necessity. The disagreement among theists (and 
atheists for that matter), is whether an ontologically nec­
essary or eternal being could conceivably fail to exist.
Just as some philosophers have believed that the world is 
eternal but might have failed to exist, so some theists be­
lieve that God is a necessary being, but it is conceivable 
that he might not exist. The existence of such a God would 
be ontologically necessary, but logically contingent. Some 
philosophers, however, claim that an ontologically necessary 
being must also be logically necessary. V/e are not concerned 
here to argue for either position (that comes later, in chap­
ter IV); we are only making a map of the various alternatives. 
Put simply, God's existence is either logically necessary or 
logically contingent. A God whose nonexistence is conceivable 
is logically contingent (although the theist will claim God 
is ontologically necessary). A God whose nonexistence is in­
conceivable is logically necessary.
How one views the logical modality of God's existence 
determines the kind of cumulative case one can give. If 
God's existence is believed to be logically contingent then 
the cumulative case is called empirical. If God's existence 
is believed to be logically necessary then the cumulative 
case is nonempirical, or a priori. Normally, an a priori
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cumulative case will make no appeal to contingent truths.
The premises of the arguments in an a priori cumulative case 
are usually necessary truths. There is no contradiction, 
however, in arguing from a contingent premise to a necessary 
conclusion. One might believe that God's existence is logi­
cally necessary and use an argument from authority to sup­
port the belief. To my knowledge, no philosopher who uses 
an a priori cumulative case uses an argument from authority. 
But there is no contradiction in the idea. Neither is there 
a contradiction in the idea of using a few necessary truths 
in an empirical cumulative case. Of course, not all of the 
premises of an empirical cumulative case can be necessary 
truths; for, from necessary truths only necessary truths can 
follow. Since an empirical cumulative case attempts to es­
tablish a logically contingent conclusion, some of the prem­
ises must be logically contingent.
Inevitably, a distinction, such as that between em­
pirical and a priori cumulative cases, reveals the biases of 
the one making the distinction. 1 happen to believe that 
all logically contingent propositions are falsifiable by 
some conceivable experience (whether divine or nondivine), 
and are thus empirical in the Popperian sense. Needless to 
say, some would argue that God's existence is a necessary 
condition of there being any world (and thus any experience), 
but that God might have failed to exist. According to this 
view, even though God's existence is logically contingent.
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no experience could falsify the proposition that God exists. 
Anyone holding this view will probably be uncomfortable with 
the idea of calling their cumulative case empirical, since, 
for them, the conclusion is not an empirical statement. 
Perhaps "quasi-empirical" or "quasi-a priori" would be bet­
ter. Although I will continue to speak only of empirical 
and a priori cumulative cases, this is in no way meant to 
prejudge the theistic issue. Chapter IV contains an argu­
ment for equating logical contingency and empiricality. Un­
til then, no more should be read into the idea of an empir­
ical cumulative case than that it must have a logically con­
tingent proposition as a conclusion.
Historically, few philosophers have self-consciously 
argued for God's existence using a cumulative case. While 
it is true that many have offered more than one argument for 
God's existence, few have been aware of the cumulative nature 
of their arguments. Two outstanding exceptions to this gen­
eral trend are Duns Scotus and F. R. Tennant.® Duns' argu­
ment is perhaps the most sustained effort by any medieval 
thinker to establish the existence of God. The Scotistic 
argument employs variations of the ontological, cosmological 
and teleological arguments. A good case can be made that 
Duns considered his own argument to be a priori. According
9John Duns Scotus, A Treatise on God as First Prin­
ciple , Allan B. Wolter, Transi (Chicago : Forum Books, 1966),
and F . R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, vol. II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1930).
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to Copleston,
What Scotus maintains is that all factual propositions 
relating to finite things are contingent. If true they 
are contingently true. If therefore these contingently 
true propositions are used as a basis for proving the 
existence of God, the conclusion will itself be contin­
gently true. He prefers to argue from the possibility 
of the existence of things. In other words, he tries 
to show, by means of a complex and lengthy argument, 
that the existence of God is the ultimate and necessary 
condition of the possibility of there being any finite 
thing at all. He assumes of course that while the exis­
tence of finite things is not necessary, the possibility 
of their existing is.l"
In refusing to argue from the existence of finite beings Duns 
seems to want to establish the existence of God on nonempiri­
cal grounds. Yet, even if this be denied, it is clear from 
the structure of his argument that Duns considered it to be 
a cumulative case. In separate arguments. Duns attempts to 
prove the existence of a being first in the order of effi­
cient causes, a being first in the order of final causes, 
and a being first in the order of perfection. According to 
Scotus, all of these first causes are necessary beings. He 
then offers a proof that there can be only one necessary 
existent. Finally, Duns claims that this necessary being, 
first in the orders of perfection, and final and efficient 
causation is also infinite. Duns felt that none of his argu­
ments, taken individually, was sufficient to prove the exis­
tence of God. For example, a being which is merely a first 
efficient cause is not God. Furthermore, without the proof
^^Frederick Copleston, On the History of Philosophy 
(New York: Barnes § Noble, 1979), p. 88.
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that only one necessary being can exist. Duns would have 
succeeded in proving polytheism. Thus, the various argu­
ments require each other; they constitute a cumulative case.
If the Scotistic argument is an example of an a 
priori cumulative case, F. R. Tennant's work represents an 
empirical cumulative case. In the second volume of his 
Philosophical Theology, Tennant uses epistemological, teleo- 
logical, aesthetic, and moral arguments to show that it is 
more probable than not that God exists. Tennant even refers 
to his argument as a "cumulative theistic a r g u m e n t . U n ­
like Scotus, Tennant is concerned that his argument be em­
pirical. "The attributes to be ascribed to God will be such
as empirical facts and their sufficient explanation indicate 
1 ?or require.” “ Although their approaches differ, Tennant 
and Scotus agree that theism is to be established by a se­
ries of interconnected arguments-- in short, a cumulative 
case.
The outstanding contemporary examples of cumulative 
cases are those of Swinburne and Hartshorne. Swinburne em­
ploys his own versions of the cosmological, design, and moral 
arguments along with arguments from history, miracles, con­
sciousness, and religious experience. Since Swinburne
^^Tennant, Philosophical Theology, p. ix. 
l^lbid., p. 78.
^^Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979).
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rejects the idea of an a priori argument for theism, it is
clear that he takes his own arguments to be empirical.
Hartshorne's 'global argument', on the other hand, is clearly 
a nonempirical cumulative case. Hartshorne repudiates all 
empirical arguments for the existence of God (OT 67).
Hartshorne's global argument consists of six proofs, includ­
ing his famous ontological proof. The cosmological, design, 
aesthetic, moral and epistemic arguments are all transformed 
into a priori form to complete Hartshorne's cumulative case.
If few theists have considered the possibility of a
cumulative case, it is also true that few nontheists have
argued against the possibility. Flew, MacIntyre and Scriven
are the exceptions to this t r e n d . T h e i r  basic objection
to the idea of a cumulative case is that several arguments,
none of which are valid, cannot possibly add up to a valid
argument. MacIntyre says,
. . . the invalidity of the arguments is such as to pre­
clude the believer from drawing even a limited encourage­
ment from them. One occasionally hears teachers of the­
ology aver that although the proofs do not provide con­
clusive grounds for belief in God, they are at least 
pointers, indicators. But a fallacious argument points 
nowhere (except to the lack of logical acumen on the 
part of those who accept it). And three fallacious ar­
guments are no better than one.^°
^^Ibid., p. 10.
^^Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London: Hutchinson,
1966); Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1966); Alasdair MacIntyre, Difficulties in Christian 
Belief (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959) .
^^Maclntyre, Difficulties in Christian Belief, p. 63.
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Flew makes the same point and labels the putative fallacy
the ten-leaky-buckets-tactic. "If one leaky bucket will not
hold water that is no reason to think that ten c a n . F l e w ' s
analogy has unfortunate consequences for his own position.
Jonathan Barnes has noted that one could carry water in more
than one leaky bucket provided their holes do not coincide.
Swinburne makes the same point more rigorously:
An argument from p to r may be invalid; another argument 
from q to r may be invalid. But if you run the arguments 
together, you could well get a valid deductive argument; 
the argument from p and q to r may be valid. The argu­
ment from 'all students have long hair' to 'Smith has 
long hair' is invalid, and so is the argument from 'Smith 
is a student' to 'Smith has long hair'; but the argument 
from 'all students have long hair and Smith is a student' 
to 'Smith has long hair' is valid.
Swinburne goes on to point out that inductive arguments can
also be cumulative in nature, as any court of law will
show."^ Flew, however, recognizes this fact but insists
there is a distinction between
. . . the valid principle of the accumulation of evi­
dence, where every item has at least some weight in its 
own right; and the Ten-leaky-buckets-Tactic, applied to 
arguments none of which hold water at all.21
What Flew has in mind is perhaps best illustrated by an ex­
ample created by Scriven.
^^Flew, God and Philosophy, p. 62.
^^Mitchsll, The Justification of Religious Belief,
p. 160.
19Swinburne, The Existence of God, p. 13.
ZOlbid.
^^Flew, God and Philosophy, p. 141.
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For something to be evidence for an explanation, it is 
essential not only that the explanation explain the evi­
dence but that there not be an entirely satisfactory al­
ternative explanation. The fact that North was in Dallas 
at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was shot is not evidence, 
even weak evidence, that he did it, since it is perfectly 
clear that Jack Ruby did it.22
Scriven is saying that if there is a perfectly satisfactory 
explanation of some phenomenon, evidence for alternative ex­
planations is irrelevant since we know that the alternative 
explanations are false. Since we know that Ruby shot 
Oswald, there can be no evidence that North is the guilty 
party. Scriven's point is valid as far as the shooting of 
Oswald is concerned, but is dubious (at best] when applied 
to the case for theism. The evidence that Ruby shot Oswald 
is beyond reasonable doubt. One could hardly say the same 
concerning the existence of God without begging the question. 
If we knew that God does not exist then there could be no 
good evidence that he does exist. But the nonexistence of 
God is hardly as well established as the fact that Ruby shot 
Oswald. Theists and their opponents are deeply divided 
about what is the completely satisfactory explanation of the 
world. As long as reasonable disagreement remains, the case 
that God exists and the case that North shot Oswald are sim­
ply not analogous. A more appropriate analogy is with the 
shooting of John F. Kennedy. Reasonable people differ as to 
how many assassins were involved in Kennedy's death. Since 
it is not clear how many assassins were involved, there is
2 2Scriven, Primary Philosophy, p. 153.
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room for competing explanations. Similarly, there is room 
for rival explanations of the world. Either God is behind 
things or he is not. As in the case with Kennedy's assassi­
nation, it is not clear which explanation is correct.
Scriven and Flew, of course, have examined many of the main 
arguments for theism and found them unconvincing. Neverthe­
less, there are many strong arguments they do not consider 
(some of the arguments examined in this dissertation are ex­
amples). More important, however, is the fact that for 
every Scriven or Flew there is a Swinburne or Hartshorne who 
has come to the opposite conclusion. Reasonable people may 
differ. The ten-leaky-buckets objection is, at best, a non 
sequitur when applied to an issue which, like the existence 
of God, has no agreed upon solution. The impossibility of a 
cumulative case for theism, like the impossibility of alter­
native explanations of Kennedy's assassination, will become 
apparent only if theism is conclusively refuted.
There are two final objections to the idea of a cu­
mulative case to be considered. Both concern what 1 have 
called an a priori cumulative case. The first focuses upon 
the nature of deductive arguments and is suggested by 
MacIntyre.
A deductive argument is one in which the conclusion fol­
lows from the premises simply because it is already con­
tained in the premises. . . . But now there appears to 
be something curious about the project of proving the 
existence of God to the sceptic or atheist. For if we 
have a valid deductive argument in which the existence 
of God is affirmed in the conclusion, then that same
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existence must also be affirmed in the premises. And 
anyone who rejects the conclusion will certainly reject 
some at least of the premises.^3
There is some ambiguity about what is meant by saying that 
the conclusion of a valid deductive argument is contained 
already in the premises (can there be no such thing as syn­
thetic a priori propositions?). But it is not essential to 
MacIntyre's point to delve into this problem. What MacIntyre 
is reminding us is that anyone who finds the conclusion of a 
deductive argument that God exists questionable is also 
likely to find questionable one or more of the premises used 
to infer the conclusion. Since an a priori cumulative case 
would most likely be composed solely of deductive arguments, 
JIacIntyre’s objection is important.
If one views the purpose of a proof as a means of
intellectually coercing one's opponent into submission, then
MacIntyre has raised a formidable barrier to one's project.
But there are a variety of ways of understanding proofs for
God's existence. Hartshorne agrees with MacIntyre's point
but goes on to say:
But though it is unrealistic to hope that all doubts 
concerning theism can be removed by deductive argument, 
it may be quite as unrealistic to suppose that no doubts 
can be removed. (NT 30)
2 3MacIntyre, Difficulties in Christian Belief, pp. 
78-79. Dr. Ken Merrill has pointé? out to me that very of­
ten, the conclusion of a deductive argument is not contained 
in any one of the premises but is contained in the premises 
distributively. Thus, a person may be inclined to reject 
the conclusion of an argument but not be inclined to reject 
any of the premises.
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A proof of God's existence may be an important aid in under­
standing the logic of theism. Hartshorne notes that the 
theistic proofs may serve as a way of focusing a metaphysical 
system (NÏVG 252). The interconnections among fundamental 
ideas may thus become clearer.
It may be a good deal easier to see a truth if its logi­
cal connections with various propositions, initially not 
known to be connected with it, are made clear. (OT 31).
Furthermore, as Hartshorne notes, a deductive argument estab­
lishes "a price for rejecting its conclusion." (OT 30). To 
reject the conclusion of a valid deductive argument it is 
necessary to reject at least one of the premises. For any
single theistic argument, the price paid for rejecting the 
conclusion may not be too high. Where a cumulative case is 
concerned, however, there are many premises which must be 
rejected to maintain the nontheistic position. The nontheist 
may, on examination of the arguments, judge the price of 
holding his ground too dear to pay. The same thing, in re­
verse, could happen to the theist. The point, however, is 
that deductive arguments, especially as elements of a cumu­
lative case, need not be considered superfluous to the de­
fense of theism.
Another objection to the idea of a nonempirical cu­
mulative case runs as follows: It is clear how, in empiri­
cal matters, an accumulation of evidence may be necessary 
to settle an issue. But if the existence of God is a non­
empirical question, why should more than one argument be
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necessary? Would not one a priori argument suffice to set­
tle the issue?^^
This argument can be read two ways. On the first 
interpretation, the question is why more than one argument 
for God's existence should be necessary if it is either 
self-evident that God does or does not exist. This, how­
ever, involves a confusion between necessity and self­
evidence. As Plantinga notes, ". . . not all necessary
2 5propositions are self-evident." Goldbach's Conjecture and 
Fermat's Last Theorem are either necessarily true or neces­
sarily false but neither is self-evidently true or false.
As noted above, offering a variety of proofs may serve to 
bring a metaphysical system into sharper focus, thereby fa­
cilitating a surer evaluation.
On the second reading, the argument questions the 
necessity of more than one argument in nonempirical ques­
tions. It is sufficient to point out that nonempirical 
questions often require more than one argument. It is not 
uncommon for a mathematical proof to involve many subproofs. 
Furthermore, the more complex the problem, the more likely a 
series of arguments will be needed to settle the issue. The 
metaphysical question of God's existence has shown itself to 
be as complicated as any mathematical or philosophical
^^This argument was suggested to me by Ben Gary
Nowlin.
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 5.
25
problem is likely to be. It is therefore natural to expect 
that something like a cumulative case is most appropriate 
for confronting the issue.
Most philosophers would agree with William James
when he says that
[T]he arguments for God's existence have stood for hun­
dreds of years with the waves of unbelieving criticism 
breaking against them, never totally discrediting them 
in the ears of the faithful, but on the whole slowly 
and surely washing out the mortar from between theirjoints.26
The waves of unbelieving criticism of which James speaks 
have, for the most part, washed only against islands of the­
istic belief--that is to say, individual arguments for God's 
existence. But there remain vast and unexplored continents 
that hold a good deal of promise for the justification of 
theism. A few theists have seen their way to use the re­
sources of a cumulative case. So far, critics have failed 
to discredit their enterprise. What remains is the diffi­
cult task of examining the complexities of individual at­
tempts to construct a cumulative case--untangling premises 
from conclusions, assessing the validity of inferences, and 
probing the depths of argument for suggestions to further 
inquiry. Let us, then, turn to Hartshorne's a priori cumu­
lative case, the global argument.
^^William James, The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence (New York: Modern Library, 1929], p. 427.
CHAPTER II
THE GLOBAL ARGUMENT; PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
For a proper understanding of Hartshorne's global 
argument three preliminaries are necessary, (1) to trace the 
history of the global argument in Hartshorne's writings, (2) 
to see the form in which the argument is presented, and, (3)
to understand Hartshorne's form of theism. The next chapter 
will cover the third point, that is, neoclassical theism.
The purpose of this chapter is to cover points (1) and (2). 
We begin by sketching the history of the global argument. 
Discussion then turns to the form in which Hartshorne pre­
sents the argument. Two factors emerge as important, (a) 
the division of the global argument between theoretical and 
normative proofs, and (b) the relations between the various 
elements of the global argument; or more specifically, how 
or in what sense the proofs are said to support one another.
Hartshorne wrote his dissertation at Harvard in 
1923. The dissertation is, arguably, the first presentation 
of the global argument. As William Sessions says, "In an
important sense, the whole dissertation is a single ramified
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argument for God's existence. Eight arguments are employed 
to demonstrate what Hartshorne refers to variously as Teleo- 
logical Monism or Personalistic Monism. The position is 
monistic in the sense that there is "one ultimate and uncom- 
ponded Principle or R e a l i t y . T h e  position is teleological 
or personalistic in the sense that the relation of the many 
to the one is that of valued to valuer.^
It is not clear that Teleological Monism is identi­
cal to neoclassical theism. Sessions argues that the dis­
sertation has no clear concept of a di-polar God.^ There is 
some truth to what Sessions says. But we must insist that, 
however inadequately expressed, Hartshorne's intentions 
point clearly in the direction of neoclassical theism. The 
dissertation's answer to the problem of evil substantiates 
this claim. Evil is said to be the inevitable result of 
there being a multiplicity of decision makers. The idea of 
a power with absolute control over all other individuals is 
said to be contradictory (OD 251). The consequence of this 
view is that not everything that happens in the world is for 
the best (OD 252). Hartshorne's theodicy has not changed to
William Lad Sessions, "Hartshorne's Early Philos­
ophy," in Two Process Philosophers, Hartshorne's Encounter 
with Whitehead, Lewis Si Ford, ed. (Tallahassee, Florida : 
American Academy of Religion, 1973), p. 29.
2O D , page 1 of the digest of the dissertation. 
^Ibid.
^Sessions, "Hartshorne ' s Early Philosophy, p. 29.
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the present day. But this theodicy is available only to 
someone who adopts a position which, if not identical to, is 
very similar to neoclassical theism. Closely related to 
these considerations is the fact that Hartshorne rejected 
the idea of the actualization of all possible goods. "We do 
not argue for a perfect amount of good--but for a perfect 
quality of goodness or power." (OD 279-280). This echoes 
the notion of a changing God in his later work. If not ex­
plicitly neoclassical, the dissertation was at least headed 
in that direction.
The dissertation's eight arguments for Teleological 
Monism are taken from the categories of Being, Individuality, 
Quality, Relation, Space and Time, Knowledge, Value, and Per­
fection (OD 83). Only the arguments from knowledge and per­
fection survive in anything like their present form in the 
global argument of Creative Synthesis. The argument from 
the category of knowledge is an early statement of the epi­
stemic argument while the argument from the category of per­
fection is Hartshorne's earliest version of the ontological 
argument. Although Hartshorne's later philosophy contains 
an argument from the concept of Being (the cosmological 
proof), it is different from the argument from the category 
of Being in the dissertation. As Sessions notes, the dis­
sertation's argument from Being is found nowhere in 
Hartshorne's later writings.  ̂ Elements of the other argu-
^Ibid., p. 31.
29
merits are found scattered throughout Hartshorne's work. But 
none of these arguments--from Individuality, Quality, Rela­
tion, Space and Time, or Value--constitute part of the glob­
al argument of Creative Synthesis. For this reason it may 
seem strange to call the dissertation an early version of 
the global argument. The identification is, however, justi­
fied if we remember that there is a certain arbitrariness 
about which proofs are to compose the one global argument.
There are as many arguments for God as there are concep­
tions of absolute generality. . . . Since these concep­
tions are more or less arbitrarily divisible into aspects 
or nuances, there is no one final list of arguments.
(MVG 251).
h'e conclude that the dissertation is best viewed as an early 
version of the global argument.
Man's Vision of God (1941) contains a discussion of 
the idea of employing a multiplicity of arguments for God's 
existence but does not explicitly carry out the task (MVG 
251-252). The ontological argument and a version of the 
cosmological argument are, however, treated at length. The 
term "global argument" is first used in A Natural Theology 
for Our Time (1967). In this work, the global argument is 
"an argument from the rational necessity of religious expe­
rience and of God as its adequate referent." ( ^  45). Al ­
though treated separately, the global argument is said to 
"sum up" the other theistic proofs (OT 45). The only other 
proofs discussed at any length in Natural Theology are the 
ontological, design and moral arguments.
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The form finally taken by the global argument in 
Creative Synthesis (1970) is first suggested in Philosophers 
Speak of God (1953). In the 1953 work it is suggested that 
arguments for God's existence be divided into three, cor­
responding to ethics, aesthetics and epistemology, and three 
corresponding to the traditional triad of proofs, the onto­
logical, design, and cosmological (PSG 24-25). These are 
precisely the arguments of Creative Synthesis■ This brings 
us to our next topic of discussion, the form of the global 
argument.
The global argument is composed of six arguments. 
Rather than presenting each argument as a set or premises 
leading to the theistic conclusion, Hartshorne prefers to 
list each argument as a series of alternatives, the last of 
which is neoclassical theism. In chapter VI (on the design 
argument) I have transposed Hartshorne's argument to illus­
trate how it looks in more traditional form. The advantage 
of presenting the arguments as a series of alternatives is 
that it highlights the options among which one must choose 
in order to reject neoclassical theism. Hartshorne's mode 
of presentation is a much needed reminder that atheism is 
not, as some have supposed, without ontological implications. 
One pays a price for rejecting theism. Needless to say, with 
each argument, Hartshorne finds the price too high to pay. 
This is not to say that he thinks neoclassical theism is 
without its problems. He simply finds more problems
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(paradoxes, contradictions, etc.) in other positions than 
in the neoclassical alternative.
It should be noted that in each of the arguments, it 
is the neoclassical variety of theism which is the desired 
conclusion (CS 296). This is an important point insofar as 
it absolves Hartshorne of the charge of begging the question 
against other forms of theism. In the cosmological argument, 
for example, the second alternative, which says that every­
thing that exists is contingent, is compatible with many 
forms of theism. As noted in the previous chapter, many 
theists believe that God's existence is logically contingent. 
Hartshorne disagrees. But this is just to say that not all 
of Hartshorne's philosophical opponents are atheists. Some 
forms of theism share assumptions with atheism. It is these 
assumptions which Hartshorne argues are mistaken.
We have already noted that the proofs in the global 
argument, are divided into two groups, the theoretical and 
the normative. Theoretical arguments are well entrenched in 
the collective consciousness of philosophers. That is to 
say, even if one denies that any of the theistic arguments 
work, one is still likely to have no serious difficulty with 
the idea that, God's existence could be proved by reason, 
the proof would look something like one of the traditional 
arguments, namely, the ontological, cosmological or design.
Philosophers are more suspicious of normative argu­
ments, that is, arguments which attempt to demonstrate or
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make probable an existential assertion from normative or 
valuational considerations. Even Kant, who gave so much 
importance to practical reason, denied the possibility of 
proving the divine existence from the requirements of ra­
tional action. For Kant, God's existence is merely a pos­
tulate of practical reason. The Kantian position is not 
without its plausibility. Should one not guard against 
the temptation to make valuation claims the foundations of 
one's ontology? Hume warned against deriving an ought from 
an is. Is it not equally illegitimate to go from ought 
is?
Hartshorne defends the idea of a normative argument 
by distinguishing those considerations of value linked only 
to contingencies, and those linked to necessities. There 
is no logical bridge between "X is something good" and "X 
exists" where X is something which is contingent and there­
fore might have failed to be. If this were not true, no 
one would ever go hungry. But if X is something that could 
not fail to be, the situation is different. One must, dis­
tinguish the merely useful, or what is good for some pur­
poses only, from the indispensable, or what is required for 
the fulfillment of any purpose whatever.
It is idle to complain of wishful thinking if the idea 
is required for any wish fulfillment whatever. It is 
wishful to think that one can ride because one would 
like a horse, but this is relevant only because there 
are other wishes which can be satisfied without a horse. 
For the sake of these other wishes one acknowledges the 
facts. But honestly facing facts cannot have value if
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there is no value. And the theistic question is how , 
there can be any value, any meaning, any significance.
Tillich was fond of denying that God is one being among 
others. Hartshorne would approve of this but add that God 
is not one good among other goods. The point is that, ac­
cording to the theist, if God does not exist, then there is 
nothing which could take his place. There would be a "hole" 
in reality which no finite good could fill. Thus, if there 
is, in human life, a need for God, then either God exists or 
philosophy must abandon any hope of making sense of the uni­
verse. Barring a retreat into irrationalism, the task of 
the critic is not to try to show how the absence of God's 
goodness might be compensated by other values; rather, it 
is to show that nondivine values are all that reasonably 
could be required for human life.
We come now to the second question concerning the 
form of the global argument. If the global argument is to 
be a cumulative case, then the various arguments must some­
how form a network in which each argument supports and is 
supported by other arguments. This is not to say that the 
arguments cannot function independently of one another.
But, when combined into the one global argument, they are 
said to make a more persuasive case for neoclassical theism.
In the dissertation, the arguments are characterized
^Charles Hartshorne, "James's Empirical Pragmatism,"
American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, 1, 1 (Jan.
1980), p. 17.
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as "independent yet cumulative." (OD 87). The arguments 
are independent in the sense that each is, according to 
Hartshorne, sufficient to reach the position he calls Teleo­
logical Monism (OD 88). But the arguments are also, in an 
important sense, cumulative.
In the series of categories which follows [i.e., the 
arguments] the order is in general intended to be such 
that each category should render more explicit than the 
previous ones, its own ultimate character as an aspect 
of Being, hence also should throw the nature of the lat­
ter into clearer light and aid in the interpretation of 
the previous categories as in their own way likewise 
functions of the One. (OD 83).
The first category discussed in the dissertation is the
highly abstract concept of Being. With each argument this
abstract outline is filled in by the more concrete "details"
provided by the other categories. As Hartshorne says,
. . . There is a cumulative development in that each 
[argument] shows itself capable of incorporating the 
preceding as a more abstract or relatively blind expres­
sion of the same truth, and in that the conclusion in 
each case directly necessitated tends to become, as al­
ready indicated, more and more concrete--or, on the ad­
vocated view of concreteness more and more explicitly 
and richly ini terms of value. (OD 88) .
Thus, through the progression of arguments there is a pro­
gression from the abstract to the concrete.
Hartshorne's later statements on the interrelations 
of the arguments modify, if not completely overhaul, the 
ideas of the dissertation. How far Hartshorne has changed 
his mind depends on how the concepts of abstractness and 
concreteness are understood as they are used in the disser­
tation. If abstractness and concreteness are understood in
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the sense which Hartshorne finally came to give these terms, 
then there can be no movement from the abstract to the con­
crete in a series of metaphysical arguments. None of the 
arguments of Creative Synthesis claim to prove anything but 
something highly abstract. Hartshorne distinguishes between 
God's existence and his actuality. The fact, if it is a 
fact, that God exists, tells nothing about the way in which 
the existence is actualized. Just as I may exist whether as 
reading a book or as listening to a symphony, so God exists 
no matter what concrete details we may specify (the differ­
ence being that my existence, unlike God's is subject to 
death]. The distinction between existence and actuality is 
explained more fully in the next chapter. Suffice it to say 
that in Hartshorne's post-dissertation philosophy, existence 
is abstract while actuality is concrete. But the only thing 
that any of the elements of the global argument can prove is 
God's existence, and this is the abstract aspect of God.^
Rather than read a total shift in Hartshorne's posi­
tion, I prefer to interpret the statements of the disserta­
tion as saying not that the arguments become progressively 
more concrete in the sense Hartshorne later gives this term, 
but that the progression of arguments makes more and more 
explicit the implications of theism. As already noted.
nFor a more extensive discussion of the concepts of 
abstractness and concreteness in Hartshorne's dissertation 
see Sessions's "Hartshorne's Early Philosophy," pp. 30-31.
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Hartshorne believes that "each category should render more 
explicit than the previous ones, its own ultimate character 
as an aspect of Being . . ." (OD 83), [emphasis mine].
This interpretation fits best with what Hartshorne says eigh­
teen years later in Man's Vision of God.
The only value of a multiplicity of arguments is that it 
diminishes the probability that we have overlooked fal­
lacies in the reasoning, somewhat as preforming a mathe­
matical operation by several methods helps to insure 
that no blunder has been committed . . . (MVG 252).
It may be that, at the time of the dissertation, Hartshorne 
believed not only that his arguments made the implications 
of theism more explicit but that they were also able to ren­
der more and more concrete conclusions. If he actually held 
the latter view, it is a position he has since abandoned.
But he has not backed away from the idea that a variety of 
arguments can serve to make the implications of theism more 
explicit.
Hartshorne's view has also expanded in his acknowl­
edgement that each of the proofs has its weak points. The 
arguments may, then, serve to buttress each other at their 
weakest points. For example, Hartshorne believes that the 
weakest premise of the ontological argument is that it is 
possible that God exists. The other arguments attempt to 
show that the concept of God is implied in such fundamental 
notions as cosmic order, knowledge and beauty. If these 
ideas are indispensible for a proper understanding of the 
world and if they imply the concept of God, then it is
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possible that God exists. The ontological proof supports 
the others by emphasizing their a priori nature. This is a 
topic to be discussed more extensively in chapter IV.
Besides the relation between the ontological argu­
ment and the other proofs, there are others which Hartshorne 
does not mention. Throughout the course of our discussion 
I shall highlight these relations. One general comment, 
however, is in order. Since each of the proofs begins from 
a different categorial concept, each casts its own unique 
light on one of the divine attributes. As has been clear 
from the time of the dissertation, the ontological argument, 
in a manner, sums up the others by arguing from the concept 
of a perfect being. A perfect being is one lacking no per­
fection it could conceivably possess. The other arguments 
make these perfections explicit. The cosmological argument 
emphasizes God's necessary existence; the design argument 
emphasizes God's eminent power; the epistemic argument rea­
sons to an omniscient being; and the moral and aesthetic 
arguments, in their ways, shed light on God's goodness and 
beauty. Thus, each of the arguments contributes something 
to the case for theism.
The history and the form of the global argument 
should now be sufficiently clear that we can move on to a 
discussion of Hartshorne's brand of theism. We shall then 
be in a position to look at the elements of the global argu­
ment on an individual basis.
CHAPTER III 
NEOCLASSICAL THEISM
Some of Hartshorne's most important contributions to 
philosophical theology are in his discussions of the idea of 
God. For more traditional concepts of God, Hartshorne sub­
stitutes a dipolar God. Since the global argument is an at­
tempt to establish the existence of the dipolar God, it is 
important to know precisely what the dipolar God is. Our 
purpose here is not to argue for the coherence of Hartshorne's 
brand of theism (although some questions of coherence will 
arise). Indeed, a major function of the global argument is 
to deal with the coherence question. We wish only to indi­
cate what Hartshorne means by the term 'God'. Hartshorne 
refers to his metaphysics of God as "neoclassical." Part, 
at least, of the reason for this is that there is a conti­
nuity between classical and neoclassical concepts of God. 
Nevertheless, the deficiencies Hartshorne finds in tradi­
tional theisms dictates that the concept of God be revised.
The purpose of neoclassicism is to overcome the inadequacies 
and contradictions of classical theism while incorporating
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its insights. In this chapter we will indicate some of the 
main deficiencies Hartshorne finds in traditional concepts 
of deity and show how the dipolar concept of God is designed 
to overcome these problems.
There are almost as many concepts of God to be found 
in the history of philosophy as there are philosophers. 
Hartshorne has done much to clarify the logically possible 
varieties of theism.^ One concept of God, however, is dis­
tinguished by its popularity among some of the greatest phi­
losophers in the western world. This is what is called 
classical theism. Classical theism in various forms was 
espoused by such notable philosophers as Augustine, Anselm, 
Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Leibniz, Descartes, and Kant. There 
are, of course, important differences among these philoso­
phers. But there is a common core to their theisms which 
Hartshorne questions. In order to clarify and evaluate 
Hartshorne's criticisms, it is important to review some of 
the major guiding constructs of classical theism.
The heart of classical theism is the denial of po­
tentiality in the supreme being. God is actus purus, pure
act. Aquinas contends, ". . . God has no admixture of po-
2tency but is pure act." There are several reasons for this
^See especially, MVG, Chapter 1 and C^, Chapter Xlll,
7Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, 
Book One : God, a translation of Summa Contra Gentiles by
Anton C. Pegis (Garden City, New York : Image, 1955), p.
101, 16.5.
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view of God. The cosmological argument, at least as it is 
developed by Aquinas, relies on the principle that "the re­
duction of potentiality to act requires a principle which is 
itself act. . . From the fact that things in the world 
change, that is, proceed from potentiality to act, Aquinas 
reasons that there is at work a principle which is itself 
act. This is called God.
Another way to approach the doctrine of God as pure 
act is to consider the definition of God as the most perfect 
being. God, as the most perfect being, could lack no per­
fection. But, were there any potency in God there would be 
some perfection which he lacked. Thus, God must be a being 
without potency. It directly follows from the lack of po­
tency in God that God cannot change because change requires 
potency. God is therefore immutable. The concept of God's 
immutability also implies that God does not exist in time.
He is eternal. Furthermore, since in "every composite there 
must be act and potency"^ God must be absolutely simple, 
having no composition or parts. God is therefore immutable, 
eternal and simple.
Classical theism also involves the belief that God 
created the world ex nihilo, which is to say, that, in 
creating the world, he did not rely on any pre-existing
^Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 
2 Part II (Garden City, New York: Image, 1962), p. 51.
^Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, p. 103, 18.2.
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material (as does Plato's demiurge). God is also said to be 
omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. Omnipotence, or 
perfect power, is the ability to bring about any state of 
affairs, the description of which is not self-contradictory. 
Omniscience refers to God's knowledge which encompasses past, 
present and future. This classical interpretation of omni­
science follows from God's atemporality mentioned above.
God does not anticipate the future, rather, future singulars 
(and past ones) are eternally present to God's mind. God is 
also said to be good in the sense of being just and merciful. 
Not all classical theorists agree about how we come to know 
these various things about God. Duns Scotus, for example, 
denied the possibility of a philosophical knowledge of God's 
omnipotence.^ Kant went so far as to deny the possibility 
of any theoretical knowledge of God. Nevertheless, all 
agree on what they mean by the word 'God'. And this is what 
is important for our purposes.
Hartshorne's attack on classical theism employs both 
religious and philosophical objections. We are primarily 
concerned with theism as a philosophical problem. But a 
brief mention of the religious objections may help clarify 
Hartshorne's philosophical standpoint. One of the assump­
tions on which classical theism rests is that dependence is 
an imperfection. A God who, in any way, was dependent on 
something outside of himself, was thought to be less than
^Copleston, A History of Philosophy, p. 250.
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perfect. This is part of the reason for the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo■ God is, as it were, self-contained. 
Hartshorne questions this view. If we look to common expe­
rience for analogies there is, says Hartshorne, an admirable 
and an imperfect form of dependence. The person who is to­
tally unmoved by the suffering of others is considered some­
thing less than human. Those who are capable of sympathetic 
participation in the feelings of others, on the other hand, 
are more worthy of respect and admiration. Asks Hartshorne, 
suppose a man says,
I can be equally happy and serene and joyous regardless 
of how men and women suffer around me. Shall we admire 
this alleged independence? I think not. Why should we 
admire it when it is alleged of God? (DR 44].
Dependence is not always a defect. Therefore, Hartshorne 
believes in a God who is influenced by, and thus in a sense, 
dependent on the world. Furthermore, if God is, in some as­
pect dependent, then the idea of serving God makes sense.
If God were in no way dependent on the world then it seems 
there would be no sense in which we could serve God or add 
to his glory. The Jesuit motto, ad maj orum Dei glorium 
takes on added meaning for a dependent God.
The sense in which God is independent, according to
Hartshorne, is in his resolve always to do what is best.
There is an admirable independence, but it is indepen­
dence in basic ethical purpose, not in specific concrete 
experience and happiness. (DR 45).
When scripture teaches that God does not change it is not
speaking of immutability in the classical theist's sense.
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rather it has to do with God's promises to his people.®
Putting it simply, God does not go back on his word.
Hartshorne attempts to weave the positive notions of depen­
dence and independence into a coherent concept of God. For 
further clarification of this concept, let us consider some 
of the philosophical objections to classical theism.
According to Hartshorne, the exclusion of any change 
in God results in several paradoxes. One paradox has to do 
with God's omniscience. Since, in God, there is no poten­
tiality, God's knowledge of the world is eternal. Although 
the world changes, God's knowledge of the world does not 
change. But there is a problem with such an assertion. 
Hartshorne asks,
. . . how can what is not eternally actualized be eter­
nally known? The datum of knowledge is essential to 
that knowledge, and hence an eternally known datum, be­
ing integral to the eternal, must be as eternal as the 
knowledge of it. (CŜ  166).
The argument can be expressed in the form of a dilemma.
Perfect knowledge conforms perfectly to its object. Now, 
temporal events are either eternal or they are not. If they 
are eternal they are not really temporal events. On the 
other hand, if the events are not eternal then perfect knowl­
edge could not know them eternally.
One way to attempt to escape from the dilemma is to 
argue that the qualities of the thing known do not necessarily
Aquinas finds scriptural support for the doctrine 
of divine immutability in Malachi 3.6, James 1.17, and Num­
bers 23.19. See Summa Contra Gentiles, p. 97, 14.4.
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transfer to the knowledge. I may know something ugly with­
out my knowledge itself being ugly. Similarly, God may know 
temporal events without his knowledge itself being temporal. 
All that is necessary for God's eternal knowledge of events 
in time is that those events be eternally present as occur­
ring in time to God's mind. Much as all of the points on 
the circumference of a circle are equidistant from the cen­
ter, so God is equally present at each moment in time.^
This answer fails to meet the objection. The prob­
lem of the relation between omniscience (classically under­
stood) and time does not arise from assuming that the knowl­
edge of a thing necessarily has the qualities of the thing 
known. The argument attempts to establish that the knowl­
edge of temporal things must itself be temporal. This is 
not because knowledge of a thing and thing known necessarily 
have the same qualities. Rather, it is because one destroys 
the very nature of a temporal event by thinking it could be 
known eternally. If something is to be known from all eter­
nity, it must be present from all eternity. But temporal 
events are not present from all eternity--they are not eter­
nal. Thus, knowledge of them cannot be eternal. The analogy 
with the circle is also suspect. For future temporal events 
(some of the points of the circumference) are either actual 
or possible. If they are actual then they are not future.
^This is an analogy used by Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles, p. 219, 66.7.
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If they are possible then God must know them a£ possible. 
True, God must be considered as being fully present at each 
moment. Here classical theism is correct. But it may be 
that God is at future moments only as they cease to be fu­
ture, that is, as they become present.
Hartshorne's position is that God knows future con­
tingents only as possibilities. It is no objection to this 
view that God, having perfect knowledge, must know all times, 
past and future. Hartshorne denies that there are, or could 
be, any such things as future actualities. There are only 
future possibilities. Thus, it is no limit on God's knowl­
edge that he knows the future only as possible. Hartshorne 
asks,
Is it not the essence of the future that it consists of 
what may or may not exist, that is, of what is unsettled, 
indefinite, undecided? If so, then God, who knows all 
things as they are, will know future events only in their 
character as indefinite, or more or less problematic, 
nebulous, incomplete as to details. (RSP 158).
Hartshorne is here defending the same position as the six­
teenth century scholar Socinus (PSG 226).
The classical theist's justification for thinking 
God surveys all moments, past, present and future is that 
God is the supreme cause and the world is the effect. If as 
Aquinas says, "an effect can be preknown in its cause even 
before it exists"^ then God's knowledge of himself as cause 
entails God's knowledge of the world as effect. Thus, the
Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, p. 218, 66.6.
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notion of omniscience follows from the ideas of omniscience 
and God as creator.
Hartshorne is as quick to reject the classical con­
ception of omnipotence as he is to reject its notion of om­
niscience. In the first place, Hartshorne's metaphysics is 
indeterministic. Thus, the cause of a thing need be no more 
than a necessary condition--not a sufficient condition--for 
the occurrence of an effect.
. . .  to know a cause adequately is indeed to know its 
possible results. However, causes never imply any pre­
cise actual results, but only a range of possible ones. 
Thus, God, merely in knowing his eternal essence, would 
know "possible worlds" so far as these are eternally im­
plied by the essence; but he would not thereby know the 
actual world. Causes always leave results somewhat open 
for further decision. 11) .
The classical theist’s claim that every event is caused and 
that a perfect knowledge of a cause entails a perfect knowl­
edge of which effect will occur is tantamount to a denial of 
indeterminism.
Classical theists are invariably deterministic; more 
specifically, they are theological determinists--God is, as 
it were, 'omniresponsible' for all that occurs. The question 
of how creaturely freedom is possible if God determines all 
that occurs is difficult, but a variety of ingenious re­
sponses have been developed.^ All of the answers are species 
of compatibilism, the doctrine that freedom and determinism
For an excellent review of traditional theodicies 
see David Ray Griffin's God, Power, and Evil : A Process
Theodicy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976).
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are not incompatible. There is, however, a dilemma con­
cerning the problem of moral evil that none seem to have es­
caped. The most plausible reply to the problem of moral 
evil is the freewill defense: it is not God, but the free
decisions of his creatures which accounts for much of the
evil in the world. The problem is that the theological de- 
terminist cannot use the freewill defense. For it seems 
that God could have created a world with less moral evil 
while in no way infringing upon the freedom of his creatures. 
Even if it is true that creaturely decisions are the cause 
of moral evil, it follows from the concept of God's omnipo­
tence that he could have created a world in which there was 
less moral evil than actually exists, or none at all!
Leibniz apparently saw this problem and deduced the momen­
tous conclusion that this is the best of all possible worlds. 
Voltaire's satire of the Leibnizian solution is unparalleled 
for its clarity of vision. Few classical theists would be 
willing to use Leibniz's theodicy. Thus, the classical the- 
ist is faced with the problem of moral evil without being 
able to use the most plausible answer to that problem.
Hartshorne's answer is to abandon the idea of theo­
logical determinism in favor of a metaphysics in which each
individual has some capacity for self-creation. Although
God contributes to the character of each individual, he is 
not wholly responsible for what an individual becomes.
Thus ,
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In the cosmic drama every actor no matter how humble, 
contributes to the play something left undetermined by 
the playwright. (CS 239).
We are co-creators of the world with God. It follows from
this notion of "universal creativity" that the classical
concept of omnipotence is erroneous. Hartshorne says,
[God] is not 'omnipotent' in the Thomistic sense [of 
having] the power effectively to choose that any pos­
sible world, no matter which, shall be actual. (CS 
242). ~
God does not, and logically could not, unilaterally decide
which world will be actual; which world is actual is partly
determined by beings other than God.
It has been objected that Hartshorne's God is lim­
ited, and thus not religiously adequate. Madden and Hare 
refer to Hartshorne's philosophy of God as 'quasi-theism' to 
indicate their belief that the neoclassical God is not really 
God in the full-blown s e n s e . B u t  just as omniscience does 
not entail a knowledge of future actualities, so omnipotence 
does not entail the ability to bring about any conceivable 
state of affairs. Hartshorne agrees with Whitehead that the 
divine method of world control is persuasion. "'Persuasion' 
is the ultimate power; not even God can simply coerce." (CS 
239-240). God's power is exerted on individuals and accord­
ing to Hartshorne,
Individuals (not alone human individuals) must in some 
degree be self-managed, agents acting to some extent on
^^Edward Madden and Peter Hare, Evil and the Concept 
of God (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Pub.,
1968T7 pp. 115-125.
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their own, or they are not individuals, concrete units 
of reality. (CS 30).
If coercion is the ability of a cause to produce an effect,
such that the effect is totally determined in all of its
details, then an individual cannot be coerced without
ceasing to be an individual. Hartshorne says,
. . . if power means capacity to guarantee a particular 
fully specified form of actualization, either for one­
self or for another, then according to this philosophy 
there can be no such power. It is nonsense or contra­
diction.
Hartshorne is not denying that the concept of co­
ercion has applicability. In one place he distinguishes the
abstract aspects of a decision from the process of deciding.
A person who is hypnotized may be told to open a window.
But Hartshorne notes,
Merely "opening the window" is not a concrete act. The 
concrete action includes just how the window is opened, 
just how far, at what split second, with what rational­
izing explanations (if not to others at least to the 
person himself), with what feeling tone and sense of 
purpose, duty, or guilt.1^
The hypnotist may be able to cause the person to open the 
window. But this is an abstract feature of the concrete 
process of decision. The person hypnotized remains an in­
dividual precisely insofar as he is responsible for some
^^Charles Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of 
Deity," Review of Metaphysics 21, 2 (Dec. 1967), p. 283.
Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of 
Evil," in Current Philosophical Issues : Essays in Honor of
Curt John Ducasse, compiled and edited by Frederick C. 
Pommeyer (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Pub.,
1966), p. 203.
50
aspects of the decision. Coercion then, at best, refers to 
some abstract features of a decision. Were there absolutely 
no details or aspects of the decision left for the person to 
determine, the person would no longer be an individual--the 
meaning of which, as we have seen, is to be partly self- 
creating .
The clearest (but not the only) example of God's
persuasive power, in Hartshorne's view, are the regularities
in nature--natural laws.
God decides upon the basic outlines of creaturely ac­
tions, the guaranteed limits within which freedom is 
to operate.13
The function of God is not to guarantee that the 'best of 
all possible worlds' becomes actual. Rather, "The ideal 
rule sets those limits outside which freedom would involve 
greater risks than opportunities." (I^ 231). Given the re­
ality of individual freedom, any world will contain the pos­
sibility for evil. "Risk and opportunity are nonidentical 
twins having the same root, f r e e d o m . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  since 
God's power is persuasive, not coercive, natural laws do not 
describe exact regularities, rather they are statistical.
15Although no ’’creature has decided what these laws shall be” ,
l^Ibid., p. 206.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "Taking Freedom Seriously," 
unpublished sermon delivered to the First Unitarian Church 
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, February 22, 1981.
^^Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil,"
p . 206.
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the laws are not conformed to exactly. Individual crea­
turely decisions
cannot completely fit such a plan for then they would 
not be self-determined; or, to put it better, the plan 
cannot be completely definite and detailed. ( W  23).
Once again we may refer to the distinction between abstract 
aspect and concrete decision. Natural laws are, at best, an 
abstract aspect of the behavior of individuals. They pro­
vide the broad outlines in terms of which freedom occurs.
In the discussion thus far, a general trend is evi­
dent. In place of the classical concept of God as pure act, 
Hartshorne affirms a God in which there is real potentiality. 
God's knowledge increases as the future becomes present.
God's power has limitless opportunities for exertion. 
Hartshorne's God is a growing God. Now, one of the reasons 
given by classical theists for denying potentiality in God 
is that God, as the one who is completely unsurpassable and 
perfect, can lack no perfection. But if there is potential­
ity in God there are perfections which he lacks.
Hartshorne's response comes in two parts. In the 
first place, the notion of a being containing all possible 
perfections is incoherent. Since there are incompossible 
goods, not all goods (or perfections) can be actualized.
In every choice some good possibilities are rejected, 
in every artistic creation possible forms of beauty 
are renounced. (C^ 229) .
Even for the classical theist, God was faced with the deci­
sion to create this world or some other, he could not create
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both. The worlds he chose not to create were not simply 
valueless. Thus, in creating the world some goods were nec­
essarily left unactualized. Unlike Leibniz, Hartshorne de­
nies that the concept of a greatest possible value is any 
more coherent than the possibility of a greatest possible 
number. A God who contains all possible perfections is 
therefore impossible ( W  18).
The second half of Hartshorne's response is to re­
define the concept of perfect being so as to make it intel­
ligible. The perfect being might be (a) unsurpassable by 
any being, including itself, or (b) unsurpassable by any be­
ing other than itself but capable of surpassing itself. 
Classical theism denied that God could surpass himself in 
perfection. Hartshorne rejects this view and defines God 
as the "self-surpassing surpasser of all." 20). Al­
though it is impossible for any being, other than himself, 
to rival God's perfection, God is capable of increase in 
value. The increase of value in the divine life occurs 
partly as a result of creaturely decisions. As noted above, 
each individual has some capacity for self-creation. In 
creating oneself one adds new definiteness to reality and 
hence, new value. God, in his knowledge of the new creation 
also acquires this new value. The beauty and moral goodness 
of a charitable deed, for example, contributes not only to 
the value of the world, but to the divine life as well.
There are, of course, also negative values in the world. If
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God rejoices in our triumphs, he also sorrows at our petti­
ness, greed, and indifference. But Hartshorne believes 
there is always more satisfaction than dissatisfaction and 
thus God always has more reason for joy than for sorrow. 
Furthermore, God retains the consciousness of past joys.
Thus, "there will always be a net increment of value accru­
ing to God at each moment." (DR 46).
A possible objection to the idea of God as the 
self-surpassing surpasser of all is that a being who can be 
surpassed by himself can also be surpassed by another. Thus, 
it is conceivable that some being other than God could sur­
pass him in perfection, which is absurd. Hartshorne escapes 
this problem by his doctrine that God includes the world as 
part of himself. Hartshorne distinguishes three views of 
the relationship between God and the world,
(1) God is merely the cosmos, in all aspects insepa­
rable from the sum or system of dependent things or ef­
fects; (2) he is both the system and something inde­
pendent of it; (3) he is not the system, but in all 
aspects independent. ( M  90).
The first view, that God and the world are identical, is
pantheism. The third view is classical theism. Hartshorne
adopts the second view, sometimes called panentheism.
Hartshorne likens the relationship between God and world to
the relationship between a person and his body. A person is
not simply identical with his body. One's body undergoes
constant change, but one remains the same person. Similarly,
God's body, the cosmos, is constantly changing, but God
54
remains himself. When Hartshorne says that God includes the 
world he means to say that the world is a part of God. Here 
is a clear break with the classical doctrine of divine sim­
plicity. Further, since the world is a part of God, there 
is no logical possibility of a being in the world surpassing 
God in perfection. For whatever value a creature has, God 
has it too, plus something more. The divine unsurpassability 
(by another) is thus insured.
The analogy between the person/body relation and 
God/world relation has interesting ramifications for the rest 
of metaphysics. We have noted that Hartshorne's God is in 
some respects dependent on the world. But according to 
Hartshorne, "to be conditioned by i^ to include . . In
being conditioned by, or dependent on the world, God includes 
the world. But since God necessarily exists, it follows that 
the world necessarily exists. And indeed, this is Hartshorne's 
c o n t e n t i o n . F o r  Hartshorne, both God and the world neces­
sarily exist. Dipolar theism therefore rules out the possi­
bility affirmed by classical theism of creation ex nihilo.
It is important to note that, for Hartshorne, the 
universe is not an entity existing over against God. There 
is not 'God and the world', but rather, 'God and all non-
Charles Hartshorne, Replys to questions in Philo­
sophical Interrogations, Sydney and Beatrice Rome, edsl [New 
York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 343.
1 7 Charles Hartshorne, "Could There Have Been Noth­
ing? A Reply [to Craighead]," Process Studies 1, 1 (Spring 
1971), pp.* 25- 28 .
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divine entities'. What is normally referred to as the uni­
verse is merely the set of all nondivine entities. Although 
the individuals in this set have an independence of God 
characterized by freedom of self-creativity, the set, as a 
whole, has no independence. The universe is included in, 
or is a part of, the divine reality. "God is the self­
identical individuality of the world somewhat as a man is 
the self-identical individuality of his ever changing system 
of atoms." (MVG 230). The necessity of the universe is 
identical with the necessity of God's existence. The neces­
sary element in the universe is God's immanence in each non­
divine event.
A consequence of the view that God is conditioned,
which the Frenchman Lequier was perhaps first to see, is
that, in a certain sense, we create something in God.
Hartshorne notes that Lequier says,
. . . that in making our decisions we to a certain ex­
tent make ourselves. "Thou (God) hast created me cre­
ator of myself." Since this partly new myself becomes 
an item in divine cognition, the individual creates 
something in God. ( W  16) .
God is therefore not simply the creator, he is, to some ex­
tent created. This view is in direct opposition to classi­
cal theism which took the distinction between God and the 
world to correspond to the distinction between creator and 
created.
Classical theism involves what Hartshorne often 
calls a "monopolar prejudice." Hartshorne is referring to
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the practice of putting God on only one side (or one pole) 
of a pair of metaphysical contraries. Thus, according to 
classical theism, God is (for example) absolute, creator, 
infinite, and necessary while the world is relative, cre­
ated, finite and contingent. Hartshorne believes such a 
view is too simple. The truth of the matter is that God is 
both absolute and relative, creator and created, infinite 
and finite, necessary and contingent. This is what 
Hartshorne calls the principle of dual transcendence. It 
takes both sides of metaphysical contraries to describe God 
(CS 120). Thus, Hartshorne refers to God as being dipolar. 
He has a necessary pole and a contingent pole, an absolute 
pole and a relative pole, etc.
Some philosophers feel that Hartshorne is guilty of 
self-contradiction in using the principle of dual transcen­
dence.^® Hartshorne avoids contradiction by distinguishing 
various aspects in God. For example, God is not necessary 
and contingent in the same sense. Although God's existence 
is necessary (he could not not-be), the particular manner in
The classic statement of this view can be found in 
Bonaventure's The Mind's Road to God, trans. and with an in­
troduction by George Boas (New York : Liberal Arts Press,
1953).
19Bernardino M. Bonansea, God and Atheism (Washing­
ton, D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 1979),
p. 164; John J. Shepherd, Experience, Inference and God 
(London; Macmillan, 1975), p. 118. Shepherd is particularly 
concerned that a contradiction is involved in calling God 
both necessary and contingent, cf. Chapter V, footnote 22 of 
this dissertation.
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which his existence is actualized is contingent. Thus,
Hartshorne distinguishes existence from actuality. There is
perhaps no other distinction as crucial as this one for
understanding neoclassical theism. Hartshorne says.
That I shall (at least probably) exist tomorrow is one 
thing; that I shall exist hearing a blue jay call at 
noon is another. The latter is the more specific or 
concrete statement, and it is not entailed by the for­
mer (unless one accepts the logical structure of 
Leibniz's theory of the monad). (I^ 63).
The fact that an individual exists gives no information 
about the specific manner in which he exists. Existence is 
one thing, actuality quite another. Applying this distinc­
tion to the divine case we can say that, God's existence is 
necessary but his actuality is contingent. That God's ac­
tuality might have been different can be seen from the fact 
that the world might have been different. If, instead of 
listening to Einstein and others, Roosevelt and Truman, had, 
like Hitler, not given the development of the atomic bomb 
top priority, world history might have taken a very differ­
ent course. God would then not have knowledge of the way 
the world is now, but the way it would have been. He would 
also have incorporated different values from what he actu­
ally possesses. In short, God's actuality could have been 
different. But whether God knows this world or one that 
might have been, he still exists. That God exists is nec­
essary. That he exists with just the knowledge, feeling or 
value he has is contingent.
Similar remarks are applicable to the other pairs
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of metaphysical contraries. For example, God is absolute or 
independent in the sense that he exists regardless of which 
world is actual. But whatever world there is, God is re­
lated, and thus dependent on it (though not for his exis­
tence!). Or again, God helps create any world there is.
But his actuality (not his existence) is partly created by 
the world. Since any actualization of value involves limi­
tation or finitude, God is also finite. God is infinite 
with respect to his possibilities for actualization.^*^ From 
these examples it is evident that no contradiction is in­
volved in the principle of dual transcendence as long as one 
is careful to distinguish various aspects in God.
Classical theists failed to make the distinction 
between actuality and existence and thus failed to see that 
potentiality can be introduced into God without contradic­
tion. Thus, Aquinas had argued that.
The being whose substance has an admixture of potency 
is liable not to be by as much as it has potency; for
that which can be, can not-be. But, God, being ever­
lasting, in His substance cannot not-be. In God, there­
fore, there is no potency to being.
As far as God's existence is concerned, Aquinas is correct.
There is no possibility of God not existing. But this does
not mean that there can be no potency in God. The particular
Hartshorne also notes that there is a sense in 
which God is actually infinite. If the world has always 
existed, as Hartshorne believes, then there are an infinite 
number of past moments. In his inclusion of this infinite, 
God would also be actually infinite, 235.
21Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, p. 100, 16.2.
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state, or manner in which God exists--his actuality--is con­
tingent and therefore contains a principle of potentiality. 
There is potency in God in at least two respects. In the 
first place, God knows the actual world. But since the 
world, as it is, might have been different, God's knowledge 
might have been different. Second, there is potency in God 
in the sense that God grows with the world. He has an in­
finite capacity to adjust to any world-state that becomes 
actual. Thus, the existence/actuality distinction allows 
Hartshorne to deny the existence of a purely immutable God 
without falling into the absurdity of claiming that God 
might have failed to exist. Potency, the capacity for being 
otherwise, is not found in God's existence. But God's actu­
ality might always have been other than it is. Of course, 
Hartshorne denies that the divine actuality could absolutely 
fail to be. The alternatives for God's actuality do not in­
clude the possibility of not being actualized. It is a con­
sequence of the view that God's existence is necessary that 
God be somehow actualized. Otherwise, God would be a mere 
abstraction, not a concrete reality. But the fact [if it is 
a fact) that God necessarily exists does not determine the 
way in which that existence is actualized.
The concept of God's necessary existence has, thus 
far, been used rather uncritically. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, Hartshorne claims that God's existence must be 
considered logically necessary. If God exists then he exists
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in every conceivable state of affairs. A result of this 
view is what Hartshorne calls modal coincidence, or in some 
places, modal extensiveness. According to this doctrine, 
God's existence is coextensive with actuality and possibil­
ity 38). God not only knows the actual world, whatever 
could be actual God could know as actual. Thus, if God 
exists, there is no conceivable state of affairs that he 
could not know. God is the God of the possible as well as 
the actual. The difference between the classical idea of 
actus purus and the neoclassical idea of modal coincidence 
is that the latter doctrine admits potentiality into the 
divine. God, as neoclassically conceived does not contain 
all value. But any value that could be actualized, God 
could contain.
Sometimes, in explaining the concept of modal coin­
cidence, Hartshorne has spoken as if the existence of God 
were the explanation of logical possibility. "God himself 
is conceived as the ground of all possibility, presupposed 
by any affirmation, any possibly legitimate negation, any 
state of affairs, any truth." (C^, 258). This has led 
Henry L. Ruf to claim that Hartshorne's concept of God is 
unintelligible.
It is impossible for Hartshorne's God to exist because 
it is impossible for anything to be a necessary condi­
tion for the existence of logical possibilities as pos­sibilities .
2 2Henry L . Ruf, "The Impossibility of Hartshorne's 
God," Philosophical Forum (Boston) 7, (1976), p. 349.
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According to Ruf, logical possibilities are not the sorts of 
things that need a ground. The reason is that if something 
is possible, it is necessarily true that it is possible.
A necessary truth, however, needs no ground. Thus, if 
Hartshorne's concept of God is the concept of a being who is 
the ground of logical possibility, it is impossible for such 
a being to exist.
Ironically, Robert Neville, has recently attacked 
neoclassical theism for failing to provide a sufficient ex­
planation for metaphysical first principles. Presumably, 
logical truths are among the metaphysical first principles. 
Employing the dictum that "[w]hatever is determinately com­
plex calls for explanation," Neville argues that, since 
first principles are determinately complex, they require ex­
planation. "But with respect to the formal possibility of 
those universal structures, [first principles], Hartshorne's 
theory gives no a c c o u n t . W h e r e a s  Ruf complains that 
Hartshorne attempts to explain too much by making God the 
ground of possibility, Neville complains that, by failing to 
account for metaphysical first principles, Hartshorne has 
not explained enough.
As far as the correct interpretation of Hartshorne's 
thought is concerned, Neville is much closer to the mark than
^^Ibid.
^^Robert Neville, Creativity and God : A Challenge
to Process Theology (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), p. 61.
62
Ruf. Ruf has simply read too much into Hartshorne's talk 
about God being the ground of possibility. Hartshorne is 
not attempting to explain why logical possibilities are as 
they are and not otherwise. They could not be otherwise and 
thus do not require explanation. The doctrine of modal coin­
cidence says no more than that God's existence is coextensive 
with possibility as such. God exists in every possible state 
of affairs. This is why Hartshorne claims that the existence 
of God is "presupposed by any affirmation, any possible le­
gitimate negation . . . "  (£S 258). If Hartshorne's concept 
of God is incoherent, it is not for the reasons Ruf adduces.
Ruf's criticism is more applicable to Neville's
concept of God than to Hartshorne's. Neville does seem to
believe that possibility requires explanation. Indeed, this
is the main thrust of his criticism of neoclassical theism.
In his reply to Neville, Hartshorne makes it clear that he
sees no reason to believe that metaphysical first principles
stand in need of explanation.
The most abstract definiteness or complexity I regard 
as necessary, for contingency just is the freedom of 
creativity to provide this or that i n s t e a d .
For Hartshorne, only contingent truths require explanation.
And if the doctrine of modal coincidence is correct, then
God must always be part of the explanation of any contingency.
Charles Hartshorne, "Three Responses to Neville's 
Creativity and God," given by Charles Hartshorne, John B. 
Cobb, Jr., and Lewis S. Ford, Process Studies, 10, 3-4 (Win­
ter 1980) , p . 95.
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This is the only sense in which Hartshorne's God can be 
called the ground of possibility.
One aspect of classical theism we have yet to men­
tion is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. The 
soul, it was held, continues to exist even after bodily 
death. Hartshorne denies that the soul continues to exist 
apart from the body. Like Whitehead, Hartshorne does not 
rule out, a priori the possibility of survival of bodily 
death (RSP 143) . Perhaps we survive our death, but 
Hartshorne does not think so. For Hartshorne this is simply 
not a burning issue. Religiously speaking, conscious sur­
vival of bodily death is not important. Hartshorne could 
here invoke the example of some forms of Buddhism for whom 
there is no continuance of an individual's consciousness 
after death. If Hartshorne denies the doctrine of the im­
mortality of the soul, he does not deny immortality alto­
gether. The kind of immortality Hartshorne espouses is 
called by Whitehead, objective immortality. Objective im­
mortality is a function of God's omniscience. God knows all 
that is occurring and remembers all that has taken place. 
Unlike human memory which is fallible, indistinct, and frag­
mentary, God's memory is nothing less than a perfect record 
of the past. Although, according to Hartshorne, we must all 
die, we live forevermore in the memory of the divine.
Hartshorne maintains that objective immortality, 
not literal personal survival of bodily death, is what is
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religiously significant. Of all questions, religion must 
answer the question of the meaning of life. People want to 
believe that their lives have significance, that it does not 
all add up to zero. We wish, in some way, to contribute to 
something greater than ourselves. The something greater to 
which we contribute, in Hartshorne's metaphysics, is the di­
vine life. In the divine memory we achieve objective immor­
tality. And this supplies the needed significance for our 
lives.
Our abiding value is indeed what we give to posterity, 
to the life that survives us; but is there not one who 
survives all deaths and for whose life all life is pre­
cious? For the believer, it is the Holy One who is our 
final posterity. 242].
In contributing to the divine life we are contributing to
something indestructible, abiding, and permanent (Hartshorne
calls this view contributionism; I have called it plenar-
ism.].^^ If we find a place in the divine memory we can be
assured that whatever good we have made of our lives will
not be lost. Furthermore, we are assured that God will make
unsurpassably good use of our lives in a way that would have
been impossible for us. Our lives have nothing less than a
cosmic significance. Objective immortality is, then, taken
to be an adequate response to the question of the meaning
of life. Hartshorne says.
'Plenarism' comes from the Latin 'plenus', mean­
ing 'full'. Plenarism is the opposite of nihilism. The 
doctrine of plenarism implies that there is a fullness to 
life akin to what Jesus meant by the abundant life (cf. John 
10.10] .
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Classical theism cannot give us hope of serving a cause 
infinitely greater than ourselves; for its God derived 
no benefit from our lives. Atheism cannot give it ei­
ther; for it is limited to what we can do for posterity, 
which will little remember us, and our effects upon which 
are very incompletely predictable--quite apart from the 
manifest impossibility of knowing that there will always 
be a human posterity. The idea of objective immortality 
is an immense advantage of process theology over all its 
rivals. ( W  19).
Neoclassical theism presents modern religion with 
an alternative heretofore unavailable. No longer is it nec­
essary to choose between a purely infinite God like that of 
the scholastics, and a purely finite God like that of Mill.
If Hartshorne is correct, then the classical insight that 
God is the absolute reality can be coherently combined with 
the deep religious intuition that God truly sympathizes with 
his creatures. In this chapter we have deliberately avoided 
an extensive discussion of the liabilities of dipolar theism. 
We shall have ample opportunity for this in our treatment of 
the global argument. For now, it is important to give neo­
classical theism the courtesy of explaining itself.
CHAPTER IV 
THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Of all of the elements of Hartshorne's global argu­
ment, the ontological proof is perhaps the most important.
As Hartshorne comments,
. . . it is this argument [the ontological] that gives 
us the clue to the logic of any possible theistic argu­
ment . -
An examination of the ontological proof is therefore essen­
tial to a proper understanding of Hartshorne's a priori cu­
mulative case. Goodwin's book is the best single piece on 
Hartshorne's ontological argument.  ̂ He demonstrates that 
the argument is tied to Hartshorne's neoclassical metaphys­
ics, and more specifically, to the Hartshornean theory of 
temporal possibility. We cannot improve on Goodwin's schol­
arship. But we can, perhaps, throw a different light on the 
argument by getting clear on its relations to the other
Charles Hartshorne, Forward to The Ontological 
Argument of Charles Hartshorne by George L. Goodwin (Missoula, 




theistic proofs. In this way, it will become apparent in 
what sense the ontological argument is the "clue to the 
logic of any possible theistic argument." We will also see 
in what way the ontological proof relies on the others for 
support.
Hartshorne first discussed the ontological argument 
in his 1923 dissertation (OD 259-285). Since that time he 
has defended the argument perhaps more extensively than any 
other philosopher in history.^ At no time, however, has the 
argument clearly been considered sufficient, unto itself, to 
establish the truth of theism. In his dissertation, the 
ontological proof is only the last of a multiple phase argu­
ment designed to demonstrate the existence of God. Later, 
in 1944 he says, "It is the coherence of arguments, not any­
one argument, that can decide as to God's existence. A 
similar point is made in 1964, "It is a mistake to ask of 
Anselm's proof that it do everything for the defense of the­
ism . . Finally, in a recent reply to criticism,
Hartshorne says.
David A. Pailin, "An Introductory Survey of Charles 
Hartshorne's Work on the Ontological Argument," in Analecta 
Anselmiana, volume 1, edited by F. S. Schmitt (Frankfurt- 
am-Maini: Minerya, 1969).
^Charles Hartshorne, "The Formal Validity and Real 
Significance of the Ontological Argument," The Philosophical 
Review, 53, 3 (May 1944), p. 236.
^Charles Hartshorne, "What the Ontological Proof 
Does Not Do," Review of Metaphysics, 17, 4 (June, 1964), 
p. 609.
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[Anselm's] goal of a single theistic argument that would 
make others unnecessary is unattainable. A whole system 
of basic ideas is required to meet all objections to his 
single argument.G
If the ontological argument does not, by itself, prove the 
existence of God, it nevertheless holds a central place in 
Hartshorne's global argument. As noted above, Hartshorne 
believes that it provides the clue to the logic of any the­
istic proof. To understand Hartshorne's meaning, let us 
look at his version of the argument.
As is well known, Hartshorne maintains that there 
are two forms of the argument found in Anselm's Proslogion. 
Norman Malcolm is usually given credit for this discovery, 
but it was Hartshorne who first came to this conclusion.^
The Hartshorne-Malcolm reading of Anselm has not gone un-
3challenged. This fine point of Anselmian scholarship need 
not delay our discussion. For whatever is true of Anselm, 
it is a fact that something in the Proslogion suggested to 
Hartshorne that there can be a valid ontological argument.
Charles Hartshorne, "John Hick on Logical and Onto­
logical Necessity," Religious Studies 13, 2 [June 1977),
p. 161.
7Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," 
The Philosophical Review 69, 1 (January 1960), pp. 41-62. 
Hartshorne made the same point in 1953, see PSG 96-97. The 
point was made somewhat less clearly in "The Formal Validity 
and Real Significance of the Ontological .Argument."
^See for example, J. Brenton Stearns, "Anselm and 
the Two Argument Hypothesis," Monist 54, 2 (April 1970), 
pp. 221-233, and Gregory Schufreider, ^  Introduction to 
Anselm's Argument (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1978).
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And it is this argument which concerns us. What is the so- 
called second, or stronger form of the ontological proof? 
Hartshorne's first formal statement of the proof appeared in
91944. Later, in 1962 he employed the symbolic apparatus of
modal logic to state the argument CLP 50-51). In his book
on Anselm two forms of the argument are given 92, 96).
Another formulation of the argument appeared in 1970 as part
of the global argument (CS 281).^^ Further refinements of
the 1962 version of the proof were made by Purtill.^^
Purtill's revision considerably simplifies the proof without
abandoning the essentials of Hartshorne's version. Purtill's
revision is as follows:
'q ' for ’C3x)?x,’ there is a perfect being, or per­
fection exists, 
for 'it is necessary that' or 
'0' for 'it is possible that' or .
'p3q' for 'p materially implies q ' or '~(pâ-'q) ' .
'p)q' for 'p strictly implies q ' or 'D^(pS~q)'.
1. Cq-?nq)o(Oq;^q) theorem
2. q->nq assumption (Anselm's principle)
3. »q-)q 1,2, M.P.
^Hartshorne, "The Formal Validity and Real Signifi­
cance of the Ontological Argument," p. 225.
^*^This is substantially the same form of the argument 
as given in ^  92. The major difference between the argument 
of CS and the argument considered in this chapter is that, in 
CS, the idea that deity is an "unactualizable ideal or limit­
ing concept" is among the alternatives rejected. This view 
shares, with the atheistic view, the assumption that it is 
possible that the concept of God is coherent but that God 
does not exist. The following discussion of Anselm's prin­
ciple, 1 think, discredits this assumption.
L. Purtill, "Hartshorne's Modal Proof," The
Journal of Philosophy 63, 14 (July 1966), pp. 397-409.
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4. Oq assumption (perfection is conceiv­
able, i.e., logically possible)
5. q 3,4, M.P.
Purtill notes that the first premise is derivable from
12axioms of modal logic. The only serious questions, then, 
concern the truth of the second and fourth steps. Although 
the second step, in a sense, requires help from other theis­
tic arguments, it provides the key to the logic of any the­
istic proof. The fourth step is the weak point of the argu­
ment- -the point at which the other proofs are really needed 
to come to the aid of the ontological argument.
The second premise says that if a perfect being 
exists, then a perfect being necessarily exists. Tomis 
Kapitan has pointed to an apparent difficulty with this 
premise (which he labels PI).
(PI) states only that if some being is perfect then, 
necessarily, some being is perfect. Therefore (PI) 
does not guarantee that a being who is perfect, if 
there is such a being, is such that he is necessarily 
perfect, or that he necessarily exists, but only that 
there must be some being or other which is perfect or 
necessarily exists.
Perhaps Kapitan has in mind the following picture. Suppose 
for the sake of argument that it is true that a perfect be­
ing exists. It follows, by premise (2) that there is always 
in existence a perfect being. But so far as premise (2) is 
concerned, perfect beings may pop in and out of existence at
l^Ibid., p. 398.
^^Tomis Kapitan, "Perfection and Modality: Charles
Hartshorne's Ontological Proof," International Journal for 
the Philosophy of Religion 7 (1976), p . 381.
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random. So long as there is some perfect being or other, 
it is true that a perfect being necessarily exists.
Hartshorne is aware of the kind of problem Kapitan 
has raised.
If in the formula '(3x)Dx' ('for some x, x is divine') 
the values of the variable 'x ' are taken to be individ­
uals, in the usual sense of thing or person, then 'for 
some x' is misleading, since only one individual could 
be divine. In other words, '(3x)Dx & (3y)Dy' strictly 
implies ' (x = y) ' . ( ^  50).
If, as Hartshorne says, only one individual could be divine
then Kapitan's criticism would have been answered. For if
there is at most one God, then the two occurrences of 'q '
in premise (2)- -'q->Dq'--could not refer to more than one
individual. But what reason is there for thinking there
could be only one perfect being? Several reasons can be
offered, two of which are discussed in chapter X. Suffice
it to say that Hartshorne is not unaware of Kapitan's kind
of criticism and has arguments at his disposal to solve the
problem. I shall, therefore, assume throughout the remainder
of this chapter that there is, at most, one perfect being.
Premise (2) is meant to be a statement of what
Hartshorne calls Anselm's principle. Hartshorne says.
The true Anselmian Principle, which so few know, that 
of Prosl. Ill, is, 1^ exist without conceivable alter­
native of not existing is better than to exist with 
such alternative; hence Greatness is incapable of the 
latteïü (AD 88).
Hartshorne probably has in mind Anselm's statement that,
. . . it is possible to conceive of a being which can­
not be conceived not to exist; and this is greater
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than one which can be conceived not to exist.
We have, then, two possibilities with respect to the concept 
of any being, (1) it can be conceived not to exist, that is, 
as existing contingently, or (2) it cannot be conceived not 
to exist, that is, as existing necessarily. If necessary 
existence is greater than contingent existence, then, if a 
perfect being exists, he must exist necessarily. For if a 
perfect being existed contingently, it would always be pos­
sible to conceive of a more perfect being--one that exists 
necessarily. The exclusion of contingency from divine exis­
tence is what Hartshorne calls Anselm's discovery.
By itself, Anselm's principle does not prove that 
God, in fact, exists. Premise (4)--that God's existence is 
conceivable--is needed for a complete proof. Anselm suc­
ceeded in refuting atheism and empirical theism which hold 
in common the assumption that the existence and nonexistence 
of God are equally conceivable. But positivism, which holds 
that the concept of God is somehow incoherent, is not af­
fected by Anselm's principle. Once it is conceeded, however, 
that God is conceivable, the existence of God immediately 
follows. If it is true that God could not exist contingently 
then he must exist necessarily. And if he exists necessarily 
he exists--period. Another way to see this is by considering 
the following alternatives.
^^Anselm, St . Anselm: Basic Writings translated by
S. N. Deane (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1966), p. 8.
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God exists in every conceivable state of affairs.
God exists in no conceivable state of affairs.
God exists in some conceivable states of affairs
but not in others.
C is ruled out by Anselm's principle. B is the positivistic 
position. Granting the falsity of B, A is the only remain­
ing alternative.
Sometimes one hears the atheist retort; granted
that God's existence must be considered necessary, it does
not follow that God exists. All that has been shown is
that, iĵ  God exists, then necessarily he exists. Hartshorne
and Malcolm believe this statement harbors a contradiction.
Hartshorne comments:
"If God exists, he exists noncontingently" I regard as 
self-contradictory ; for the "if" can only mean that 
something which could be lacking is required for the 
existence, while "noncontingently" means that nothing 
required for the existence could possibly fail, or have 
failed to obtain. "If" refers to a condition, but we 
are speaking of unconditioned existence. Thus "if" and 
"necessary" do not properly combine in the manner pro­
posed.
"If" implies the possibility of God's nonexistence, whereas 
"necessary" implies the impossibility of God's nonexistence. 
Given the truth of Anselm's principle, the only meaning "if" 
can have in the statement "If God exists he necessarily 
exists" is to refer to our own ignorance. Properly stated, 
the sentence reads: If God exists, and we're not sure if he
does, then he necessarily exists. Our uncertainty concerns
Charles Hartshorne, Replys to questions in Philo - 
sophical Interrogations, Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds. 
(New Yorkl HoIt% Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 347.
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the question of whether the concept of God makes sense: Is
the concept of God coherent?
Needless to say, not everyone agrees that Hartshorne's 
reasoning is cogent. Most would agree that God, if he exists, 
has an unusual mode of existing, different from ordinary 
existence. But they would not call this extraordinary exis­
tence necessary in the sense of logically necessary. John 
Hick has long criticized Hartshorne for what Hick claims is 
a confusion between two kinds of necessity, ontological (or 
factual necessity) and logical n e c e s s i t y . T h e  ontological 
argument is invalid, according to Hick, since it equivocates 
between these two concepts of necessity. According to Hick,
. . . to say that God has (logically) necessary being,
or that his existence is logically necessary, would be 
to say that the meaning of "God" is such that the prop­
osition "God exists" is a logical, analytic or a priori 
truth; or again that the proposition "God does not 
exist" is a self-contradiction, a statement of such a 
kind that it is logically impossible for it to be true.
The heart of the idea of ontological necessity is what has
come to be called existence a ^e, or aseity. Existence a ^
refers to,
. . . the existence of something that simply and unquali­
fiedly i^, without beginning or end and without dependence
Hick's articles include, "God as Necessary Being," 
Journal of Philosophy 57, 22 and 23 (November 1960), pp.
7 25-734; Review of Hartshorne's The Logic of Perfection in 
Theology Today 20, 2 (July 1963), ppl 29S-7ÏÏ8; ’’A Critique 
of the 'Second Argument'" in The Many-Faced Argument, edited 
by John Hick and Arthur C. McGill (New York: Macmillan,
1967), pp. 341-356; Arguments for God's Existence (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1971), Chapter 6.
^^Hick, "A Critique of the 'Second Argument'," pp. 
341-342.
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for its existence or for its characteristics upon any­
thing other than itself.
Hick believes that it is the idea of ontological necessity, 
not logical necessity, which Anselm was indicating when he 
said that God cannot be conceived not to exist. Furthermore 
--and here is the crux of Hick's critique-- if God's exis­
tence is only ontologically necessary, then God's nonexis­
tence is possible. But if God's nonexistence is possible 
then the ontological argument must fail, since God's exis­
tence, like all other existence, would be conceptually con­
tingent. In terms of the alternatives listed on page 73, 
Hick would choose C, God exists in some conceivable states 
of affairs but not in others.
Similar criticisms of the second form of Anselm's
argument have been raised by Lycan and Plantinga.^®
Plantinga says.
If God cannot (logically) come into or go out of exis­
tence, it is a necessary truth that if He ever exists.
He always exists. But it does not follow that if He 
exists, the proposition "God exists" is logically nec­
essary. 20
Plantinga's point is that even if God's existence is onto­
logically necessary, it does not follow, without further
^®Hick, Arguments for God's Existence, p. 86.
^^William Lycan, "Eternal Existence and Necessary 
Existence," Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17, 2 (April 
1976), pp. 287-290 ; Alvin Plantinga, "A Valid Ontological 
Argument?" in The Ontological Argument, edited by Alvin 
Plantinga (New Yorkl Doubleday, 1965), pp. 160-171.
^*^Plantinga, "A Valid Ontological Argument?" p. 165.
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argument, that his existence is logically necessary. 0£ 
course, further argument has been given as we shall see.
But most philosophers who speak in terms of God's ontologi­
cally necessary being do so in order to emphasize their be­
lief that God's existence is not logically necessary. In 
other words, they maintain that God's existence, if he 
exists, is logically contingent.
Hartshorne is perfectly aware of Hick's criticism,
but insists that there is no firm basis for a distinction
between ontological and logical modalities.
Anselm's conviction was, and mine is, that only the con­
ceptually necessary can reasonably be viewed as uncaused, 
and only the conceivably caused can reasonably be viewed 
as conceptually contingent.
Hartshorne supports this view by his theory of temporal pos­
sibility, according to which,
Modal distinctions are ultimately coincident with tempo­
ral ones. The actual is the past, the possible is the 
future. (C^ 60).
Hartshorne is, therefore, concerned not to drive a wedge
between the modal operators "q"  and "̂  " and the temporal
structure of existence. On this view, to say something is
logically possible is to say it might have occurred in the
past (since all past moments were once future) or that it
might occur in the future. Hartshorne says, "nothing has
even a logically possible alternative unless it once was
21 Charles Hartshorne, "Is the Denial of Existence
Ever Contradictory," Journal of Philosophy 63, 4 (February
17 , 1966) , p. 89.
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22future." If Hartshorne is correct then, it follows from 
God's aseity that God exists of logical necessity. To exist 
a 2Ë. means to have no beginning and no end. Thus, if God 
exists, there was never a future (in the past) and there 
never will be a future when God might fail to exist. If no 
future contains the possibility of God's nonexistence, then, 
on Hartshorne's view, God's existence is logically necessary.
The theory of temporal possibility supplies the
needed premise to infer logical necessity from ontological
necessity. To deny the theory, says Hartshorne, is to make
God an arbitrary exception to otherwise generally applicable
rules concerning contingent existence. If the existence of
God is held to be contingent then,
. . . unlike all noncontroversially contingent proposi­
tions, ["God exists"] does not affirm an existence having 
a conceivable cause, or a conceivable beginning in time, 
does not exclude any positive form of existence or par­
ticular finite quantity or degree between zero and in­
finity, or assert any particular kinds or numbers of 
parts, etc. Thus all the criteria that render intelli­
gible a distinction between possible and real existence 
are lacking in this case.23
The same point is made in another place where Hartshorne 
lists ten marks of contingency and finds that none of them 
apply to God as the empiricists conceive him (1^ 73-84).
The point is that for any characteristic of ordinary contin­
gent propositions, the proposition that God exists lacks
^^Charles Hartshorne, "Real Possibility," Journal of 
Philosophy 60, 21 (October 10, 1963), p. 596.
^^Personal letter dated May 4, 1981.
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these characteristics. Thus, the proposition that God exists 
cannot reasonably be taken as contingent.
Rather than run through all of the marks of contin­
gent propositions, let us focus upon one characteristic of 
contingency, namely, that causal conditioning is always asso­
ciated with contingency (understanding 'cause' as explained 
in chapter III). Hartshorne comments.
We do not seek causal explanations of noncontingent 
truths, as in mathematics, but we do seek them for con­
tingent truths. The empiricists tell us in effect to 
forget all this when considering God. They accuse 
Anselm of violating rules; but they violate the elemen­
tary rule that logically contingent matters are intel­
ligible in genetic and causal terms, or not at all.24
If it were possible for Hartshorne's opponents to 
produce one example (besides "God exists") of a logically 
contingent existential statement, inexplicable in causal 
terms, there might be some precedent for denying the logical 
necessity of God's existence. But the only examples that 
are offered are highly suspect. Gaunilo spoke of a lost is­
land, Paul Henle of "Necs", William Rowe of an eternal star,
2 Sand William Lycan of "agnews" or eternal gavels. The idea 
behind all of these examples is to think of something ordi­
narily considered contingent and apply to it the property
^'^Hartshorne, "John Hick on Logical and Ontological 
Necessity," p. 161.
2 'ÏAnselm, Anselm: Basic Writings, pp. 150-151;
Paul Henle, "Uses of the Ontological Argument," in The Onto­
logical Argument, Plantinga, ed., p. 173; William Rowe, The 
Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 197 5) , p. 52; Lycan, "Eternal Existence and Necessary 
Existence," p. 290.
79
of being eternal--or in our language, existing a se.
If the examples are successful, they demonstrate
that an eternal being could exist contingently. Rowe says.
Surely it is possible for an everlasting star to exist. 
The stars that exist are presumably not everlasting-- 
for each star, let us suppose, there was a time before 
which it did rfot exist and there will be a time at which 
it ceases to exist. But this seems to be an empirical 
fact and not a matter of conceptual or logical neces­
sity. 26
We must differ with Rowe; it is no mere empirical fact that 
there are no everlasting stars. For an everlasting star 
would not be a star as we ordinarily understand the term.
An everlasting star would not, for example, consume the
gases of which it is made. And if it consumed no gases it 
could give off no light. In short, an everlasting star is 
not a star at all. Similar comments could be made with re­
gard to the other examples. If Gaunilo's lost island does 
not depend for its continued existence on the sea level, the 
nonoccurrence of earthquakes, erosion, etc., then it is not 
really an island. Implied in the very idea of an island or 
a star is the concept of contingency, and of noneternal exis­
tence. Whatever we describe as being logically contingent-- 
except the empiricist's God--is explicable in causal terms. 
We, therefore, agree with Hartshorne, that to allow that God 
exists £ ££ is to imply that his existence is logically nec­
essary. The burden of proof rests with Hick and company to 
explain how their God is not an exception to the rules of
^^Rowe, The Cosmological Argument, p. 52.
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contingency. Of course, our argument presupposes that, as 
Whitehead says, "God is not to be treated as an exception to 
all metaphysical principles. . ." But what empiricist 
would self-consciously deny this?
The discussion thus far has yielded the conclusion 
that contingency must be excluded from God's existence.
This is Anselm's principle. What has not been shown is that 
the concept of God does not conceal an absurdity. God's 
existence might be logically impossible. Thus, from Anselm's 
principle alone we can deduce only that God's existence is 
either logically necessary or logically impossible. The im­
portance of Anselm's principle, however, is that it provides 
the key to the logic of theism. Theism can no longer be 
considered simply as a question of fact, questions of mean­
ing are at stake. God's existence is a conceptual problem.
Self-understanding is the issue: someone is confused,
either the theist, or the nontheist. Which is it? This 
is the real question. (OT 88].
For this reason, Hartshorne maintains that empirical argu­
ments for (or against) the existence of God are impossible. 
Before this claim can be evaluated we must understand what 
Hartshorne means by an "empirical argument for theism."
27Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality cor­
rected edition, David Ray Griffin and Donald Sherburne, eds. 
(New York: Free Press, 1978], p. 343.
The argument here is independent of the issue of 
whether truth is eternal. For whether or not truth is eter­
nal, there are contingent truths (unless one is a Spinozist] . 
And if contingent matters are only causally intelligible, 
then Hartshorne has made his point.
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Hartshorne adopts Popper's position that falsifi- 
ability by some conceivable experience is a minimal require­
ment of empiricality. What, then, is an empirical argument? 
At one point Hartshorne identifies an empirical argument as 
any argument whose premises are empirical (CS 278). Else­
where, empirical arguments are identified as having an em­
pirically falsifiable conclusion. Thus, in connection with 
the so-called empirical arguments for God's existence 
Hartshorne asks,
. . . what advocate of 'empirical arguments' for theism 
(Tennant? Brightman?) has told us how experience might 
conceivably show that God does not exist? (OT 67) .
Does Hartshorne mean to define an empirical argument by ref­
erence to its premises or to its conclusion? The answer to 
this question seems important. For if an empirical argument 
is any argument with empirical premises then it seems there 
could be an empirical argument for God's existence. For ex­
ample, an argument from authority to God's existence would
have an empirical premise to the effect that so-and-so is a 
2 9reliable authority. On the other hand, if an empirical ar­
gument is identified by an experientially falsifiable con­
clusion, then Hartshorne is correct in asserting the impos­
sibility of an empirical argument for God's existence. Ac­
cording to Anselm's principle, if God exists, then he exists 
without conceivable alternative. And this just means that
am indebted to George Mavrodes for pointing this
out to me.
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nothing could falsify the proposition "God exists."
I am inclined to believe Hartshorne means to iden­
tify empirical arguments by their conclusions. When he 
claims that none of the theistic proofs have empirical prem­
ises he has in mind the traditional proofs such as the cos­
mological and design arguments. According to Hartshorne, 
it is not simply a fact that contingent beings exist or that 
there is order; these are necessary truths. A totally cha- ■ 
otic world or a world in which nothing exists are not con­
ceivable. Thus, the premises of these arguments are not 
genuinely empirical. Furthermore, arguments from authority 
are useful only when the authorities themselves do not dis­
agree or when the person advocating the argument is not him­
self one of the authorities. But as with most philosophic 
disputes, theism has no agreed upon solution. And the peo­
ple who offer arguments for God's existence (and those to 
whom they are directed) are usually authorities on the sub­
ject anyway. Thus, there is little hope for arguments from 
authority in this issue. Anselm's principle, at least casts 
doubt on the fruitfulness of attempting to infer God's exis­
tence from empirical premises.
One final criticism of the ontological argument 
must be considered. B. G. Nowlin and R. L. Purtill have 
criticized the argument for being "sound, but superfluous."^^
Ben Gary Nowlin, "The Ontological Argument: Sound
But Superfluous?" unpublished manuscript; R. L. Purtill, 
"Ontological Modalities," Review of Metaphysics 21, 2 (Decem­
ber 1967), pp. 297-307.
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Neither author disagrees with the concept of God as logi­
cally necessary being. But both believe that,
. . . one could have sufficient reason for thinking the 
ontological argument sound only by employing some other 
proof wjjich would render the ontological argument super­
fluous .
The weak premise in the ontological argument is the premise 
which says that God is conceivable. But how is this to be 
demonstrated? Purtill notes that one way to prove the con- 
ceivability of God is to prove that God exists. But this 
renders the ontological argument superfluous, since we would 
have proved the existence of God without it. The other way 
to prove the conceivability of God is to show that some con­
ceivable state of affairs contains the divine--heaven per­
haps. The task of the atheist would be to show that some 
conceivable state of affairs lacks the divine. The problem 
with this strategy is that conceivability is such a tricky 
matter. We have already seen, in this chapter, how easy it 
is to combine contradictory ideas without realizing there 
is a contradiction, e.g., eternal stars and lost islands. 
Purtill and Nowlin believe the most promising strategy for 
theists is to prove the conceivability of God by proving 
that God exists. Thus, even if the ontological argument is 
sound, it is superfluous.
Even if, in a certain sense, the ontological argu­
ment is superfluous, in another sense it represents a
perfluous?"
^^Nowlin, "The Ontological Argument: Sound But Su-
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tremendous gain in philosophic understanding. Hartshorne
admits that any
proof which establishes the conceivability of God can 
as well or better be so formulated that it directly
establishes his e x i s t e n c e . ^2
To this extent the ontological argument is superfluous. But 
there are at least three senses in which it is not super­
fluous .
One often hears atheists claim that the burden of 
proof is on the theist since the theist is the one who is 
introducing a novel entity to explain t h i n g s . S u c h  a de­
mand is unjustified in light of the ontological argument.
God cannot be, in Tillich's words, one being among others; 
he is rather, the very condition of there being anything or 
any truth at all. The problem of God's existence is not 
empirical, it is conceptual. As far as God's existence is 
concerned, all the facts are in, and all the relevant expla­
nations have been given. What remains to be seen is whether 
the theist or the nontheist is conceptually confused. There 
is no neutral ground on which the atheist can hide. For in 
the very assertion that God does not exist, concepts are em­
ployed. Either these concepts require or they exclude the 
existence of God. In either case the atheist is as much 
obliged as the theist to defend his position--the theist to
3 2Charles Hartshorne, "Rejoinder to Purtill," Review 
of Metaphysics 21, 2 (December 1967], p. 308.
33Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1966), pp. 102-107.
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argue for, the atheist to argue against the conceptual nec­
essity for God.
Another important function of the ontological argu­
ment is that it demonstrates that the traditional problem of 
evil is a confusion. Implicit in the atheistic argument 
from evil is the assumption that God is equally conceivable 
as existent or as nonexistent. We are told that, if God 
existed, he would prevent a great deal of the suffering in 
the world. But what is this but an admission that the athe­
ist can conceive of a world in which God exists? Anselm's 
principle should change such atheists into theists! The 
ontological argument at least shows that the only respect­
able argument from evil is a priori, that is, that the mere 
conceivability of suffering contradicts the existence of 
God.
Finally, the ontological argument shows that any 
theistic argument which begins from a premise to the effect 
that the world requires God in some way, must also admit 
that any conceivable world or coherently conceivable absence 
of a world would require God if the divine existence is nec­
essary. If the existence of certain contingent beings re­
quires that God exists, then any conceivable world with con­
tingent beings requires God. Similarly, if the existence of 
order is a mark of the creator's handywork, then any ordered 
world or any to a coherently conceivable degree disordered 
world would bear God's imprint. The arguments that Nowlin
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or Purtill would offer for God's conceivability (and thus 
existence), at least depend upon the ontological argument 
for this point of clarification. To admit the validity of 
the ontological argument, therefore, represents a net gain 
in philosophical theology.
The importance of the Nowlin-Purtill objection is
that it raises, once again, the spectre of positivism. The
weakest premise of the ontological argument is premise (4)--
that God is conceivable. Hartshorne says of this premise.
All my difficulty in believing in theism, all of it, 
turns on the not easily disproved suspicion that every 
available formulation of the idea of God involves some 
more or less well hidden absurdity.
The justification of God's conceivability rests with con­
siderations properly outside the ontological argument-- in 
short, with the other theistic proofs. It is to these we 
now turn.




The cosmological argument appears several places in 
Hartshorne's work. The "Argument from the Category of Be­
ing," of his 1923 dissertation, is arguably the first pre­
sentation of the proof (OD 99-116). In Man's Vision of God
(1941) , an entire chapter is devoted to the argument (MVG 
251-298). In 1953, the proof is included as one of six ways 
to demonstrate God's existence (PSG 24-25). By the time of 
Creative Synthesis (1970), the six arguments become elements 
of the one global argument, wherein the cosmological proof 
is a part (CS 275-297). Each discussion of the cosmological 
argument differs in important respects from the others; and 
it is not clear that the various forms in which Hartshorne 
offers the proof are reducible to one another. For example, 
the 1923 version argues from the concept of Being to the 
reality of an all-inclusive, or monistic One. The object of 
the argument in Man's Vision of God is to show that the most 
adequate conception of the subject of all change is the con­
ception of deity neoclassically conceived. Furthermore, the
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argument in M an's Vision of God, unlike the latest version 
makes no mention of God as the subject of change. Finally, 
as noted in chapter II, the 1923 version of the argument is 
found no where else in Hartshorne's writings. The title of 
this chapter is therefore misleading; there is more than one 
Hartshornean cosmological argument. Despite these dissimi­
larities, however, there is a continuity running through the 
proofs. Each of the earlier versions may be viewed as con­
tributing something to the argument of Creative Synthesis. 
Hartshorne's mature position can be seen as an attempt to 
incorporate, in one argument, the insights embodied in his 
earlier discussions. This chapter, accordingly, treats the 
earlier versions of the proof only as they contribute to the 
argument of Creative Synthesis. Untangling the differences 
between Hartshorne's cosmological arguments is a task left 
to others.
Following the procedure of exhausting all possible 
alternatives to theism, Hartshorne states the argument as 
follows :
A1 Nothing exists.
A2 What exists either (a) has no modal character or 
(bj is wholly contingent.
A3 What exists is wholly necessary.
A4 What exists is partly contingent and partly neces­
sary, but nothing is divine.
T What exists is partly contingent and partly neces­
sary and something is divine. (CS 281).
Several clarifications are needed for a proper understanding
of the argument.
When Hartshorne uses the words "necessary" and
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"contingent" he means them to be taken in a strictly logical 
sense. As noted in the previous chapter, Hartshorne holds 
to a theory of modality according to which logical and onto­
logical modalities are not ultimately separable. To exist 
contingently is to exist as one among a variety of logical 
possibilities. To be logically possible is to be 'really'
(or ontologically) possible either at some past moment or at 
some future time. The logically necessary is the common 
element in all contingencies (CS 246) . This is important 
since it explains why Hartshorne believes his statement of 
the cosmological argument exhausts the possible alternatives 
to theism. Many theists would accept A2(b), with the pro­
viso that there is a God whose existence is ontologically, 
though not logically, necessary. The conclusion of the last 
chapter, if true, shows that this position is mistaken. God 
exists of logical necessity or his existence is impossible. 
The position that God's existence is logically contingent is, 
according to Hartshorne, inconsistent with the implications 
of the concept of deity. A2(b) is, therefore, not an option 
open to theists.
It is arguable that A3 divides into two different 
positions, one which says that the necessary is not divine, 
the other that it is divine. The latter position is a form 
of pantheism, best exemplified by Spinoza's necessitarianism. 
Parmenidian monism is perhaps the nearest any philosophical 
system has come to denying contingency to the real while
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failing to identify the One with God. But the case of 
Parmenides and Spinoza are unclear and could be argued ei­
ther way with some plausibility. As Hartshorne says, 
"Spinoza has been called 'God-intoxicated' and also 'athe­
ist'. There is a fairly strong case for both descriptions" 
(NT 2). Could the same apply to Parmenides? There is good 
reason to believe that the debate of whether an unrestricted 
monism is theistic or atheistic is purely verbal. One may 
adopt a 'worshipful' attitude towards the One and call the 
object of devotion "God," but I see no rational compulsion 
to do so.
A distinctive feature of Hartshorne's cosmological 
argument is that it differs from traditional formulations 
not only in being nonempirical, but also in not being an 
argument to a prime mover, or first cause. Like all of 
Hartshorne's theistic arguments, the cosmological proof is 
offered as an a priori demonstration that God exists. Com­
mentators have generally agreed that most famous versions 
of the argument (for example, those of Aquinas, Descartes, 
and Clark) are empirical.  ̂ Hartshorne's version makes no 
mention of a first cause; it is, rather, an argument "from 
the modal structure of the concept of existence . . . "  (CS
See William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) . For an
interesting discussion on the idea that Aquinas' arguments 
are a priori see Louis Mackey, "Entreatments of God: Re­
flections on Aquinas' Five Ways," Franciscan Studies 37, 
Annual XV (1977), pp. 103-119.
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2294). The reason for classifying Hartshorne's argument as 
cosmological is that, in a sense (to be explained), it moves 
from the concept of contingently existing beings to the con­
cept of a necessary being. With these clarifications in 
mind, let us examine the argument step by step.
No one doubts that the proposition "Nothing exists" 
is false. The more interesting question is whether "Nothing 
exists" describes a conceivable state of affairs. The ques­
tion is not whether the proposition is false, but whether it 
is necessarily false. Hartshorne maintains that nonbeing, 
or total nothingness, is not genuinely conceivable. For 
Hartshorne, it is necessarily true that something or other 
exists (this is not to say that what exists, exists of ne­
cessity). Houston Craighead has rendered a valuable contri­
bution to the debate by listing six arguments found in 
Hartshorne's writings for the necessity of something exist­
ing (I find at least eight).^ Considerations of space and 
the scope of the present work do not permit a treatment of 
each argument. We will focus on the arguments on which 
Hartshorne most often relies.
2Since the argument of the dissertation is founded 
on the concept of Being, it is reasonable to call the argu­
ment cosmological. The ontological argument is founded on 
the concept of a perfect being. The perfection of existence, 
namely, necessary existence, is deduced from the concept of 
a perfect being.
^Houston Craighead, "Non-Being and Hartshorne's 
Concept of God," Process Studies 1, 1 (Spring 1971), p. 14.
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The most important reason for denying the conceiv- 
ability of nonbeing is that it is completely unknowable.
Like Peirce, Hartshorne equates knowability with being [see 
chapter V I). To be capable of existing is to be knowable 
and to be knowable is to possibly exist. If this is correct 
then nonbeing is not a genuine possibility. No conceivable 
knower, not even an omniscient one, could know nonbeing.
This argument rests on the assumption that knowabil­
ity and being are coextensive. Craighead accuses Hartshorne 
of arbitrarily defining being in terms of knowability. 
"Hartshorne has won the game by definition. He defines the 
real in terms of the knov.’able. Craighead's contention is 
unfounded. Hartshorne gives reasons for the assumption in 
question, the most important of which Craighead never con­
siders. Hartshorne argues that any statement which is, in 
principle, verifiable but not falsifiable is necessarily 
ture. Also, any statement which is falsifiable but not ver­
ifiable is necessarily false. As noted above, not even an 
omniscient being could verify "Nothing exists"; and it is 
falsified by every being that has ever existed or will exist. 
Thus, according to the Hartshornean criteria of necessary 
truth, "Nothing exists" is necessarily false.
Several reasons for thinking the criteria capture 
what we want to say about necessary truth and falsity can be 
adduced. First, the clearest examples we have of necessary
^Ibid.
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falsehoods are also falsifiable but not verifiable. The 
existence of round-squares, unborn mortals, or polygymous 
bachelors are logically impossible. Their existence is not 
only unverifiable but also falsifiable. The mere concept 
of a round-square is enough to falsify its existence. Sec­
ond, there are no clear counter-examples to Hartshorne's 
criteria. John Hick maintains that the proposition that we 
survive death is verifiable if true but not falsifiable if 
false since no one would be around to falsify it.^ Hick 
would be correct if he only said that an afterlife is not 
falsifiable by ordinary means. But ordinary methods of 
falsification do not exhaust the possibilities. God might, 
for example, reveal to humans that there is no afterlife. 
Furthermore, God's own experience is capable of falsifying 
the existence of an afterlife. Thus, it is not true that 
survival of death is unfalsifiable.
A more plausible counter-example to Hartshorne's
criteria is given by Hick,
Consider, for example, the proposition that "there are 
three successive sevens in the decimal determination of 
IT." So far as the value of ir has been worked out, it 
does not contain a series of three sevens, but it will 
always be true that such a series may occur at a point 
not yet reached in anyone's calculations. Accordingly, 
the proposition may one day be verified if it is true, 
but can never be falsified if it is false.°
^John Hick, "Theology and Verification," in The 




Once again it is important to distinguish between human (or 
nondivine) and divine capacity to falsify a proposition.
In order to know the value of ir, humans are obliged to actu­
ally do the requisite division. Temporal limitations pre­
clude ever knowing the complete value of a transcendental 
number. But God is an eternal being--temporally unlimited. 
This might mean that the divine life extends infinitely into 
the past and indefinitely into the future. In that case God 
would not face the nondivine limitations in knowing the 
value of IT. One may also question the legitimacy of con­
ceiving God's knowledge of mathematical, logical, and geo­
metric truths as in any way similar to nondivine knowledge 
of these truths. Humans are obliged to learn that 7 - ^ 5  = 
12, but this may be 'innate' knowledge for God. Whether be­
cause of his infinite past life or because of an 'innate' 
knowledge of abstract truths, it seems that God's experience 
could falsify, if false, the proposition that three succes­
sive sevens occur in the decimal determination of ir. This 
means that we have yet to discover a counter-example to 
Hartshorne's criteria for necessary truth and falsity.
Since, according to these criteria, "Nothing exists" is nec­
essarily false, there is good reason to believe nonbeing is 
not genuinely conceivable.
Although he denied the coherence of the idea of non- 
being, Bergson suggested a way, that has appealed to many, 
of conceiving complete nothingness.
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There is, in fact, not a single object of our experience 
that we cannot suppose annihilated. Extend this annihi­
lation of a first object to a second, then to a third, 
and so on as long as you please: the nought [nonbeing] 
is the limit toward which the operation tends. And the 
nought so defined is the annihilation of everything.^
According to this view, if we take the denial of each state­
ment asserting the existence of some object in the world and 
combine these statements in a lengthy conjunction we have 
the meaning of "Nothing exists."
This argument for the coherence of the concept of 
nonbeing commits the fallacy of composition. It does not 
follow from our ability to deny the existence of any partic­
ular thing within the universe that we can deny the exis­
tence of the universe as a whole. The fallacy becomes more 
apparent when coupled with the argument that negative exis­
tential statements have positive implications. As Hartshorne 
says,
'There are no men in the room' affirms that every sub­
stantial part of the room contains something (if only 
air, or a 'vacuum' furnishing free passage to radiant 
energy) other than a man. (CS 159).
Defenders of the idea of nonbeing could perhaps make a per­
suasive argument that statements denying the existence of 
fictional characters carry no positive implications.  ̂ It is 
not clear what difference the nonexistence of leprechauns
^Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Arthur Mitchell 
trans. (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 304-305.
^For a discussion of this issue see William L. Reese, 
"Non-Being and Negative Reference," Process and Divinity, 
William L. Reese and Eugene Freeman, eds. [La Salle, Illinois: 
Open Court, 1964), pp. 311-323.
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makes in the actual world. But we have a fairly good idea 
that [and how) the nonexistence of actually existing things 
makes a difference. Suppose the Pope were, tomorrow, to 
disappear from the face of the earth leaving no clue as to 
his whereabouts. On a mundane level this would mean that 
his bed would not be slept in, certain documents would go 
unsigned, appointments would go unattended, etc. The social 
and political scene would also change. Suspicion would 
arise between heads of state that a conspiracy was afoot, 
the church machinery would be put into action to find a new 
Pope, and thousands would mourn the loss of their religious 
leader. Although the details of his absence are unpredict­
able, it is evident that the Pope's disappearance would not 
be a purely negative fact. The same truth holds, in prin­
ciple, for any other actually existing thing. The nonexis­
tence of pebbles, drops of water and the like would be less 
spectacular than the nonexistence of the Pope but no less 
real in their effects on the world. Thus, statements deny­
ing the existence of things within the world have implicit 
positive implications. Unless this fact can be remedied, 
it is a mistake to suppose that the possibility of denying 
the existence of each thing within the world makes possible 
a denial of Being as such.
Hartshorne suggests one other argument against the 
concept of nonbeing worth mentioning (if only because 
Craighead overlooks it). He asks, "If nothing were to exist.
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what would make this true? Bare nothing?" (CS 159). The 
principle implied by this question is that the truth of a 
proposition is determined by a state of affairs. There be­
ing a flower in the garden makes the statement "There is a 
flower in the garden" true. If the flower wilts or in some 
other way is destroyed, the statement becomes false. In 
either case, truth and falsity are founded upon what is the 
case. But if this principle is sound then there is no way 
"Nothing exists" could be true. For, by hypothesis, there 
would be no world, no state of affairs, to make it true.
To reply by calling nonbeing a state of affairs is to con­
fuse the issues. Nonbeing is not a state of affairs. It 
is, rather, a denial that there are states of affairs. If 
nonbeing is a state of affairs, then what is the difference 
between "The state of affairs, nonbeing, exists" and "There 
are no states of affairs"? This is a distinction without a 
difference. We conclude, therefore, that no state of af­
fairs could make "Nothing exists" a true statement. But a 
statement which could not conceivably be true is necessarily 
false.
We have seen several reasons for thinking that non- 
being is a pseudo-concept. But thus far, the discussion has 
failed to reveal an important ambiguity in the proposition 
"Nothing exists." The statement may mean (a) nothing non­
divine exists or (b) nothing nondivine or divine exists.
The arguments against the coherence of the concept of non-
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being, if sound, show that (b) is not a genuine possibility. 
Something, whether divine or nondivine, must exist. But it 
does not follow that (a) is necessarily false. It may be 
that "Something exists" is necessarily true but that the 
universe could fail to exist. Many theists hold that God 
could have chosen not to create a world. In that case, God 
would have existed but nondivine things would not. Since 
Hartshorne's theism requires that some nondivine things al­
ways have existed, the traditional view must be refuted.
The problem can be approached from two angles, from the 
standpoint of the world and from the standpoint of the di­
vine. The first is to ask whether all nondivine things 
could fail to exist. This question will involve us in the 
problem of the eternity of the world. The second angle from 
which to examine the problem is to ask whether any sense can 
be made of the concept of God existing without some world or 
other. I will argue that, (1) the debate between what I 
call finitism and infinitism concerning the eternity of the 
world is a stalemate, but (2) the concept of God existing 
without some world or other is not genuinely meaningful.
An important objection to the idea that the world 
has always existed is that the concept of an actually infi­
nite series of events in time is contradictory or paradoxi­
cal. Wishing to preserve the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, 
arguments concerning the impossibility of an actual infinite 
have been favorites among Jewish, Christian and Islamic
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philosophers. The Christian theologian, John Philoponus, 
was probably the first to use the argument.® He was followed 
by an impressive list of philosophers, not least of whom was 
St. Bonaventure.^® Recently, the argument has been revised 
in light of modern transfinite mathematics by William Lane 
Craig.
There are several arguments against the idea of an
actually infinite series of events in time. Kant's first
antinomy is a good example.
If we assume that the world has no beginning in time, 
then up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed, 
and there has passed away in the world an infinite ser­
ies of successive states of things. Now the infinity 
of a series consists in the fact that it can never be 
completed through successive synthesis. It thus fol­
lows that it is impossible for an infinite world-series 
to have passed away, and that a beginning of the world 
is therefore a necessary condition of the world's exis­
tence. 12
Hartshorne has long recognized the problems that arguments 
like this pose for his philosophy and seems never to have 
answered the arguments to his complete satisfaction, ". . .
I confess myself puzzled in the matter." (CS 235).^^
QWilliam Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from 
Plato to Leibniz (New York: Barnes § Noble, 1979), p. 52.
^®For an excellent exposition of Bonaventure's argu­
ments see Bernardino M. Bonansea, God and Atheism (Washing­
ton, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1979) , pp. 327-338.
^^William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argu­
ment (New York: Barnes 8 Noble, 1979).
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp 
Smith, trans. (London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 397.
^^For other comments concerning God and the actual 
infinite see CS 126.
100
Hartshorne is not alone. As Craig points out, "Contemporary 
philosophers have proved impotent to refute this reasoning.
It would be a mistake, to conclude from the inabil­
ity of philosophers to answer the problems posed by the idea 
of an actual infinite, that one should not believe that the 
past is actually infinite. As noted in Chapter I, no meta­
physical world-view is without its problems. As long as the 
problems in other positions are seen as greater than the 
problems in one's own position, there is justification for 
not capitulating to the opponent's arguments. This is 
Hartshorne's principle of least paradox. "One must decide 
which paradoxes are the really fatal ones, in comparison 
with those of contending positions." (CS 88). This is an 
important principle for evaluating the debate about the ac­
tual infinite since it can be demonstrated that there are at 
least as many (if not more) problems with the idea of a be­
ginning of time as with the idea of a temporal infinite.
Hartshorne mentions two problems with the idea of a 
first moment of time in Man's Vision of God. First, he 
argues :
Even a beginning is a change, and all change requires 
something changing that does not come to exist through 
that same change. The beginning of the world would 
have to happen to something other than the world, some­
thing which as tTîe subject of happening would be in a 
time that did not begin with the world. (MVG 233).
The other problem with the idea of a first temporal moment
^^Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 105.
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which Hartshorne mentions is that a first moment would never 
appear to be the first moment. An analogy with present day 
defenders of "Creation Science" illustrates the point. Be­
cause they believe the universe is so young, defenders of 
"Creation Science" are obliged to hold that God created the 
light from distant stars half way to earth to make it appear 
as though the light originated from the star. A similar 
paradox infects the view that there was a first moment of 
time. Since any event will appear to have come from some 
previous event, the so-called first event will never look 
like the first event. As Russell says, for all we know, God 
could have created the world five minutes ago.'*'̂  The uni­
verse must always appear older than it actually is. "A 
first moment of time would be an ontological lie through and 
through, a joke of existence upon itself." (MVG 234).
A problem with the idea that the universe's past is 
temporally finite which Hartshorne does not mention, is 
that, whatever age the universe is, it could not be conceived 
to be older. St. Bonaventure recognized this as a consequence 
of his view. According to Bonaventure, God was not free to 
make this world any older than it actually is.^^ To claim
^^Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London; 
George Allen § Unwin Ltd., 1921), pp. 159-160.
^^Francis J. Kovach, "The Question of the Eternity 
of the World in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas--A Critical 
Analysis," in Bonaventure ^ Aquinas, Robert Shahan and 
Francis J. Kovach, eds. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1976), p. 170.
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that the universe could have begun, say, two seconds earlier 
is to imply a measure of time outside the universe. But, 
according to Bonaventure, the first moment of creation marks 
the beginning of time. Hence, there could be no time inde­
pendent of the world. Nothing seems easier, however, than 
to imagine scientists discovering that the universe has 
existed for a longer time than previously believed. Of 
course, Bonaventure does say that it is this world that 
could not have been older. Perhaps God could have created 
another world, older than this one. The problem with this 
line of argument is that it presupposes a measure of time, 
independent of both worlds, in terms of which one world is 
said to be older than the other. But if, as Bonaventure 
holds, time begins with the creation of the world, then 
there is no independent standard of temporal duration.
Since the finitist's position is no less paradoxi­
cal than the infinitist's position, it is reasonable to de­
clare the debate surrounding the possibility of an actual 
infinite a stalemate. There is, however, one important con­
sideration which favors the infinitist's position. It is 
noteworthy that in Craig's discussion of this issue (the 
most careful in recent literature), there is no attempt to 
prove that there is a contradiction in the idea of an actual 
infinite. Craig's position is clear.
What I shall argue is that while the actual infinite 
may be a fruitful and consistent concept in the mathe­
matical realm, it cannot be translated from the mathe-
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matical world into the real world, for this would in­
volve counter-intuitive absurdities.
In order to argue that the concept of an actual infinite is 
contradictory, it would be necessary to become embroiled in 
the debate between mathematicians concerning the legitimacy 
of transfinite numbers. Craig is one of the few philosophers 
to have understood this point. Since, as Craig notes, the 
majority opinion in mathematical circles clearly favors the 
consistency of transfinite numbers, Craig steers a safe 
course in arguing only for the paradoxical or counter­
intuitive consequences of applying the concept of the actual 
infinite to the real world. The weight of authority in 
mathematics is presently against the idea that the concept 
of the actual infinite is contradictory. This fact can only 
favor the infinitist's position in the philosophical dispute 
concerning the eternity of the world. Both the finitist and 
the infinitist positions involve, in Craig's words, counter­
intuitive absurdities. Given the present state of mathe­
matical knowledge, however, only the infinitist can, with 
any assurance, claim that there is no contradiction in his 
position.
I have argued that the debate concerning the eternity 
of the world is a stalemate. Both positions result in para­
doxes. Insofar, then, Hartshorne's position is in no better 
standing than any of the alternatives (except for the proviso
^^Craig, The Kalâm Cosmological Argument, p. 69.
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that it is reasonable to believe that infinitism is free of 
inconsistency). Let us turn, therefore, to the problem of 
conceiving of God as existing without a world. Hartshorne 
offers two arguments that God requires some world or other, 
one which I find inconclusive, the other which I find con­
vincing.
The argument to which Hartshorne most often refers
is from the nature of creativity. Not even God, according
to Hartshorne, has the option not to create.
Suppose God had refrained from creating; the world 
would then not have existed; however, something else 
would also have existed, the decision itself. There 
would instead have been the decision not to create, 
or to create some world other than ours. This shows 
us that a free agent must create something iti himself, 
even if he decides not to create anything else; tor 
the decision, if free, is itself a creation (CS 9).
Hartshorne speaks as if God could have chosen not to create
the world. But it is clear that he does not think this is
genuinely possible. A further analysis of the concept of
creativity shows that creation requires antecedently given
data.
We know creativity only as a responding to prior stim­
uli, and if we refuse to allow an analogy between such 
ordinary creative action and the divine 'creating' of 
the cosmos, we are using a word whose meaning we cannot 
provide (CS 12).
Hartshorne is raising a familiar objection to the doctrine
of creation ex nihilo. If the idea of creation is to have
any recognizable meaning, then the divine form of creativity
must bear some analogy to ordinary examples of creativity.
But the doctrine of creation ex nihilo posits an absolute
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difference between divine and nondivine creation. If God's 
creativity requires antecedently given data and if God does 
not have the choice not to create, then the concept of God 
existing without a world is not genuinely conceivable.
I agree with Hartshorne that God must create, if 
only a new state of himself. But I am unconvinced by the 
argument that there is no basis for an analogy between cre­
ation ex nihilo and ordinary creativity. It is not incon­
ceivable that I should discover, within myself, the power 
to create certain objects merely by 'willing' their exis­
tence. Whenever I 'will' that there should be a penny in 
my desk drawer I discover that a penny appears there.
Humans do not, as a matter of fact, possess this ability.
But there does not appear to be any inconsistency in imag­
ining the possibility. It is on some such analogy that cre­
ation ex nihilo would have to be understood.
The argument from the nature of creativity is unsuc­
cessful. But Hartshorne suggests another argument which 
holds more promise for proving that God could not exist 
without some world or other.
And is not the notion of a knower knowing only himself 
absurd? Could even God observe a mere privation? I 
hold that we have no right to suppose this, since we 
have no idea what he would be observing as the objec­
tive situation.19
^^I am indebted to Gary Nowlin for this point.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "Negative Facts and the Analog­
ical Inference to 'Other Mind'," Dr - S . Radhakrishnan Sou­
venir Volume, J. P. Atreya, ed. (MoraFadad, India : Darshana
Int., 1964), p. 149.
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While there can be an analogy between creation from nothing 
and other conceivable kinds of creativity, there is no cor­
responding analogy between ordinary cases of self-knowledge 
and the putative divine knowledge of self. Humans are in­
curably social creatures whose self-knowledge is set against 
the backdrop of something that is not the self. A child has 
no clear knowledge of herself until she begins to distinguish 
her own individuality from the environment in which she is 
situated. Without such an environment of something that is 
"not-self," it is not clear how she could ever have self- 
knowledge. Unlike the child's knowledge of self, God's self- 
knowledge has no genesis. Since there is never a time when 
God does not know himself, he does not learn to distinguish 
himself from the world. The important point, however, is 
that there seems to be a connection between self-knowledge 
and knowledge of the not-self. Experience furnishes no ex­
amples to the contrary.
The classical theist's reply to this argument is 
that God's knowledge of the not-self is different from ordi­
nary examples of this kind of knowledge in that God's knowl­
edge creates its objects. If knowledge of an effect is 
known in the cause, then, in knowing himself, God knows 
things other than himself. We have already discussed the 
reasons why Hartshorne believes this view of God's knowledge 
is mistaken (cf. Ghapter III). Unless absolute determinism 
is true, knowledge of causes does not entail knowledge of
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the precise details of the effects. Another problem is that 
the traditional view of God's knowledge of the world does 
not answer the question with which we are concerned. The 
claim is that self-knowledge requires knowledge of the not- 
self. The question, then, is how God could have knowledge 
of himself if there were no world. It is no reply to this 
question to say that because God creates the world he knows 
the world. The assumption of the question is that God has 
not yet created the world. Prior to creating the world, God 
could have no knowledge of a not-self since, by hypothesis, 
there is no not-self. Thus, even if true, the traditional 
view of God's knowledge does not explain how God could knov; 
himself without a knowledge of the world. The most that the 
traditional theist can say is that in knowing himself, prior 
to the creation of the world, God has a knowledge of a pos­
sible not-self [cf. ^  11). But a merely possible world is 
not enough to ensure an actual self-knowledge. Once again, 
experience fails to provide the traditional theist with an 
adequate analogy on which to base his claim. For it is a 
universal feature of experience that knowledge of possible 
states of affairs presupposes an acquaintance with the actual 
world. Unless God's self-knowledge is totally unlike our 
own, it too requires a world--a not-self--in terms of which 
the knowledge can occur. Rather than use words, the meaning 
of which we have no idea, God's self-knowledge should be 
conceived as the eminent form of what in us is called self-
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knowledge. The idea of God as knowing himself, then, en­
tails the idea of some world or other.
The arguments thus far support Hartshorne's views 
that something or other necessarily exists and that, if God 
exists he does not exist without some world or other. Now, 
the impossibility of nonbeing at least shows that "Something 
exists" is necessary. Thus, the second lemma of the 
Hartshornean cosmological argument is already partially 
answered. Those who believe that what exists has no modal 
status must contend with the arguments thus far.^^ It might 
appear that by proving the necessary falsity of "Nothing 
exists" we have also proven that not everything is contin­
gent. But this is false since the two statements "Every­
thing that exists is contingent" and "Necessarily something 
exists" are subcontraries, not contradictories. There are 
many atheists who would agree to both propositions. Thus, 
the second half of the second lemma, "What exists is wholly 
contingent" must be argued.
Hartshorne suggests a line of reasoning similar to
the traditional cosmological argument to defeat A2(b).
. . . the necessity that at least something should exist 
is not intelligible apart from the idea of a being which 
exists necessarily (CS 283).
One way to read the argument is as follows: if everything
An extensive discussion of current disputes sur­
rounding ^  re modality can be found in Alvin Plantinga, 
The Nature oT^Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978),
Chapters I, II, III.
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is contingent then the universe is contingent. But, from 
the falsity of Al, the universe is not contingent. There­
fore, not everything is contingent. According to Russell, 
the first premise of the argument involves a fallacy of 
composition. If the parts of the universe are contingent 
it does not follow that the universe as a whole is contin­
gent.^^
While it is true as a matter of general principle 
that the nature of the whole cannot be inferred from the 
nature of the parts, there are many cases in which whole 
and parts share a common characteristic. If each of the
parts of a house is made of wood, then the house is made of 
wood. The claim of the premise in question is that there 
is no way many contingent things could be anything but con­
tingent. This seems right, as John Shepherd points out:
. . . if the constituents of the world are contingent 
the world itself must be so too, for contingency con­
cerns the existence of things and the existence of the 
world is nothing over and above the existence of all 
its constituents. Thus, though a whole may possess 
some qualities which its parts do not, the nature of 
its existence cannot be d i f f e r e n t .
^^See Russell's debate with Copleston in Hick's The 
Existence of God, pp. 173-174.
2 2John J. Shepherd, Experience, Inference and God 
[London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 24. It should be noted that
the thrust of Shepherd's own position is to contrast the 
contingency of the universe with the divine necessary exis­
tence. According to Shepherd, "each of these logically ex­
cludes the other as a mode of existence of one and same be­
ing." [pp. 117-118). Shepherd believes his argument re­
futes Hartshorne's claim that God is necessarily dependent 
on some world or other. A necessary being, says Shepherd,
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The world, considered merely as a collection of contingent 
entities, cannot explain the necessity of existence. Only 
by reference to a necessary being is the world of contingent 
things made intelligible.
If Hartshorne's cosmological argument proved only 
that there is a necessary being, the case for theism would 
have been substantially strengthened. Whether the necessary 
being is also proved to have all or most of the attributes 
normally ascribed to God is of little importance as far as 
the cumulative case is concerned. To prove the existence of 
a necessary being is a long way toward proving the existence 
of God. It is important, however, to demonstrate that there 
is more in the world than the necessarily existent. Philos­
ophers of no small stature have explicitly denied the reality 
of contingency--Parmenides, Shankara, Spinoza, Bradley and 
Blanshard to mention only a few. Furthermore, Hartshorne's
is dependent on nothing external to its existence. I sus­
pect Shepherd's argument rests on an ambiguity in the con­
cept of dependence. God does not depend on the universe 
for his existence in the same sense that the universe de­
pends upon God for its existence. Any particular universe 
depends upon the sustaining activity of God for its exis­
tence. God's existence, on the other hand, is dependent 
upon no particular state of affairs. Since Hartshorne be­
lieves that it is a necessary truth that something nondivine 
always exists, God's dependence on the universe is only the 
dependence of logical entailment. God's existence is not 
dependent on any particular universe that happens to exist 
but only on the abstract (and necessary) truth that there is 
a universe. Shepherd might reply by denying that something 
nondivine must exist. But as far as I can tell. Shepherd's 
arguments support no more than what Hartshorne affirms, 
namely, that no particular world exists of logical necessity.
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God has a contingent aspect. Indeed, the contingent is iden­
tified with the concrete. If God's existence and each aspect 
of his actually were necessary, he would, according to 
Hartshornean principles, be only an abstraction. Thus, the 
falsity of A3--"What exists is wholly necessary"--is essen­
tial to Hartshorne's theism.
Common sense is almost certainly against the neces­
sitarian. Contingency is felt as so pervasive an aspect of 
experience that to deny its reality seems to fly in the face 
of the most obvious of facts. For example, Alicia regrets 
her harsh words to Tamara. The regret implies she believes 
that she could have chosen her words more carefully. Fur­
thermore, contingencies are not simply referred to, they 
have genuine cognitive import. We can learn, in part, how 
to conduct our lives by thinking of what might have been.
Any philosophy which requires that such a basic feature of 
existence is a mere appearance is, by the nature of the case, 
subject to suspicion. But the fact that brilliant minds 
have cast their votes against contingency is enough to take 
the philosophy seriously.
Hartshorne's favorite argument against necessitar­
ianism is that it violates the principle of contrast (a sim­
ilar argument applies to those who believe everything is 
contingent). The contrasts to which Hartshorne refers are 
such ultimate contraries as simple/complex, abstract/concrete, 
object/subject, cause-effect, etc. The necessary/contingent
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contrast is also part of the list. The principle of con­
trast is that,
. . . the two poles of each contrast stand or fall to­
gether; neither is simply to be denied or explained 
away or called 'unreal'. For if either pole is real 
the contrast itself, including both poles, is so [CS 
99).
in general philosophers do not question the princi­
ple of contrast. Where there is cause there is effect, 
where there is effect, cause. The simple is simple only as 
related to something which is not simple, the complex.
The claim is that the necessary/contingent distinction is no 
different. We have already seen how the concept of a con­
tingent being implies the concept of a necessary being.
Does the entailment hold the other way? According to the 
principle of contrast, the concept of necessity should im­
ply the concept of contingency. Indeed, this is so. As 
Hartshorne notes,
A thing is necessary if no alternative to it is possi­
ble; but this presupposes a meaning and a referent for 
"possible" and for "alternative" which the doctrine 
that all things are necessary cannot provide (PSG 195).
In denying the reality of contingency, the necessitarian
has denied a basis for the distinction between necessity
and contingency. But since the necessary is defined in
23Notice that the principle of contrast does not en­
tail the claim that an entity must occupy only one pole of 
the contrast. Wittgenstein's point that something may be 
simple in relation to a certain whole and complex in rela­
tion to another does not argue against the validity of the 
principle of contrast but only against a rather naive inter­
pretation of it.
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terms of the contingent (that is, that to which no alterna­
tive is possible), there must be a distinction. Otherwise, 
the concept of necessity is deprived of meaning.
Necessitarians do not usually deny the principle of 
contrast but try to account for the contrast between neces­
sity and contingency by giving expressions such as "might 
have been otherwise," or "may be" an epistemic reading. 
After explaining his brand of Spinozism, Blanshard asks,
Does this mean that the language of "may" and "might" 
is meaningless? Not at all. It is perfectly legiti­
mate, given the knowledge that we have, to say that it 
may rain tomorrow. But the statement is then about 
the extent of what we know.
The contingent is, then, a function of our "invincible ig­
norance." If we could only see things, as a whole, or from 
the standpoint of omniscience, it would be clear that what 
we thought was contingent, is really necessary.
The problem with Blanshard's argument is that an 
epistemic meaning of contingency is not enough to insure a 
genuine contrast with necessity. Blanshard can perhaps ex­
plain how we come to use the concept of contingency, but 
not how we can attach a clear meaning to necessity if con­
tingency is not real. If, in the final analysis--or from 
the standpoint of omniscience--there is no contingency, 
then how is the notion of necessity meaningful? If every­
thing is necessary there are no real alternatives or
Brand Blanshard, "Reply to Charles Hartshorne," 
The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard, Paul A. Schilpp, ed. 
(La Salle, Illinois; Open Court, 1980), p. 642.
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possibilities in terms of which necessity could be defined. 
Have we not reached the night in which all cows are black? 
This is not to say that notions involving contingency are 
not sometimes epistemic. But they are not merely epistemic. 
There is more to contingency than the concept of ignorance 
can exhaust. Indeed, ignorance itself is understandable 
only in terms of contingency. To be ignorant of something 
is to fail to know something that could be known.
Against necessitarianism, Hartshorne also points out 
that, apart from contingency, becoming is explained away (CS 
283). Since this argument is developed in the next chapter 
we can leave the topic of necessitarianism and consider the 
view that there are both contingent and necessary things, 
but nothing is divine.
An argument for theism is not necessarily deficient 
if it fails to prove that the necessary being has all of the 
characteristics of God. Failure to prove X is not a proof 
of not-X. Other arguments may provide support for the belief 
that the necessary being is God. Nevertheless, there is a 
presumption in favor of the view that a necessary being must 
be divine. For it is not clear that anything but a divine 
being could be necessary. A nondivine being is, by defini­
tion, imperfect. But imperfection involves exclusiveness 
from other possibilities. For example, an imperfect knower 
is one to whom a certain amount of information is lacking ; 
or again, an imperfect love is a love that fails to include
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the beloved totally. Similarly, imperfection of existence 
implies an exclusion, or cutting off of certain possibili­
ties for being. A being which exists necessarily is, so far 
as the concept of existence is concerned, more perfect than 
a contingently existing being. Thus it seems likely that an 
imperfect, or nondivine being, could not exist necessarily.
Alvin Plantinga points out that necessary existence
is one of several "great making" qualities. But a thing
might exist necessarily without having any other great making
qualities. In that case, the necessary being would not be 
2 5divine. What is at issue, however, is whether an imperfect 
being could have a great making quality. Could a nondivine 
being have a divine property?
In a sense, God and creatures must be conceived as 
sharing properties. Although a creature is an imperfect 
knower, it is a knower nonetheless. Creaturely power is 
limited, divine power is unlimited, but both are power. In 
another sense, however, being imperfect precludes having cer­
tain divine attributes. To be limited in space and time is 
to fail to be unlimited in knowledge. My death, for example, 
prevents me from knowing what happens afterwards. The same 
holds, mutatis mutandis, for the other divine attributes, 
omnipotence, omnipresence and omnibenevolence.
Could one be limited in knowledge, power or goodness 
and necessarily exist? There are certain deities, in
7 5Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, pp. 213-214.
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religious literature, which fit this description. The evil 
deity of Zoroastrianism, Ahriman, is the best example. Ac­
cording to Zoroastrian mythology, Ohrmazd, the good deity, 
outwits and finally overpowers Ahriman in the final battle 
between good and evil. Although he necessarily exists,
Ahriman is limited not only in goodness [he is the evil 
deity), but also in knowledge and p o w e r . T h e  question is 
whether something like Ahriman is genuinely conceivable.
If it is possible for a necessary being to be limited 
in knowledge, power, and goodness, then it is not part of 
the essence of such a being to be omniscient, omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent. If the necessary being possesses these at­
tributes at all, it is only accidentally. The theist must 
find this completely unacceptable. For God is, by hypothesis, 
a necessary being, but is not all-knowing, all-powerful or 
all-good merely by accident. These are essential properties 
of God. It follows that if something like Ahriman is pos­
sible, the existence of God is impossible. Thus, if it could 
be shown that there is a being whose essence is to be omni­
potent, omniscient or omnibenevolent--since such a being
"Ahriman, when the battle is over, is not destroyed 
as a substance--for a substance is by definition indestruc­
tible- -but he is, to use the Pahlavi word a-kàr-ênit, he is 
'put out of action' or 'deprived of actuality': he is rele­
gated to an eternal potency which can never be actualized 
again, or in more everyday language for people unfamiliar 
with the Aristotelian jargon, 'they drag Ahriman outside the 
sky and cut off his head'.", R. C. Zaehner, The Teachings of 
the Magi (London: Sheldon Press, 1975), p. SÔ.
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would also have to exist necessarily--the existence of 
Ahriman would have been shown to be impossible, that is, 
omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence would have been 
shown to be essential, not accidental properties, of a nec­
essary being. The other elements of Hartshorne's global 
argument attempt to accomplish just that. The design argu­
ment argues to a being whose essence is to exert universal 
influence (i.e., to be omnipotent); the epistemic argument 
concludes to the existence of an omniscient being; the moral 
and aesthetic arguments reason to a being who is wholly good 
and beautiful. If these arguments are successful then 
Hartshorne's claim that, "The necessary aspect of existence 
is . . . positively intelligible, if at all, only as the
existence of deity" ( ^  283-284), is true.
Hartshorne seems to think that the aid of the other 
arguments is not necessary to prove that the necessary being 
is divine. But I am not sure how this is possible. Whether 
it is possible or not to prove, without other arguments, that 
a necessary being is divine, is, in the context of the global 
argument irrelevant. For the other arguments can be used. 
This much Hartshorne would not deny. Let us, then, postpone 
the question of Ahriman's existence until we have examined 
Hartshorne's other arguments.
Due to the a priori nature of Hartshorne's cosmolog­
ical argument, many criticisms aimed at traditional formula­
tions of the argument simply miss the mark. Objections
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■which rely on the assumption that the cosmological argument 
is an attempt to apply the principle of sufficient reason to 
the universe as a whole are irrelevant. Hartshorne makes no 
attempt to show why there is something rather than nothing. 
The assertion that something exists is, for Hartshorne, not 
empirical at all, but an a priori necessity. Furthermore, 
since there is no mention of the concept of cause, objec­
tions to a first-cause argument are also beside the point. 
Perhaps the only objection that is relevant is Kant's con­
tention that the cosmological argument stands or falls with 
the ontological argument. With this, Hartshorne agrees.
But Hartshorne does not have as low an opinion of the onto­
logical argument as Kant. If Hartshorne's long career has 
accomplished nothing else, it has at least shown that the 
ontological argument is not as easily refuted as some have 
believed.
With these thoughts, let us leave the cosmological 
argument and consider the last in the famous triad of the- 
istic proofs--the design argument.
CHAPTER VI 
THE DESIGN ARGUMENT
The design argument for God's existence--or as it is 
sometimes called, the teleological argument--reasons either 
from the order of the universe as a whole or from particular 
examples of order within the universe to the existence of a 
divine ordering power. From its beginnings in Plato, the 
argument, incorporating the many attacks of sceptics, 
reached a high level of sophistication in the writings of 
P. R. Tennant.^ No one, however, in the argument's long 
history, ever understood the design argument as anything 
more than an empirical approach to God's existence, giving 
us at best good inductive or probabilistic grounds for be­
lieving in God. Hartshorne's version of the design argument 
is noteworthy if only because it purports to be, like the 
ontological proof, an a priori argument. In the context of 
the global argument, the design proof is meant to establish
'Plato's version of the argument is in The Laws,
Book X. F. R. Tennant's "Cosmic Teleology" is in his Philo - 




the conceivability of God by showing that any cosmic order 
requires a divine cosmic ordering power. Of course, if any 
cosmic order requires God then, if there is a cosmic order, 
it follows not merely that God is conceivable but that God 
exists.
Hartshorne has discussed the design argument often.
In Man's Vision of God (1941) the argument is considered
only in its traditional empirical form and is rejected as
inconsistent with the idea that God must be conceived as' a
necessary being (MVG 253). But as early as 1945 Hartshorne
explicitly states the design argument in its a priori form
(RSP 192) . Perhaps the most comprehensive treatm.ent of the
argument is in A Natural Theology for Our Iime (58-62) . in
Creative Synthesis (1970) the proof is incorporated as an
element in the global argument (CS 281). The most recent
2treatment of the design argument was in 1972.
Hartshorne is fond of presenting the design argument 
in terms of four alternatives, the last being the theistic 
alternative. The object is to show that only the theistic 
option is intelligible. The alternatives are as follows.
There is no cosmic order.
There is cosmic order but no cosmic ordering power.
There is cosmic order and ordering power, but the power 
is not divine.
There is comsic order and divine power. (CS 281).
2Charles Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the 
Existence of God," in Religious Language and Knowledge, 
Robert H. Ayers and William T. Blackstone, eds. (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), pp. 62-75.
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The advantage of this formulation of the argument is that 
it makes explicit the price one must pay for rejecting the­
ism. The argument is easily put into a more conventional 
form by transforming the first three alternatives into prem­
ises supporting the fourth alternative as the conclusion.
1. There is cosmic order.
2. If there is cosmic order then there is cosmic
ordering power.
3. If there is cosmic ordering power then the power 
is divine.
4. Therefore, there is a divine cosmic ordering power. 
This version of the argument has the advantage of making 
explicit the positive claims for which Hartshorne must argue.
The validity of the argument is also apparent from this for­
mulation. From premises 2 and 3 it follows that cosmic ordei
requires a divine ordering power. Ivith the additional prem­
ise that there is cosmic order it follows that God, the 
divine cosmic ordering power, exists. All that remains to 
be seen is whether the premises are true.
The argument begins from the uncontroversial claim 
that there is cosmic order. Although chance, spontaneity, 
and novelty may play an important role in our understanding 
of nature, there is little doubt that the universe exhibits 
discoverable patterns and regularities. The point is not 
that disorder is nonexistent but that some degree of order 
is present throughout the universe. Thus, in claiming that 
there is cosmic order, Hartshorne is not committed to the 
further claim that the order is absolute, exceptionless, or 
perfect. Indeed, according to the metaphysics that
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Hartshorne adopts any genuinely conceivable state of affairs 
involves elements of both regularity and irregularity.
Hartshorne's view is that an unordered universe is 
not genuinely conceivable. Traditional design arguments 
proceed on the assumption that the observable order in the 
world--or some aspect thereof--serves as the empirical prem­
ise of the argument. Tennant, a defender of the empirical 
design argument says,
. . . the primary epistemological contribution to teleo­
logical reasoning consists in the fact the world is more 
or less intelligible, in that it happens to be more or 
less a cosmos, when conceivably it might have been a 
self-subs istent and determinate 'chaos' in which similar 
events never occured, none recurred, universals had no 
place, relations no fixity, things no nexus of determi­
nation, and 'real' categories no foothold.^
The premise that there is cosmic order is not empirical un­
less coherent meaning can be given to the idea of a purely 
disordered or chaotic universe. Normal usage of the con­
cepts of disorder and chaos presuppose a minimal amount of 
order. For example, the furniture in a warehouse may ex­
hibit no purposive arrangement and so we say the furniture 
is not ordered. But there is at least enough order for there 
to be furniture and a warehouse. Or again, a scientist may 
speak poetically of the meaningless, chaotic collision of 
atoms. Once again, there must be at least an atomic order, 
that is, enough order to maintain atoms in existence. When
^Tennant, Philosophical Theology, p. 82. Richard 
Swinburne makes the same point, "The universe might so nat­
urally have been chaotic, but it is not--it is very orderly." 
The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.
136.
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Tennant speaks of things having "no nexus of determination," 
or of 'real' categories having no foothold, it is not clear 
that he is speaking of anything that could be conceived.
The argument from the ordinary usage of words like
order and disorder casts serious doubt on the possibility of
a completely unordered universe. But Hartshorne prefers
another argument. According to neoclassical metaphysics,
to be knowable and to be are the same. Hartshorne would
agree with Peirce who says.
Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but 
knowable reality; but over against all possible cogni­
tion, there is only the self-contradictory. In short, 
cognizability (in its widest sense) and being are not
merely^metaphysically the same, but are synonymous
terms . ̂
If Peirce is correct, and if a chaotic universe is unknow­
able then it could nor exist. But, as Hartshorne notes, an 
absolutely unordered universe would be absolutely unknowable 
since no knowledge could exist in it (CS 284). In this re­
spect, a chaotic world is indistinguishable from nonbeing 
since neither could, in principle, be known. Against this 
view, one could argue that the possibility of a chaotic 
universe is knowable even though it (the chaotic universe) 
would be unknowable by anything existing within it. 
Hartshorne would counter this suggestion by asking what dis­
tinguishes a knowledge of the possibility of a chaotic uni­
verse from knowledge of the possibility of nonbeing. Since
C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders 
Peirce, volume V, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, eds. 
(Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 152.
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no one ever has, or could have experienced either one, it 
is not clear how a distinction could be made. Indeed, 
Hartshorne maintains that nonbeing indistinguishable from 
pure chaos (CS 284). But, as the discussion of the cosmolog­
ical argument makes clear, philosophers have failed to give 
coherent sense to the idea of nonbeing. Thus, if chaos is 
indistinguishable from nonbeing it shares the same fate; and 
we may safely assume that neither concept corresponds to any­
thing that is or could be. The arguments examined thus far 
point in this direction.
Let us now move to the second premise, which seems 
most in need of justification. Hartshorne claims that cos­
mic order requires a cosmic ordering power. The burden of 
proof is on Hartshorne to justify this claim since there are 
many examples of order which do not require an ordering 
power. Stalactites and stalagmites are always ordered in 
such a way that one is directly above the other.^ Yet no 
one believes that this order requires an ordering power.
The order of the universe may be of a similar nature. 
Hartshorne must give grounds for thinking that the order of 
the universe, unlike other kinds of order, requires an or­
dering power. This brings us to the heart of Hartshorne's 
proof. Hartshorne's design argument rests on a certain view 
of reality--of what it means to be real. Let us first
^Michael Scriven, Primary Philosophy (New York; 
McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 126.
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examine the logic of the design argument without questioning 
the truth of Hartshorne's creationist philosophy. We may 
then turn a critical eye to the Hartshornean metaphysic.
The cornerstone of Hartshorne's design argument is 
the claim that the natural order is an instance of social 
order, that is, order among a variety of active, or partly 
free individuals. The individuals in this case are the ul­
timate units of reality, what Whitehead calls actual enti­
ties. As the name suggests, actual entities are inherently 
active, not static. In the tradition of process philosophy, 
Hartshorne understands the dynamic, changing, and growing 
side of things to be more fundamental than the passive, the 
inert, and static. To say the elements of reality are in­
herently active is to say they are partly free, or self- 
creative. According to Hartshorne, "To be is to create."
(CS 1). The freedom of actual entities is never absolute, 
but is always within certain limits. The limits to freedom 
are other acts of freedom.
Thus the freedom of present creativity is not absolute, 
or in a vacuum. It accepts limits. But these limits 
are set by other acts of freedom . . . (£S 7).
It is perhaps misleading to say that present creativity "ac­
cepts limits." There is no question of an individual re­
fusing to accept any limits. The limits --previous acts of 
freedom--define the backdrop within which the present act 
of freedom occurs. Nevertheless, the present reality is an 
emergent synthesis from the past. Since every actual entity
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is partly self-creative, its causal antecedents are at most 
necessary, not sufficient conditions, for the free act.
To speak of the limits to freedom is another way of
speaking of order. Without limits to free creativity, order
would be impossible. This is the nerve of Hartshorne's
design argument.
Freedom is limited only by acts of freedom already per­
formed; but divine acts of cosmic relevance and influ­
ence must be included, to account for cosmic order.
(CS 9)
Order is explained in terms of the free decisions of indi­
viduals. According to Hartshorne, if there were no individ­
ual, inclusive of the universe, then there would be no ex­
planation of cosmic order. Hartshorne says.
Thus, in the reasonable argument from design, we may 
argue that if all interaction is supposed to be local 
and more or less unknowing, it is not to be understood 
how reality could be or remain anything but a "shape­
less chaos"--to quote Jefferson's phrase, used in this 
connection. Only universal interaction can secure uni­
versal order, or impose and maintain laws of nature 
cosmic in scope and relevant to the past history of 
the universe. (OT 53).
Hartshorne says elsewhere, "the axiom here is that plurality
of agents amounts, in the absence of a supreme agent, to
chaos." (RSP 92).
One should not suppose that because Hartshorne 
speaks of an alternative between the existence of a cosmic 
ordering power and "shapeless chaos" that he assumes that a 
completely unordered universe is possible. As we have al­
ready seen, Hartshorne does not believe cosmic chaos is 
genuinely conceivable. Not even God, says Hartshorne, has
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"the choice between world-order and chaos." ( W  133). Thus, 
it cannot be said that God rescues the world from chaotic 
non-being since there is no possibility of complete chaos. 
Nevertheless, God is necessary to explain the cosmic order 
since no nondivine individual or group of individuals could 
secure this order. Local interaction, that is, the inter­
action between nondivine individuals, could only result in 
a local, not a cosmic order.
Without calling the creationist philosophy itself
into question, the only alternative to the idea of a supreme
ordering power, is the idea of mutual adjustment. If more
than one ordering power is assumed, none having universal
influence, then the only explanation of cosmic order that
could be given is in terms of the mutual adjustment of free
agents. Hartshorne rejects an explanation of order in terms
of mutual adjustment as question-begging.
If all individuals make their own decisions, act with a 
certain spontaneity, what prevents universal conflict 
and confusion? Can all things freely conspire together 
to make an orderly world? Each adjusts to all the 
others; but one cannot adjust to chaos. Hence the no­
tion of "mutual adjustment" presupposes the solution of 
the problem of order, and does not furnish it. ( W  133).
Once again, one may be mislead by Hartshorne's reference to 
chaos into thinking that the argument presupposes the con­
ceivability of a purely chaotic universe. But this is not 
the case. Hartshorne's point is that the idea of mutual ad­
justment, on a cosmic scale, presupposes at least a minimal 
amount of cosmic order. If there are individuals adjusting
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to each other to create order there must be at least enough 
order for the individuals to exist. But if we consider 
mutual adjustment on a cosmic scale, there must be a cosmic 
order to allow for this adjustment. The idea of mutual ad­
justment presupposes a relatively stable context within which 
the adjustment can occur. Thus, cosmic mutual adjustment 
presupposes cosmic order.
One might grant Hartshorne his metaphysic of crea­
tivity but question the need for a cosmic ordering power to 
explain cosmic order. According to Hartshorne's view, only 
contingent truths require explanation. A necessary truth 
is its own explanation--it could not be otherwise. But, as 
we have seen, Hartshorne believes that the existence of cos­
mic order is a necessary truth. Why should cosmic order re­
quire any further explanation? This criticism rests on an 
ambiguity in the idea of cosmic order. According to 
Hartshorne, the existence and order of the world is no acci­
dent. It is necessarily true that there is an orderly uni­
verse. But Hartshorne denies that any particular instance 
of cosmic order is necessary (RSP 51). The laws of nature 
are contingent, but it is not contingent that there are 
natural laws 186). What God is required to explain is 
not the necessary truth that there is some form of cosmic 
order; rather, God's ordering power explains the particular 
cosmic order that happens to exist.
I personally take the laws of nature as the chief iden­
tifiable aspects of God's creative action. So far as
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the laws are contingent, they imply divine creativity, 
and I agree with Aristotle that nothing eternal is con­
tingent, hence no law is eternal unless it is without 
possible alternative.°
Just as God has both necessary and contingent aspects--God's 
existence is necessary, his actuality is contingent--so the 
order of nature is both necessary and contingent. The laws 
of nature, according to Hartshorne, change; but it is neces­
sary that there are natural laws.
The internal logic of Hartshorne's creationist meta­
physic, according to which the universe is composed of a 
variety of partly free or self-creative individuals, demands 
that there be one individual whose influence has cosmic 
scope. Since the limits to freedom are the measure of the 
order in the world, cosmic order requires a cosmic ordering 
power. But what reason is there to believe that the uni­
verse is full of free creatures? The immediate evidence of 
the senses seems to dictate the opposite conclusion. The 
universe is full of inert, dead, and inactive stuff. Fur­
thermore, even in those arenas of nature in which there is 
activity, one may question the propriety of labeling that 
activity free, or of speaking of the individuals involved 
as self-creative. In what sense, for example, is the activ­
ity of the pumping of a heart free? The point is that if 
the creationist metaphysic is either false or meaningless, 
then Hartshorne's design argument fails to establish the
^Charles Hartshorne, "Paul Weiss's The God We Seek,"
Review of Metaphysics 25, Supplement (June 1972), p. 112.
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existence of God.
Although a full treatment of a creationist philos­
ophy is impossible within the confines of this work, a few 
remarks should be offered in its defense. Like Whitehead, 
Hartshorne takes creativity to be the most generic feature 
of existence. In Whitehead's words,
'Creativity' is the universal of universals characteriz­
ing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate prin­
ciple by which the many, which are the universe dis­
junctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the 
universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things 
that the many enter into complex unity.?
Every ultimately real thing--every actual entity-- is an in­
stance of creativity. "The many become one and are in­
creased by the one. As already noted, process philosophers 
(like Whitehead and Hartshorne) believe becoming is more 
basic than being. Hartshorne's argument for this view is 
that the concept of becoming is more inclusive than the con­
cept of being.
Becoming or process can be so conceived that it entirely 
includes its own contrast with being, while being cannot 
be conceived to include its contrast with becoming.
More precisely: What becomes and what does not become
(but simply is) together constitute a total reality which 
becomes.^
Hartshorne is not saying that becoming can exist without
A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, corrected 
edition, Donald Sherburne and David Ray Griffen, eds. (New 
York: Free Press, 1978), p. 21.
^Ibid.
n Charles Hartshorne, Replys to questions in Philo­
sophical Interrogations, Sydney and Beatrice Rome, edsl [New 
York: Holt, Rinehart Winston, 1964), p. 321.
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being, for wherever there is process or change, there is 
that which is unchanging. Hartshorne agrees with Aristotle 
that "all change requires something changing that does not 
come to exist through that same change." (MVG 233). In 
this sense, becoming and being are equally real.
Philosophers of being sometimes argue that since an 
unchanging reality can exist independent of change, the un­
changing reality (being) must be ontologically more basic.
For example, a person remains self- identical through a 
variety of changes--the self-identical 'being' exists inde­
pendent of these changes. But this argument rests on an 
ambiguity in the idea of independence. The color red exists 
independent or its particular instantiations. But it does 
not follow that red exists independent of all instantiations. 
Similarly, a man retains his self-identity through many 
changes. But who has shown that the man can exist indepen­
dent of all changes? Hartshorne and other process philos­
ophers admit that being is independent of any particular 
change but deny that being is independent of all change.
One of the chief merits of process philosophy is that it 
affirms the contrast between being and becoming without re­
ducing either side of the contrast to a mere appearance, 
illusion, or accidental reality. For Hartshorne neither 
process nor being is accidentally real. Both are essential, 
although being is an abstraction from a reality that becomes. 
For Hartshorne, the distinction between being and becoming
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corresponds to the distinction between the abstract and the 
concrete. Both the abstract and the concrete are real, but 
the abstract is an aspect of the concrete, being is an as­
pect of becoming.
The fact that nature, in its grosser features, ex­
hibits an apparent lack of activity in no way detracts from 
the view that the most concrete entities are units of be­
coming. The proper conclusion is that objects such as rocks 
and planets are not the most concrete entities. Hartshorne's 
view is that inanimate objects are collections or groupings 
(called societies) of the more concrete actual entities.
This conclusion is supported by empirical considerations.
The inactivity of a rock, as a whole, tends to conceal the 
fact that its molecular constituents are in constant motion. 
Surrounded on every side by inert material objects, it is 
easy to forget that beneath the veil of inactivity is a 
hidden world--that is, a world hidden to our unaided sense 
organs--of bustling restlessness. Nature is forever chan­
ging, however static at any moment it may appear. Evolu­
tionary theories in biology and astronomy also support this 
view. Stars and galaxies are constantly being born or dying; 
and the biosphere is an arena of the birth and death of 
species. The universe is in flux, far from the static whole 
envisaged by some of our ancestors.
This restlessness of nature is nowhere better exem­
plified than in human beings. According to Hartshorne, the
133
knowledge we have of our own emotional and bodily activity 
provides a direct insight into a fundamental truth about 
the nature of things. Although it is clear that conscious­
ness is restricted to higher forms of animal life, it seems 
equally clear that the dynamism characterizing so much of 
nature is shared by conscious beings. Hartshorne maintains 
that the activity found in atoms, molecules, cells, or lower 
life forms is manifested in eminent form in human conscious­
ness. Thus, the freedom and creativity in humans is found 
in lesser degrees in other creatures. This is not to say 
that, for example, a molecule is creative in exactly the 
same sense as a human being. There are greater and lesser 
degrees of creativity.
And this phrase "creative activity," or "creative be­
coming," only escapes redundancy because there are de­
grees of creativity, implying the zero case as lower 
limit of thought, a necessarily fictitious entity, like 
"perfect lever," or "wholly isolated particle." (LP 
166] .
Some might object that talk of creativity or free­
dom in subhuman creatures is an unwarranted anthropomorphism. 
Such an objection reveals too narrow a conception of psycho­
logical predicates. As Hartshorne remarks, "They betray 
themselves by their reiterated charge that to psychologize 
everything is to humanize everything--as if an animal caught 
in a trap must become a man to suffer." 120). Attri­
buting a minimal amount of freedom to subhuman individuals 
does not, therefore, warrant the charge of anthropomorphism. 
Indeed, if, as Hartshorne claims, the ideas of freedom and
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creativity have "an unlimited breadth or flexibility ÇBH 
119), then there would be no apparent reason why all indi­
viduals could not, in some measure, however slight, be free. 
Both Hartshorne's metaphysical argument for the foundational 
nature of becoming and empirical considerations lend support 
to this creationist philosophy.
The argument thus far supports the claim that cosmic 
order requires a cosmic ordering power. It has yet to be 
shown that the cosmic ordering power (COP) is divine, that 
is, that the ordering power has all of the attributes nor­
mally ascribed to God. If the entire burden of proving the­
ism rested on the design argument, this deficiency would be 
a serious obstacle to finding a rational basis for theistic 
belief. But we have already seen that several arguments may 
be used to prove God's existence. Nevertheless, Hartshorne 
offers a reason for believing that the COP is divine.
We have some insight in experience into the power of 
agents over other agents. A man as conscious being 
sways his bodily constituents (cells, etc.). He is 
incomparably the most powerful agent in his psycho­
physical system. He is also, we all in effect assume, 
incomparably the most important and valuable. His 
experience sums up what is going on in the system 
vastly more than any events involved in the other 
agents, taken individually. By analogy we conceive 
the cosmic ordering power as the supreme or eminent 
form of awareness. (CS 285).
Hartshorne's point is that the best analogy in human expe­
rience for conceiving the relationship between a COP and 
individuals within the cosmos is the mind-body relation.
The cosmic orderer is related to individuals within the
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cosmos as the human mind is related to the human body. But, 
just as the mind is superior to its bodily parts in knowl­
edge, worth, and power, so the cosmic orderer is superior to 
individuals in the cosmos.
The analogy with the human body is incomplete and in 
some respects misleading if understood too literally. The 
purpose of the analogy is to isolate certain features of the 
mind-body relation which might apply to the COP-world rela­
tion. We are not to believe, for example, that the universe 
has arms, legs, muscles, bones, nerves, or blood vessels. 
Nevertheless, the power the mind has over its bodily con­
stituents is similar to the power the COP has over worldly 
constituents. To be sure, the mind is not responsible for 
all of the order within the body--although recent work with 
biofeedback techniques have demonstrated that the mind is 
(or can be) responsible for more than was hitherto believed. 
We can say, however, that the mind exerts more control than 
any single member of the bodily complex and is therefore the 
most powerful member of the psychophysical system. Further, 
one may speculate that any bodily order for which the mind 
is not responsible is due to factors pertaining to the body's 
external environment, a feature not shared by the COP's 
'body'. The human body is, after all, part of the larger 
ordered whole which is the universe. But, as Hartshorne 
notes, there is no environment external to the universe (NT 
98). This fact may explain why the cosmic 'body', unlike
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its creaturely counterparts, does not undergo decay and dis­
solution.
To have an external envirnoment is to depend upon fac­
tors not under immediate control, and sooner or later 
these factors may happen to conflict fatally with one's 
internal needs. But the universe as a whole, if it is 
an organism at all, must immediately control all its 
parts; so what is to prevent it from getting unsurpas­
sable limits to disintegration in relation to construc­
tion? (MVG 181).
It is reasonable to assume that the death of the human body
is the inevitable result of the body being only a part, or
a fragment of the universe, and that the body depends upon
other things for its existence. To be dependent for one's
existence on external conditions is to be subject to death.
But the universe cannot be dependent in the way a human body
is dependent. Thus, the analogy with a human body breaks
down at this point for good reasons.
If, as many scientists believe, the second law of 
thermodynamics is applicable to the universe as a whole there 
may be some analogy between the decay of the human body and 
the dissolution of the universe. According to Hartshorne, 
the universe cannot cease to exist. It may, however, loose 
its present form and acquire another. As noted above, 
Hartshorne holds that the laws of nature are contingent, but 
that it is not contingent that there are natural laws. It 
may be that the universe, as we know it, is 'running down', 
that is, increasing in entropy. What will happen when the 
process is complete is not known. But if Hartshorne (fol­
lowing Whitehead) is correct, the present universe will
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eventually be superseded by a new cosmic epoch with laws of 
its own. One reason for the succession of cosmic epochs is 
aesthetic. Beauty requires both unity and contrast, simi­
larity and difference. If the universe as a whole is beau­
tiful then an element of contrast is required; "eventually 
the repetitions of the patterns disclosed by current physics 
would call for relief from monotony in new patterns." (RSP 
50). The claim that the universe as a whole is beautiful is 
supported in chapter IX. Suffice it to say that the theory 
of cosmic epochs is not an arbitrary addition to Hartshorne's 
metaphysics.
An important consequence of Hartshorne's analogy is 
that God cannot remain unaffected by what happens in the 
universe. What occurs in the human body influences the mind. 
Similarly, God is influenced by what happens in the universe. 
Traditionally, theists have followed Aristotle in the idea 
that God is immutable. We have seen, however, that God, 
neoclassically conceived, is not immutable. Thus, Hartshorne 
is able to accommodate (and welcomes) this consequence of 
the analogy. Creaturely decisions have a real affect on the 
divine life.
Before closing, it would be instructive to survey 
the major objections to the design argument and see what, if 
any, force they have against Hartshorne's version of the 
argument. Some objections have already been covered. Hume's 
queries of why the natural order requires explanation and
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why, if it does require explanation, it is to be explained 
by reference to God have been addressed. The natural order 
is an instance of social order and thus requires explanation. 
And the cosmic ordering power is best conceived as a cosmic 
mind exerting influence over its 'bodily' constituents.
Other objections have been given implicit replies. For ex­
ample, tc the question of why the designer's mind is not as 
much in need of explanation as the world he designs, it can 
be replied that the order of God's mind is self-imposed and 
is thus not an instance of social order (RSP 192). Or again, 
some critics claim that an experience of several universes 
is a prerequisite to knowing that the order of our own uni­
verse points to an intelligent designer. But we only have 
experience of one universe. Hartshorne's claim, however, 
is that any conceivable universe requires an intelligent 
designer. The argument is not inductive, it is a priori■
The only serious objection that has not been covered is the 
problem of evil.
Prima facie, the existence of evil in the world 
argues against the existence of a good designer. On occa­
sion, Hartshorne has admitted that evil may be a formidable 
barrier to theistic belief (OD 249, MVG 195). In his own 
words, "A partially botched product can hardly be sufficient 
evidence for a perfect producer." (OT 58). At times, how­
ever, Hartshorne is less kind to the critic who takes evil 
as a disproof of God's existence. He labels the traditional
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problem of evil a piece of "semantic jugglery" (CS 293). 
Hartshorne is confident that, once the problem is under­
stood, the existence of evil poses no serious threat to 
theism. Yet, even if it can be shown that the problem of 
evil is semantic jugglery, strictly speaking, such a demon­
stration is not essential to the defense of the design ar­
gument. The design argument may be construed, in the con­
text of a cumulative case, only as an attempt to prove the 
existence of an intelligent designer. There is absolutely 
no obligation, as far as the design argument is concerned, 
to prove that the designer is supremely good. The goodness 
of God can perhaps be proved through other arguments of the 
cumulative case. As far as Hartshorne's global argument is 
concerned, the moral argument is directly relevant to God's 
goodness.
A convincing argument can be made, however, that the 
cosmic ordering power could not be evil. We have already 
seen that if God is related to the world as the mind is re­
lated to the body then, just as the mind is thought to be 
more valuable than any part of the body, so God must be con­
sidered more valuable than any part of the world.
The mind-body analogy raises another consideration. 
If the world is construed as the divine body then God could 
inflict suffering on his creatures only by doing harm to 
himself. God could be a sadist only if he were also a maso- 
chist. Hartshorne makes the point as follows.
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The cosmos could not be held together and ordered by 
malevolence, which as Plato argued, is always partly 
divided against itself and is also incapable of an ob­
jective grasp of reality; but the cosmos could be held 
together by an all-sympathetic co-ordinator, a shepherd 
of all beings. (RSP 190).
Evil is a destructive agency which occasions disorder rather
than order. "Evil does not require cosmic coordination, for
it is essentially anarchic, egocentric or ethnocentric."^*^
An evil deity could only tend to undermine the very thing
that needs explaining, namely, cosmic order.
The person who has followed the design argument to 
the point of believing that there is a cosmic ordering power 
may agree that demonic attributes do not belong to that 
power. He may insist, however, that the cosmic orderer is 
not good. In other words, the cosmic ordering power is 
viewed as morally neutral with respect to the things he 
orders. The problem of evil, then, is not understood as a 
refutation of the existence of a cosmic designer; rather, it 
is taken as a proof that the designer is not God. Again, 
the reader is reminded that Hartshorne's design argument is 
only one element in a cumulative case. There are considera­
tions, extraneous to the design argument proper, which sup­
port the goodness of God. Nevertheless, an overview of 
Hartshorne's theodicy may serve to highlight our discussion 
of the design argument. We may better understand how the 
disorder which is evil is related to the order of the world.
^*^Charles Hartshorne, "Theism in Asian and Western 
Thought," Philosophy East and West 28, 4 (October 1978), p. 
407.
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The several ways of stating the problem of evil can 
be reduced to two, which I call the incompatibility thesis 
and the improbability thesis: 1) The existence of evil is
incompatible with the existence of a good God, and 2) The 
enormous amount of apparently unjustified evil in the world 
makes the existence of a good God improbable. J. L. Mackie, 
H. J. McCloskey, and Antony Flew argue for the incompati­
bility thesis. Edward Madden, Peter Hare, and Peter 
Hutcheson argue for the improbability thesis.
The incompatibility thesis is effectively refuted 
by an appeal to creaturely freedom. Theologically speaking, 
the significance of human freedom, is that it makes a genuine 
relationship with God and other creatures (human and non­
human) possible. Without freedom, the creature is a mere 
puppet in the hands of the creator, incapable of creative 
response. But the same freedom which allows for loving re­
lationships equally allows for rejection, hatred, and moral 
depravity. Evil can be explained as the inevitable result 
of freedom. Hartshorne says, "Risk of evil and opportunity 
for good are two aspects of just one thing, multiple free­
dom . . . "  (NT 81). The contention that God could have
J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence" and H. J . 
McCloskey, "God and Evil," both in God and Evil, Nelson Pike, 
editor (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964). Antony
Flew, "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom," in New Essays 
in Philosophical Theology, Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre 
edsl (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 144-169. Edward Mad­
den and Peter Hare, Evil and the Concept of God (Springfield, 
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Pub., 1968). Peter Hutcheson,
unpublished personal correspondence.
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created free creatures who always choose the good is simply 
12false. A careful analysis reveals that an open future, 
that is, a future with genuine alternatives is a necessary 
condition of f r e e d o m . B u t  as noted in chapter III, de­
tailed knowledge of an indeterminate future is logically im­
possible. Thus, God could not know, in advance, what deci­
sions a free creature would make, that is, God could not be 
in a position to guarantee that every decision will be good. 
The fact that a great deal of suffering is the result, not 
of human freedom, but of the working of natural laws is ir­
relevant vis à vis the incompatibility thesis. It is enough 
to show that the existence of evil, however it comes about, 
is not incompatible with the existence of a good God.
The improbability thesis is more subtle than the 
incompatibility thesis but is no less mistaken in its as­
sumptions. According to the improbability thesis, the enor­
mous amount of apparently unjustified suffering in the world 
makes the existence of a good God improbable. The two im­
portant assumptions on which this claim rests are (a] that 
any instance of unjustified suffering is incompatible with 
the existence of a good God and (b) the question of God's 
existence can be decided solely on empirical grounds.
12 For a more thorough rebuttal of Flow's argument see 
Frederick Ferré, Language, Logic and God (New York: Harper
§ Row, 1961), pp. 116-120.
1 iDonald Wayne Viney, "Freedom and Responsibility:
A Whiteheadian Perspective," unpublished Master's Thesis, 
University of Oklahoma, 1979, Chapter II.
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Hartshorne takes issue with both assumptions.
The notion of an unjustified evil is not clear. As 
Hartshorne points out, "Any evil has some value from some 
perspective, for even to know it exists is to make it con­
tributory to a good, knowledge itself being a good." (NT 
80). If an unjustified evil is understood as any instance 
of suffering for which no ultimate reason can be given, then 
it must be admitted that there are many unjustified evils.
If anyone asks for some profound reason why just his 
friend, or his child, or he himself, should die pre­
maturely, I can only say, this is how the chances came 
out. Life simply is a gamble, and there is no remedy 
for that. '
To insist that every instance of suffering must contribute
to a perfect whole if God exists is to deny the reality of
chance. In the words of Emerson, it is to insist that "The
dice of God are always l o a d e d . H a r t s h o r n e  will have no
part of a chanceless universe. It is in the nature of things
that events do not always turn out for the best.
If X decides to perform act A and Y decides to perform 
act B, what occurs is the conjunction of the two acts,
A and B. But this conjunction neither agent has decided. 
It has just happened, so far as either's decision is 
concerned. Suppose for X we substitute God. The logic 
remains; God decides A, and not God but God and Y de­
cide A and B. Since there are many decision makers,
Charles Hartshorne, "A Philosophy of Death," in 
Philosophical Aspects of Thanatology, volume II, M. Florence 
and A. H. Kutscher, eds. (New York; MSS Information Corpo­
ration, 1978), p. 87.
^^Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Compensation," Emerson's 
Essays (New York; Houghton Mifflin d Co., 1876) , p. 99.
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what happens is always something no one, not even God, 
has decided.
Despite the reality of chance, the neoclassical God is able 
to make the best of the decisions individuals in the world 
have made.
God can take each successive phase of the cosmic devel­
opment and make unsurpassably good use of that phase 
(a) in his own life, and (b] in furnishing the creatures 
with such guidance or inspiration (their "initial sub­
jective aims") as (my formula) will optimize the ratio 
of opportunities and risks for the next phase.
One may still ask--like Madden and Hare--why there 
is so much unjustified suffering. Couldn't God at least pre­
vent some of the evil in the world and thus make the world a
better place? The obvious response to such a query is; how 
do you know he doesn't?*® On what grounds does the critic 
claim to know that God does not prevent as much evil as he 
could without depriving nondivine individuals of their free­
dom? As we have seen, the neoclassical God is responsible 
for the framework within which freedom operates, namely, the 
laws of nature. And according to Hartshorne,
The ideal rule [God's] sets those limits outside of 
which freedom would involve greater risks than oppor­
tunities. Risks cannot be banished, for opportunity 
would go with them, both having the same root in free­
dom or self-determination. But too much freedom would 
extend risks more than opportunities, and too little 
would restrict opportunities more than risks. (I^ 231).
^°Hartshorne, "A Philosophy of Death," p. 86.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of 
Deity," Review of Metaphysics 21, 2 (December, 1967), p. 284.
am indebted to a conversation with Gary Nowlin 
for this point.
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There is admittedly a great deal of evil in the world. This 
is to be expected given the reality of creaturely freedom.
But how much is too much? God would be in a position to 
answer this question but it is not clear any man could pro­
vide the answer--at least through empirical evidence. This 
brings us to the second assumption of the improbability the­
sis, namely, that the existence of God is to be decided 
empirically.
Alvin Plantinga argues that none of the major theo­
ries of probability provide the critic with an adequate base 
on which to build an argument against God's existence.
Hartshorne would agree, but on grounds different from those 
offered by Plantinga. According to Hartshorne, Anselm’s 
great discovery was that the question of God's existence is 
not an empirical issue. As noted in chapter IV, a minimal 
requirement for a statement to count as empirical is that 
it be falsifiable by some conceivable experience. We can 
add here that verifiability by some conceivable experience 
is a necessary condition of erapiricality (indeed, verifiabil­
ity seems to be a necessary condition of coherent meaningful- 
ness). But, we have argued-- in the discussion of the onto­
logical argument--that God either exists in every possible 
world or in no possible world. It follows that, if God
19Alvin Plantinga, "The Probability Argument from 
Evil," Philosophical Studies 35, 1 (January 1979), pp. 1-54.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?" 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 17 (1962), pp. 213-222.
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does not exist, his existence is unverifiable; and the state­
ment that he does (or does not) exist is not empirical. But 
if God does exist, his existence is unfalsifiable; and the 
statement that he does (or does not) exist is not empirical. 
Whether God exists or not, the issue is not empirical. The 
assumption of the improbability thesis, however, is that 
God's existence is an empirical question. The enormous 
amount of apparently unjustified suffering is offered as 
empirical evidence that a good God does not exist. An exami­
nation of the logic of the concept of God demonstrates the 
futility of digging around in empirical facts to find the 
presence or absence of the divine. The improbability thesis 
is therefore not a convincing argument against theism.
Hartshorne’s design argument escapes the major crit­
icisms against traditional formulations of the argument.
This is in part because it is nonempirical and because it 
is a part of a cumulative case. Any problems the argument 
may have are probably unique to this version. The status 
and possibility of nonempirical arguments and the creationist 
view of nature are obvious points at which the argument may 
either be attacked or further supported by future inquiry.
For our part, we leave the argument to consider other ele­
ments of Hartshorne's cumulative case.
CHAPTER VII 
THE EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT
The first of the normative arguments for God's ex­
istence is called epistemic or idealistic. Compared to 
other arguments for God's existence, the epistemic proof 
has a short history in philosophical literature. Although
St. Augustine argued for the existence of God from eternal 
truths, his argument differs in important respects from 
what we refer to here as the epistemic argument. The epi­
stemic proof argues for divine existence not from eternal 
truths but from the concept of reality. The argument is 
suggested in Kant's distinction between phenomena and 
nouraena (PSG 143). Later, Royce developed the Kantian sug­
gestion into an argument for his own version of pantheism 
(PSG 298-201). Hartshorne revises the Roycean argument by 
correcting what he sees as defects in traditional versions 
of Idealism. As with most other elements of Hartshorne's 
philosophy, the epistemic argument first appears in rather 
attenuated form in his dissertation (OD 203). More lengthy
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and detailed discussions appeared in 1946, 1953 and 1967.^ 
Creative Synthesis (1970) contains the first formal state­
ment of the epistemic argument (CS 286).
The argument is stated as follows:
A1 Reality (or truth) is in no way dependent upon 
knowledge.
A2 Reality is actual or potential content of non­
divine knowledge.
A3 Reality is potential content of divine knowledge 
(what God would know if he existed)
T Reality is actual content of divine knowledge.
(CS 286) .
Summarily, the argument is that the concept of reality is 
meaningless when divorced from the concept of knowledge or
experience. But the only idea of knowledge adequate to
clarify the concept of reality is ideal, or divine knowledge. 
Thus, the concept of reality implies the concept of God: 
to be real is to be the content of an infallible awareness.
An alternative Hartshorne does not consider is the 
position that there is no reality, or nothing is real. If 
there were nothing real, there would be no content of infal­
lible awareness and God's existence could not be proved. We 
have already seen, however, in connection with the cosmolog­
ical and design arguments, that Hartshorne rejects this po­
sition. "Something exists" entails "Something is real."
Charles Hartshorne, "Ideal Knowledge Defines Real­
ity: What was True in 'Idealism'," The Journal of Philos­
ophy 43, 21 (Oct. 10, 1946), pp. 573-582 (hereafter referred 
to as IK); see also p. 724 of the same volume for a correc­
tion; PSG 146-148, 197-198, 206-208; "Royce and the Collapse 
of Idealism," Revue Internationale ^  Philosophie 23 (1967), 
pp. 46-59 (hereafter referred to as RIJT
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If the former is, as Hartshorne argues, a necessary truth, 
then, since a necessary truth can only imply other necessary 
truths, "Something is real" must also be necessarily true.
If something is real, how are we to define the real? 
In agreement with the Idealist tradition, Hartshorne argues 
that reality cannot be understood apart from knowledge or 
experience. The most illustrious defender of the opposite 
view is Kant who maintained a sharp division between phe­
nomena and noumena, the latter of which is real but beyond 
2experience. But Kant's position is subtle and it is not 
clear that he can be put decisively in a camp opposing the 
Idealist tradition. Phenomena are things, as they appear 
to us, through the forms of sensibility and the categories 
of the understanding. Noumena are the things, as they exist 
in themselves. Kant suggests that noumenal reality is know- 
able only by a nonsensory intuition. The problem is that 
Kant refuses to believe that we have a clear idea of non­
sensory intuition (and this is one reason he would reject 
the epistemic proof). Thus, we don't know what it would 
mean to know things-in-themselves. There is no clear sense, 
then, on Kantian grounds, in saying that noumena are know- 
able.
2We do not mean to imply that the distinction be­
tween phenomena and noumena is the same as the distinction 
between appearance and reality for Kant. Even within the 
phenomenal world a distinction has to be maintained between 
appearance and reality. Kant uses the traditional distinc­
tion between primary and secondary qualities toward this 
end.
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The problem with the Kantian position, or anything 
similar to it, is that we are deprived of any reason we 
might have had for believing in an unknowable reality by 
the supposition that it is unknowable. If evidence is, by 
definition, unable to establish the existence or truth of 
X, then there could be no reason to believe in x. This is 
a major problem in Kant's philosophy. If knowledge is pos­
sible only through the forms of sensibility and the cate­
gories of the understanding, then on what grounds does Kant 
assert the existence of the noumena? As we have seen, Kant 
rejected the one answer he might have given to this ques­
tion, namely, that v;e could know that a nonsensory intuition 
could know the noumenal reality.
Royce makes a persuasive case that reality is agree­
ment between concepts and percepts.
To question means to have ideas of what is not now pres­
ent, and to ask whether these ideas do express, or could 
express, what some experience could verify. (PSG 198).
Questions about what is real invariably refer to some veri­
fying or falsifing experience. Hartshorne says.
We compare ideas with perceived segments of reality, 
not with unperceived segments. If then reality is 
that which ideas are tested by, only experienced real­
ity counts. Concepts are found true when they square 
with percepts, not with mere things in themselves.
This is what all science in practice assumes and must 
assume.̂
An engineer wishes to know whether a certain formula cor­
rectly describes the fluid flow through a porous medium.
^RI, p. 50.
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Through experiment and observation-- in short, through expe­
rience--the question is answered. The Roycean argument also 
seems to apply to nonempirical questions. A logician may 
wonder whether, given a set of axioms, a certain theorem is 
derivable. This can only mean that, given enough time and 
adequate care in reasoning, it will either be verified or 
falsified that the theorem is derivable (We will discuss 
nonempirical questions more thoroughly a bit later.).
Summing up the argument, Hartshorne says.
Given truth we can define reality, or given reality we 
can define truth (Tarski's definition assumes the dif­
ference between real and imaginary 'grass'), but to 
define either apart from some notion of evidence is 
impossible. (Cfe 287).
The reference to Tarski should not be taken as a criticism 
of Tarski's definition of truth. It is simply a reminder 
that Tarski's work in no way decides the question of the 
connection between reality and experience, a point with 
which Tarski would agree.^
It is important to clarify what, in the final anal­
ysis, Hartshorne means by saying that reality depends upon 
knowledge. In Reality as Social Process he distinguishes 
the principle of Objective Independence from the principle
Tarski says, ". . . w e  may accept the semantic con­
ception of truth without giving up any epistemological at­
titude we may have had; we may remain naive realists, crit­
ical realists or idealists, empiricists or metaphysicians-- 
whatever we were before. The semantic conception is com­
pletely neutral toward all these issues." Alfred Tarski, 
"The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of 
Semantics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 
(1944), p. lET.
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of Universal Objectivity (RSP 70). Objective Independence 
refers to the belief that the object of awareness or knowl­
edge in no way depends upon the subject. For example, the 
red pencil before me is independent of my awareness. When 
I leave the room the pencil does not vanish. Universal Ob­
jectivity refers to the belief that "any entity must be (or 
at least be destined to become) object for some subject or 
other." (RSP 70). The principle of Universal Objectivity 
explains the sense in which Hartshorne believes reality de­
pends upon knowledge. The principle of Objective Indepen­
dence explains the sense in which reality is not dependent 
on knowledge. The pencil is independent of my awareness or 
the awareness of any other particular subject (Objective 
Independence). But, the pencil is not independent of some 
awareness or other (Universal Objectivity). It is necessary 
that the pencil be known, but it is not necessary that the 
pencil be known by me, or any other particular subject.
Concerning the compatibility of these principles
Hartshorne says.
There is no contradiction in combining these assertions; 
just as no logical difficulty opposes combining, "John 
must wear some garment rather than none" with "There is 
no necessity for John to wear this coat" (rather than 
some other garment). (RSP 71) .
There is no logical bridge from the belief that reality de­
pends upon knowledge to the belief that the objects of 
awareness are generated by or ontologically dependent on any 
particular knower. "Reality depends upon being known by
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some knower or knowers, but not upon just what particular 
knowers fulfill this requirement."^
One may argue that the principle of Objective Inde­
pendence breaks down if God exists. For no object could be 
independent of an infallible awareness. If theism is true, 
does not the pencil depend upon one particular knower, 
namely, God? Hartshorne denies that God is a particular 
knower in any sense that would make the principle of Objec­
tive Independence false. It is true that an object is never 
independent of God's knowledge. But, to say God knows an 
object is to leave unspecified the particular way in which 
the object is known.
. . . the fact that God knows us is far from a complete
description of God's actual concrete knowing of us.
There is the question of how he knows us, in what per­
spective he puts this knowledge, with what valuational 
nuances, etc.&
Hartshorne denies that there is only one way in which God 
could be aware of any given object. "There is never only 
one possible perfect solution to the problems the world poses 
for God."^ There are alternatives even for God. This is 
not to say that God is free to choose the evil. For what­
ever decision God makes, it is unsurpassably good. "'God 
is good' means that he cannot choose between better and
^RI, p. 52.
^Charles Hartshorne, "The Dipolar Conception of 
Deity," The Review of Metaphysics, 21, 2 (Dec. Î967), p. 277.
^Charles Hartshorne, "Paul Weiss's The God We Seek,"
The Review of Metaphysics, 25, Supplement (June 1972j, p.
111.
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worse but only between actions all unsurpassably good . . 
Returning to the pencil example, if a^, a 2 . . . a n  repre­
sent the possible ways God could know the pencil, we can 
say that the pencil remains itself whether God knows it in 
manner a^, a 2 or a^. But the pencil is not independent of 
the abstract fact that God knows it in some way or other. 
Assuming the existence of a God whose knowledge has an ele­
ment of contingency, the principle of Objective Independence 
is not violated.
One can deny the principle of Universal Objectivity 
and still believe there is a sense in which reality depends 
on knowledge. This is evident when we look at A2 : Reality
is actual or potential content of nondivine knowledge. One 
might agree that 'being' and 'knowability' are coextensive 
(or synonymous) but insist that to be real is only to be the 
potential, not the actual object of knowledge--let us call 
this the K-thesis. The K-thesis is different from 
Hartshorne's principle of Universal Objectivity which says 
that every thing is, or will become, an object of awareness. 
It is not unusual to believe, if one is not a theist, that 
many events have occurred, or will occur, without ever being 
known. This belief is consistent with the claim that the 
existence of such events consists in their ability to be 
known. This is just to say that, i^ a subject were situated 
properly, the event in question would become an object of
®Ibid.
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knowledge. But there is no necessity, if God does not exist, 
that there always be a subject who is actually aware of the 
event.
The K-thesis is essentially an attempt to define 
reality in terms of nondivine capacity for experience. The 
real is what is, or might be, the object of a nondivine 
awareness. Hartshorne rejects the K-thesis for at least 
three reasons. Cl) the K-thesis involves a paradoxical shift 
from i^ to might be, C2) there are limits to nondivine capac­
ity for clarity, and (3) there are things that no merely 
nondivine knowledge could know. Let us look at each of these 
arguments separately.
To my knowledge, Hartshorne has used the argument
that the K-thesis is paradoxical in only one place in his
published work. He says,
. . . to define reality as how things would appear to
us we were clear and certain is to define the i^ in 
terms of the might be, and this shift of modality is a 
paradox, if not a downright contradiction.®
Presumably what Hartshorne has in mind is that reality can­
not be defined as something that might be since, by defini­
tion, reality is something that I do not find this argu­
ment very convincing. The K-thesis does not define reality 
as something that might be but is not. What might be is the 
experience of the event, not the event itself. The event 
goes unperceived even though some nondivine form of aware-
®IK, p. 578.
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ness could have perceived it. Another way to see this is 
that, according to the K-thesis, it is an essential prop­
erty of any reality that it can be perceived. Unless there 
is a contradiction or a paradox in a thing having the prop­
erty of being a possible object of awareness, Hartshorne's 
first argument against the K-thesis must be deemed unsuc­
cessful .
The other two arguments against the K-thesis are 
employed more often and are much more difficult to answer. 
Hartshorne argues that since there are limits to nondivine 
clarity, reality cannot be defined in terms of possible non­
divine awareness; " . . .  all our knowledge, even of the most 
obvious events, is approximate at best." (CS 287). There 
is a strong case for what Hartshorne says. Indeed, it seems 
that the clarity of any nondivine perception is gained only 
at the cost of making other things less clear. If I am to 
adequately hear my parakeet's song, I must attend to his 
chirps and force the noise from the refrigerator, the heater, 
and the street into the background of my consciousness. Ex­
amples not dealing with the senses are also available. Even 
in intellectual pursuits, clarity is achieved only at the 
price of selectivity. It would require a mind of unlimited 
capacity to process information to be clear about everything. 
No nondivine awareness could possibly fit this description.
The supporter of the K-thesis might reply: although
in any particular experience, some things remain relatively
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unclear, it is still true that the things that are unclear 
might have been clear, and this is all the K-thesis requires. 
The parakeet's song is the focus of the actual experience.
But the song might as easily have been in the background 
with the hum of the refrigerator being the focus of atten­
tion.
Hartshorne could agree with the counter-argument but 
would maintain that, no matter how clear any nondivine expe­
rience might be, it is never perfectly clear. Even when fo­
cusing on the parakeet's song, there are things that slip by 
my consciousness, nuances of tone, subtle changes of feeling 
and a thousand other unnamable shades of meaning; unless, 
per impossibile, I were God, there are an indefinite number 
of things that escape my awareness. It matters not that I 
can imagine myself with a better trained ear for birdsong.
No matter how well trained the ear, there will be elements 
that go unnoticed. This is just to say that there are, nec­
essarily, limits to the clarity of any nondivine awareness.
We can probably never know what these limits are since such 
knowledge would itself carry us beyond the limits. Never­
theless, that there are limits to clarity is, I think, in­
contestable.
The third argument against the K-thesis is that 
there are things which no nondivine individual could know. 
This argument has a tendency to be confused with the pre­
vious argument. Thus, Hartshorne says.
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. . . does one persuade oneself that there is nothing 
past we could not know? Every moment each of us has 
experiences that in their concrete specificity will 
never be known to anyone else, and eventually we shall 
not know them either, even in the limited sense in 
which we ever did know them from memory. 287).
While it is true that we are never completely clear about 
our own experiences, they are, nevertheless, our experiences, 
and, however inadequately, we are aware of them. This is 
the problem of clarity again. But are there things that no 
nondivine individual could know, either clearly or unclearly? 
Hartshorne asks us to "consider the array of events in galac­
tic space. No animal explorer will ever have more than a 
vanishingly small fraction of this array in his conscious­
ness." 287). This is most certainly true, and casts a
good deal of doubt on the K-thesis. But the defender of the 
K-thesis may insist that there is absolutely no event, how­
ever remote, that some nondivine individual could not know 
if properly situated. Although we can actually know only a 
small fraction of the "array of events in galactic space," 
it may still be true that none of those events are humanly 
unknowable. I think this position requires a great leap of 
the imagination, especially in light of the fact that there 
are probably conditions in the universe under which no human 
could survive--inside the event horizon of a black hole for 
example. But if the defender of the K-thesis still refuses 
to abandon his position there is yet a more damning argument 
to be given. Consider the example discussed in chapter V, 
"there are three successive sevens in the decimal détermina-
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tion of u ." If this proposition is false, no nondivine in­
dividual could know it to be false. Now, the proposition 
may be true, in which case it can be known to be true by a 
nondivine individual. But what is important for our pur­
poses is that, for all we know, it is false that the deci­
mal determination of % has three sevens in a row. The ex­
ample demonstrates that it is perfectly reasonable to be­
lieve that some things are humanly (or nondivinely) unknow­
able. But if this is so, then the K-thesis is false.
For those who wish to remain atheists, there are 
only two alternatives at this juncture, they may claim that 
some things are simply unknowable, or they may say that, al­
though God does not exist, reality is the possible content 
of divine knowledge (A3). The first alternative divorces 
the concept of reality from experience which, as we have 
seen, is problematic. The second alternative is not even 
coherent. One cannot be an atheist and define reality as 
what God would know if he existed. For the possible content 
of ideal knowledge includes knowledge of the ideal knower. 
Hartshorne makes the same point, "If God does not exist, one 
thing is true which he could not and would not know if he 
did exist, namely his own nonexistence." (CS 287). Another 
problem with A3 (that Hartshorne does not mention) is that, 
if reality is the possible content of divine knowledge, it 
follows that it is possible for God to exist. The validity 
of the ontological argument makes such an admission fatal to
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the atheist. If God's existence is possible then it is not 
impossible. And since God's existence is either impossible 
or necessary, it follows that God exists.
Perhaps the most plausible atheistic position is to 
modify A2 and say that most real things are knowable, and 
that those things that are not knowable are, in a sense, 
within the scope of our knowledge. The unknowable is within 
the scope of our knowledge in the sense that we have an idea 
of what kinds of things are unknowable (for example, the 
complete decimal determination of ir) . In this respect, the 
unknowable differs from Kant's noumenal reality. We simply 
have no concept of what noumenal reality would be like. But 
we do have a good idea of what it means for there to be (or 
not to be) three successive sevens in the decimal determina­
tion of TT. If v does not have three successive sevens, this 
means that, no matter how far the division is carried out 
(that is, dividing the circumference of the circle by its 
diameter) , there will never be three sevens in a row. Al­
though it will never be possible to know that there are not 
three successive sevens in ir, we at least know what the prop­
osition entails in humanly experiential terms.
Although the modified version of A2 is not obviously 
incoherent or inconsistent, it is still unaccentable. In
The atheist might wish to claim that the possibly 
existing ideal knower need not be God. Yet, even if this 
is possible--which I deny-- it is still true that the ideal 
knower could not know his own nonexistence.
161
the first place, it leaves unresolved the problem of the 
clarity of nondivine experience mentioned above. Second, 
it is not clear that a theistic assumption has not been 
smuggled into the description of the unknowable. We are 
told that, if the proposition about it is false, then no mat­
ter how far the division for ir is carried out, three suc­
cessive sevens will never appear. But what nondivine indi­
vidual (or even race of individuals) could be around long 
enough to carry out the division? If it is possible to carry 
division out for an infinite time, as would be required for 
any transcendental number, it is possible only for God.
Apart from the possibility of a divine individual, how can 
meaning be attached to the idea of carrying out division in­
definitely? The atheist might fall back on the distinction 
between logical and ontological possibility and say that al­
though it is ontologically impossible to divide infinitely, 
it is logically possible. But this will not do since it is 
tantamount to admitting that God's existence is logically 
possible--the concept of a divine experience is thus 
smuggled in again. If not inconsistent, the position is at 
least paradoxical.
Whatever other problems it may have, the theistic 
position does not share the paradoxes of the first three al­
ternatives. Reality is simply the content of divine aware­
ness. We have seen that no amount of nondivine experience 
can possibly serve to delimit the real. According to
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Hartshorne--following the suggestion of Royce--this is be­
cause of defects internal to nondivine knowledge.
Our knowledge is non-eminent because of internal char­
acteristics: confusion, inconsistency, doubt, incon­
stancy of beliefs, and, above all, a lack of concepts 
adequate to interpret our percepts and of percepts ade­
quate to distinguish between false and true concepts.
(CS 288).
It is not that parts of reality are humanly unknowable be­
cause of some property that the real possesses. It is be­
cause of defects within our own (or any nondivine) cognitive 
apparatus, that something of the real always escapes us. To 
make the mind more perfect is to make its grasp of reality 
more perfect. Thus, an infallible mind would have an infal­
lible awareness of the real. This allows us to define real­
ity as the content of ideal knowledge.
Instead of saying that eminent knowledge is that which 
knows everything, we can say, 'everything' is simply 
the entire content of eminent knowledge, defining the 
latter without reference to 'reality'. (CS 288).
There is, therefore, no need to presuppose the concept of
reality in defining omniscience. The importance of this
Roycean insight is that it allows us to contrast nondivine
knowledge, not with an anonymous and unknowable stuff, but
with the content of an ideal awareness. We can make sense
of the idea that the real is the knowable without falling
prey to the paradoxes of making nondivine awareness the
measure of reality. As Hartshorne says.
The [theistic] account gives a positive definition of 
"reality" in terms of something known, namely, the in­
ternal characters of knowledge, whereas other views
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either fail to give a positive definition, or imply 
that the universe depends upon the human mind.
We mentioned in the opening statement that Hartshorne 
corrects flaws in traditional statements of Idealism which 
tend to invalidate the epistemic argument. One of these 
flaws has already been mentioned, namely, the failure to ac­
count for the principle of Objective Independence. The prob­
lem is corrected by revising the concept of the ideal knower 
so that his knowledge has a contingent aspect. A similar 
move can rescue Idealism from other difficulties. It was 
long maintained that ideal knowledge must include detailed 
information about all future events. The paradoxes asso­
ciated with this position were outlined in chapter III. Ad­
mit a contingent side of God and the problems vanish. God's 
knowledge changes; as future becomes past, things are added 
to God's knowledge. Since the future is not there to be 
known (in all its definiteness) until it becomes past, there 
is no sense in saying that the growth in God's knowledge is 
a result of divine ignorance. As Hartshorne says.
Our imperfection in knowledge of the future lies, not 
in its leaving details unspecified, but in its failure 
to exhibit clearly how far and in what respects the 
future is determinate and how far indeterminate.
The ideal knower would be perfectly aware of the extent to
which the future is determinate.
Another problem infecting traditional Idealism that
^IK ,  p. 581. 
l^IK, p. 575.
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is solved by admitting contingency into the divine life is 
the problem of conceiving God's knowledge as generating its 
objects. Several problems confront the traditional view.
One is that in knowing evil, God creates it. Another is 
that things seem to become little more than ideas in the 
mind of God. The combination of these leads to the ingen­
ious but grotesque theodicy of someone like James Ross who 
maintains that God has no more of an obligation to make his 
creatures happy than Shakespeare had to make Hamlet happy.
We do not deny that these problems have other, more plau­
sible solutions within the framework of classical theism.
But another option is simply to abandon the idea that God's 
knowledge generates its objects. For Hartshorne, it is only 
because there is something relatively independent of God, 
that he can know it.
To say that our "being" is our presence to God is the 
same as to say that our being is our act of modifying 
the divine awareness. Ideal knowledge is as truly 
ideal passivity as it is ideal activity.
This view answers the Kantian objection that we have no con­
cept of what it would be for God to know "the world. God's 
knowledge, like all nondivine knowledge must conform to the 
object of awareness. The difference between the two forms 
of knowing is that God's knowledge is unsurpassably more
Gary Nowlin, "The Reasonableness of Faith as a Re­
sponse to Evil," unpublished dissertation. University of 




adequate than any nondivine form of awareness. This view 
parts from the classical theistic doctrine that divine knowl­
edge constitutes its objects. Hartshorne notes that "classi­
cal theism made divine properties not only different in kind 
but opposite rather than unsurpassable. Not supremely sen­
sitive and responsive but wholly insensitive and unrespon­
sive (impassable).
The passivity in God's cognitive life also answers 
the objection that God must be a solipsist. Although, in a 
sense, God knows only himself (since the universe is con­
ceived as God's body), it is also true that his self- 
knowledge involves knowledge of others. Each nondivine 
individual leaves an indelible mark in the divine memory. 
There is a logical gulf between the claim that there is 
nothing outside God's awareness and the claim that God is a 
solipsist.
We come finally to the question of whether the epi­
stemic argument proves the existence of God or merely the 
existence of an ideal knower. As noted in chapter V, an om­
niscient being could not be anything less than a necessary 
being. For if it could fail to exist there are things it 
could fail to know. Must an omniscient being also be all- 
loving and all-powerful? A plausible case can be made for 
this even apart from the other elements of the global
21, 1982.
^^Charles Hartshorne, Personal letter, dated February
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argument. If, as Hartshorne maintains, knowledge is possible 
only by a sympathetic participation in the feelings of others, 
then the ideal limit of knowledge would be the ideal of sym­
pathetic participation. God must love his creatures to ade­
quately know them [RSP 189, see also OT 13-14 and CS 262- 
263). Furthermore, a being absolute in awareness could not 
help but be absolute in power. Existence itself is the power 
to be and if an omniscient being is a necessary being, then 
it has unlimited power for existence. What more power could 
there be? This is not to say that God has the power to do 
anything that is logically possible. It is logically pos­
sible that every criminal in the United States will turn 
himself (or herself) in to the authorities. But these would 
be the decisions of the criminals, not of God. God has all 
the power he logically could have. But he is not the only 
individual with power. I conclude that the epistemic argu­
ment, if it proves anything, proves nothing less than the 




Moral arguments for the existence of God come in a 
variety of forms. The basic pattern of argument is to show 
that God's existence is implied, presupposed or made prob­
able by moral categories. Kant's version of the argument
is the most famous.  ̂ But others have used the argument in
9one way or another to support theism.” Hartshorne contin­
ues this tradition. Given the frequency with which he
^Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis 
White Beck, trans. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp.
126-136.
2William James suggests a form of the moral argument 
(following Royce) in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1956, originally published by Longmans, Green & Co., 1897), 
pp. 213-214; other well-known defenders of the argument in­
clude Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, volume 
II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907) , ppl ZÏÏ6-213 ; W. R.
Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1924), Chapter XIII; F. R. Tennant, Philo­
sophical Theology, Volume II (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1930) , pp. 93-99; and most recently, Robert Merrihew 
Adams has revived the divine command theory of morality, "A 
Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” in 
Religion and Morality, Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, eds. 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973), pp. 318-347.
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refers to the argument there is good reason to believe it 
is one of his favorite proofs for God's existence.^ The 
argument is often referred to only in passing. But, aside 
from Creative Synthesis (1970), more or less extensive dis­
cussions of the argument are found as early as 1934.^ The 
most recent discussion of the moral argument was in 1972.^
Hartshorne's moral argument is actually a defense 
of what he calls contributionisra, the view that the purpose 
of human life is to contribute value to the divine life 
through our creative activity. Traditional concepts of God 
which imply the complete immutability of the divine cannot 
countenance such a view. Only a concept of God which allows 
for a passive side of the divine life could incorporate con- 
tributionism. For this reason, Hartshorne's moral argument 
is unlike other versions. It is, therefore, a standing re­
futation of the claim that no new theistic proofs are pos­
sible .
The Hartshornean moral argument runs as follows.
The first three alternatives are found unacceptable either
After delivering a sermon at the First Unitarian 
Church in Oklahoma City on February 22, 1981, Hartshorne was 
asked, "Why bother with God?" Hartshorne replied with his 
moral argument.
^Charles Hartshorne, "Ethics and the New Theology," 
International Journal of Ethics 45, 1 (October 1934), pp. 
90-101.
^Charles Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the 
Existence of God?" in Religious Language and Knowledge, 
Robert H. Ayers and William T. Blackstone, edsl (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), pp. 62-75.
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by reason of insoluble paradoxes or contradictions. Only 
the theistic option can make sense of our moral life.
A1 There is no supreme aim or summum bonum whose reali­
zation a creature's action can promote.
A2 There is a supreme aim, which is to promote the good 
life among some (or all) creatures during their nat­
ural life spans.
A3 There is a supreme aim, which is to promote the good
life among creatures after death or in heaven.
T There is a supreme aim, which is to enrich the divine
life (by promoting the good life among creatures).
(CS 286-287).
The theistic option includes what is best in the other al­
ternatives, ". . . every legitimate aim which an unbeliever 
can have, such as promoting human happiness, is included in 
the aim of serving G o d . T h i s  is a familiar theme of Chris­
tian ethics. One cannot love God without loving his crea­
tures. The first epistle of John (4.21) says, , he who
loves God should love his brother also." Love of God is in­
separable from love of man. Thus, anyone arguing for any of
the three nontheistic alternatives cannot do so on the
grounds that theism excludes some value that another option 
embraces. If theism is mistaken at all, it is because of an 
overstatement, not an understatement. "The humanistic ob­
jectives are entirely embraced in theistic religion.
The moral argument is doomed from the beginning if 
no good reason can be found to believe that there is a su­
preme aim, whatever it might be. The view that there is no
^Ibid., p. 72. 
^Ibid., p . 73.
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supreme aim is called ethical relativism. A recent example
of relativism is in the philosophy of Westermarck. Given
the bewildering variety of ethical systems and cultural
norms, ethical relativism takes on an air of plausibility.
Furthermore, a case can be made that, as Westermarck argues,
a belief in relativism can increase tolerance for divergent 
8views.
Hartshorne uses a familiar argument against the rela­
tivist's position. "If there is no supreme aim, there is no 
reasonable idea of comparative value and importance." (CS 
289). In order to make sense of comparative value judgments
such as "X is better than Y" there must be a standard in 
terms of which the judgment is made. This argument is, how­
ever, incomplete. In his discussion of the moral argument 
Tennant says.
Our moral experience, evaluation, progress, etc., pre­
suppose norms and ideals; but it is no more obvious that 
they presuppose an absolute, infinite, or perfect norm 
than that our growth in stature presupposes the exis­
tence, or even the idea, of an infinitely tall giant.®
The relativist can agree that comparative value judgments
presuppose a standard of value. But he is not obliged to
agree that the standard is itself nonrelative.
The relativist must retreat into a nonabsolute value
standard. But this move has problems of its own which G. E.
Moore has seen. Hartshorne paraphrases Moore's argument.
Edward Westermarck, Ethical Relativity (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 8 Company, 1932).
qTennant, Philosophical Theology, p. 98.
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Granting that this or that is preferred or enjoyed by 
this or that person or group of persons, we can still 
ask meaningfully, . . . whether or not it is good that 
it should be enjoyed. [BH 63).
Of any nonabsolute standard of value in terms of which the 
relativist chooses to measure ethical principles, there is 
always the further question of whether the standard is it­
self good. A similar question does not apply to standards 
of height. Thus, Tennant's analogy between standards of 
value and quantitative standards (such as those used to mea­
sure growth) breaks down. Without the absolute standard, 
comparative value judgments are rendered completely arbi­
trary so far as goodness is concerned.
The relativist may insist that Moore's argument ap­
plies to the absolute standard itself. Could we not ask of 
the absolute standard if it is itself good? This question 
betrays a misunderstanding of the argument. There is noth­
ing beyond the absolute since it is that in terms of which 
things are measured. Hartshorne agrees with Plato that,
"the perfect is the measure of itself and of the imperfect." 
(BH 63). An analogy with a popular criticism of the cosmo­
logical argument is instructive. Russell rejected the argu­
ment to a first cause on the grounds that one could always 
ask what caused the first c a u s e . I f  one of the premises 
of the first cause argument were that everything has a cause, 
then Russell's criticism would be valid. But no serious
^^Bertrand Russell, Why !_ to Not A Christian (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 6.
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defender of the first cause argument uses such a premise. 
Rather, the first, or supreme cause is said to make the 
chain of relative or secondary causes intelligible. Moore's 
argument should be construed along similar lines. It is not 
that every judgment of value requires, as it were, a stan­
dard lying in back of the judgment. Rather, comparative 
value judgments are made intelligible only on the supposi­
tion that there is a standard. And, like the first cause 
which is its own explanation for being, the absolute stan­
dard of value is the measure of itself.
The next view that Hartshorne attacks can be labeled 
humanism (for lack of a better terra). Humanist thinkers 
wishing to avoid the pitfalls of relativism, affirm that the 
aim of human life is to promote the good life among some, or 
all, creatures as far as possible. Since the humanist usu­
ally believes there is no afterlife, obligations to fellow 
creatures are confined to this life. The humanist may adopt 
one of two views. He may believe that his primary duty is 
to himself. In that case, promoting the good life among 
others is simply a means to his own satisfaction. It is 
probably stretching the meaning of the idea of humanism to 
call this view humanistic. One can only agree with 
Hartshorne when he says, "If one seeks only one's own good, 
and takes others as mere means to this, one is unethical and 
indeed more or less inhuman." (CS 289). The humanist may, 
however, adopt a less egoistic view and insist that one's
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primary obligation is to increase the general welfare, ei­
ther among his particular social group, or among humanity 
in general. Hartshorne claims that the humanistic views 
share common problems, "death and the multiplicity of bene­
ficiaries." (CS 289). Let us examine each problem in turn.
Hartshorne believes that both individuals and the 
human race are mortal. Most humanists would agree. The 
problem is that, after the final extinction of the human 
race, any values that may have been achieved by the indi­
viduals of the race, will become as if they had never been. 
Russell expressed this idea poignantly,
. . . all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all 
the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human 
genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of 
the solar system, . . . the whole temple of man's 
achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris 
of a universe in ruins. . .H
The outcome of all ethical action-- indeed of all action--on 
such a hypothesis, is the same as if no action had been per­
formed. In connection with the Buddhist concept that nothing 
is permanent (pratityasamutpada), Hartshorne asks, "If all 
things are impermanent why does this not render all achieve­
ment, including that of becoming enlightened, completely 
12vain?" Both huamnists and nonhumanists agree that some 
actions are better than others. Presumably this is because 
good deeds make, or tend to make, the world a better place.
^^Ibid., p. 107.
12Charles Hartshorne, "Theism in Asian and Western 
Thought," Philosophy East and West 28, 4 (October 1978), p. 
410.
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When faced with the choice between being kind and being in­
different to a stranger, one should be kind. But if, in the 
end, the universe swallows the human race leaving no trace 
of its activities, how has the kind deed made the world a 
better place?
The humanist can reply to Hartshorne's argument in 
at least two ways. In the first place, the argument assumes 
that the consequences of a deed are relevant to its moral 
worth. Kant explicitly denounced all appeals to consequences 
as irrelevant to true morality. Thus, what happens 'in the 
long run' or 'in the end' has nothing to do with ethical de­
cision making. Second, the humanist can claim that, although, 
in the end, it will not be a good thing that the kind deed 
was performed, it will nevertheless be true, in the end, that 
a kind deed was performed. The goodness or value of the deed 
vanishes with the destruction of mankind, but the truth that 
the deed was good and valuable does not vanish.
Hartshorne rejects both of the humanist's counter­
arguments. Against Kant it can be argued that between "con­
sequences are never relevant to morality" and "consequences 
are definitive of moral choice," there is a third position: 
"consequences are one factor, but not the only factor, in 
moral choice." It is questionable morality to sacrifice one 
innocent person for the happiness of many. On the other 
hand, performing an act with no thought of the possible con­
sequences, is equally objectionable. The command to promote
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the general welfare cannot serve as the foundation of an 
ethical system. But surely it must have an important place 
in any such system. "In ethics, we need to assume that, 
taking their consequences into account, some modes of action 
are better than others.
The second humanist argument is more subtle. Even 
if it is not good now, that such and such took place, is it 
not true now, that it occurred? Hartshorne replies that the 
truth of a proposition about value is the reality of the 
value asserted (BH 14). If it is true that X is good, then 
the goodness of X is real. To say that it is true now that 
a kind deed was performed is tantamount to saying that the 
kindness of the deed ^  real. It is not enough to say that 
the kindness was real, but now is not. For this means that 
something has become nothing--the value that once was, no 
longer is. To be sure, it is important to see that it is a 
past value, not a present value, which is being indicated.
But for all its 'pastness', the value is still real. As 
Hartshorne says, "the past must be capable of containing 
value." ( M  14). The humanist, however, can find no place 
for past value in his ontology. He might say that the past 
value is simply 'in the world'. But this answer is of little 
help since the question is how past values can be real; but 
what is it to be real except to be in the world? Hartshorne's
^^Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence
of God?" p. 70.
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answer to the question of how past values are real is that 
God infallibly remembers all that occurs. He says that "the 
only ascertainable value of the past is in its preservation 
through memory in the present." (BH 14).
No finite mind could contain the total reality of
the past in memory, since its capacity for memory is, by
definition, limited. Something of what Hartshorne means is
captured in these lines from Jorge Luis Borges.
Events far-reaching enough to people all space, whose 
end is nonetheless tolled when one man dies, may cause 
us wonder. But something, or an infinite number of 
things, dies in every death, unless the universe is 
possessed of a memory. .
According to Hartshorne, the universe possessed of a mem­
ory, the divine memory. Only the hypothesis of a divine 
rememberance can explain how the past, with all of its values, 
can be real. There is, of course, the argument that the ac­
curacy of memory is to be measured in terms of reality, not 
reality in terms of memory. While this is true in the case 
of finite memories, it is not clear that it applies to the 
divine memory. Would not reality be synonymous with the 
content of omniscience? Indeed, this was the point of our 
previous chapter.
If it is admitted that the death of the human race 
is a serious problem for a humanist ethic, it is still open 
to the humanist to deny that the race is bound for extinction.
^^Jorge Luis Borges, Dreamtigers (Austin, Texas: Uni­
versity of Texas Press, 1964), p. 39.
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This is, perhaps, the most promising line for the humanist
to take. Hartshorne argued against this position, at one
time, as follows.
At any finite time in the future human power will not 
be absolute. This means that human security will not 
be absolute, that there always will be a finite risk 
of the ending of the human adventure through disease, 
race suicide, stellar collision, or what not. A fi­
nite risk, endured for infinite time, looks like an 
infinite probability of destruction. (BH 65, also BH 
12). —
This argument is valid only if we assume that risk increases 
with time. But the assumption is questionable. Modern 
weapons technology has, to be sure, increased the risk of 
race suicide through global thermonuclear war. But such in­
creases in risk are balanced by other considerations. The 
risk of the race dying as a result of the plague was once 
very great. But, because of advances in medical science 
this particular risk has diminished. Or again, it is very 
likely that man will colonize space. This decreases the 
risk that the entire race could be killed by some sort of 
stellar collision. Thus, it is not clear that risk increases
with time. It is just as plausible to believe that risk re­
mains, more or less constant.^^ It is therefore not beyond 
the realm of conceivability that the human race will last
I am indebted to my wife, Chris, for this argument. 
It might be claimed that the second law of thermodynamics, 
when applied to the universe as a whole supports Hartshorne's 
argument. The problem is that the second law applies only 
to closed systems and it is not clear that the universe 
counts as a closed system. Again, I have Chris to thank for 
pointing this out to me.
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forever.
Hartshorne seems to have modified his position on
the possibility of the extinction of the human race. His
latest statements on the issue make the more modest claims
that the race cannot be known to be immortal and that the
race will, if given enough time, "change beyond any knowable
l i m i t . T h e s e  claims, I think, are undeniable. Hartshorne
points out that this lack of knowledge of what the future
holds is a problem for the humanist.
Since we cannot possibly have any definite knowledge, 
or even imagining, of such an infinity of human surviv­
al, our basic ethical notion of ultimate consequences 
seems to vanish into total indefiniteness.
The theist has a distinct advantage over the humanist inso­
far as the ultimate consequences of our deeds are forever 
stored in the mind of God. For the humanist, it must be ad­
mitted that, since the collective memory of mankind is so 
fragmentary, even the greatest of deeds of the greatest of 
men and women, will someday be forgotten. We have turned 
full circle to the problem of past values.
Death is not the only difficulty facing the humanist, 
there is also what Hartshorne calls the problem of the mul­
tiplicity of beneficiaries. Implicit in the injunction to 
promote the general welfare is the notion that, all things 
being equal, the more individuals that are happy, the better.
^^Hartshorne, "Can There Be Proofs for the Existence
of God?" p. 70.
17 Ibid., p . 71.
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A corollary of this is that it is worse for two to suffer
than for one to suffer. Apart from the existence of a being
"to whom all hearts are open," it is not clear how to make
sense of these ideas. Hartshorne says,
Good is good for someone. How is the welfare of A plus 
the welfare of B a greater good than that of either 
alone? The sum of happiness, for whom is this happi­
ness? (CS289).
C. S. Lewis clearly expressed the opposite view. 
Although he was a theist, Lewis did not believe there is any 
such thing as the 'sum of suffering' or the 'sum of happi­
ness ' .
Suppose that I have a toothache of intensity x: and
suppose that you, who are seated beside me, also begin 
to have a toothache of intensity x. You may, if you 
choose, say that the total amount of pain in the room 
is 2x. [should Lev;is have said "x x" instead?] But 
you must remember that no one is suffering 2x: search
all time and space and you will not find that composite 
pain in anyone's consciousness. There is no such thing 
as a sum of suffering. When we have reached the maxi­
mum that a single person can suffer, we have, no doubt, 
reached something very horrible, but we have reached 
all the suffering there ever can be in the universe.
The addition of a million fellow-sufferers adds no more 
pain.IS
If there is no such thing as a sum of suffering, how is it 
worse when two are in pain than when one is in pain? There 
is no one for whom it is worse. According to Hartshorne, 
the problem arises even if we consider only one person, "we 
feel that it is more important that a life should be steadily
C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York; 
Macmillan, 1959, originally published 1940), pp. 103-104. 
Hartshorne quotes this passage in "Philosophy and Orthodoxy," 
Ethics 54, 4 (July 1944), p. 296.
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happy than that there should be a moment or two of happiness
during its course." (CS 289). In the case of only one in­
dividual, however, it can be argued that it is better or 
worse for the person involved that more happiness is en­
j o y e d . B u t  a similar move cannot be made when more than 
one person's happiness is in question. Hartshorne's answer 
to the problem is that it is worse, for God, when there is 
more suffering than there should have been. If the values 
of the world are incorporated into the divine consciousness,
then clear meaning can be given to the idea that more suf­
fering is worse and that more happiness is better.
The humanist might reply as follows: the suffering
of A and B is more suffering than that of A alone, not in 
the sense that someone suffers the suffering of A and B , but 
only in the sense that the number two is greater than the 
number one. Since it is true that "2 > 1" it follows that 
two instances of suffering are greater than one instance of 
suffering. This argument hinges on an ambiguity in the con­
cept of being greater than. The humanist and theist can 
agree that the suffering of two persons is numerically 
greater than the suffering of only one. But only the neo­
classical theist can make sense of the belief that the
19That the problem of a multiplicity of beneficiaries 
does not arise for individuals is especially apparent when 
the individual is God. Hartshorne would say that God is the 
only individual for whom the multiplicity of beneficiaries 
could not be a problem since God is the only individual who 
could enjoy infallible recall of all past moments of his 
life.
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suffering of A and B is worse than, or a greater evil than 
the suffering of A alone. Another way to put the question 
is to ask how a numerical difference could make a qualita­
tive or moral difference.
Another humanist reply is that since it is one's 
duty to promote the general welfare, the general welfare 
must be good. Asking why the general welfare is good is 
like asking why one should be moral. But the reason for be­
ing moral lies within the sphere of morality itself--one 
should be moral because it is the right thing to do. This 
reply masks a subtle confusion. It is true that morality 
justifies itself, but it is not obvious that asking for an 
explanation of why the general welfare is good is equiva­
lent to asking why one should be moral. If the general wel­
fare is a good, then it is true that one has an obligation 
to promote it. By definition, there is an obligation to 
promote the good. The problem is that, on humanist princi­
ples, there seems to be no account of why the general wel­
fare is a good. But if it is not a good, then whence comes 
the duty to promote it? An act is not good because there 
is a duty to perform it, there is a duty to perform it be­
cause it is good.
An interesting consequence of the problem of mul­
tiple beneficiaries is that it shows that one form of the 
problem of evil is self-defeating. As noted in chapter VI, 
Madden and Hare argue that the existence of God is made
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improbable given the enormous amount of suffering in the 
world. If Hartshorne's argument is correct, then the only 
possible way to make sense of the idea of an enormous amount 
of suffering is on the theistic hypothesis. If one denys 
the existence of God, then one must accept Lewis's argument 
that there is no such thing as a sum of suffering. But with 
no sum of suffering, the major premise of the Madden and 
Hare argument collapses.
The final alternative in the moral argument, before 
the theistic option, also suffers from the problem of mul­
tiple beneficiaries. The last option says that the supreme 
aim is to promote the good life among creatures after death 
or in heaven. Supposing that the soul survives the death 
of the body, this by itself could not explain why the hap­
piness of two disembodied spirits is better than the happi­
ness of one. There are other problems as well. One problem 
is, perhaps, more psychological than philosophical. Few 
atheists can bring themselves to believe in an afterlife. 
Thus, most atheists would opt for A2 over A3. Hartshorne's 
only serious opponents, as far as A3 is concerned, are other 
theists, not atheists.
Rather than rehearse the now familiar arguments 
against classical theism covered in our second chapter, let 
us only be reminded that the view that creatures can in no 
way add to the value in God forces one to believe that the 
supreme aim in life is to promote the good life among
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creatures, whether during their natural lives or after death. 
In what way this aim could also be considered a service or a 
benefit to God has never been made clear by classical theists. 
God, classically conceived, is self-sufficient and unchanging. 
Since the total content of value in the divine life is for­
ever fixed, God is the only individual who adds value to the 
lives of others. Others, in no way, add to the value in God. 
We can do nothing for God, but he does everything for us.
Kant brings this out most clearly. By providing an after­
life in which the injustices of earthly existence are set 
straight, God does for his creatures what they could not do 
for themselves.
Apart from the doctrine of an immutable deity, neo­
classical theism can accept much of the Kantian picture.
Lewis Ford and Marjorie Suchocki have shown how Whitehead's 
metaphysics, which is not so different from Hartshorne's 
views, can account for a kind of subjective immortality.^*^ 
Hartshorne rejects the idea of personal immortality on the 
grounds that a nondivine individual could undergo only a fi­
nite number of changes before becoming a different person 
21(LP 261). One could accept this argument but still believe
Lewis S. Ford and Marjorie Suchocki, "A Whiteheadian 
Reflection on Immortality," in Philosophical Aspects of Than- 
atology, volume II, Florence M. Hetzler and A. H. Kutscher, 
eds. XNew York: MSS Information Corporation, 1978), pp. 67-79.
^^John Hick, who believes in immortality, concedes 
this point but says that through numerous deaths the unity of 
the individual might be saved. It is not clear to me how this 
is supposed to solve the problem. See Hick's Death and Eter­
nal Life (San Francisco: Harper § Row, 1976), pp. 413-414.
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in a limited immortality in which many of the injustices of 
earthly existence are compensated in a life to come. There 
may be a point at which one's personal experiences come to 
an end, but it may not be what we call natural death.
Hartshorne clearly rejects this view. Not even God 
can eliminate risk of failure; and thus, an afterlife could 
not solve the problem of injustice. I do not think this 
argument is conclusive. May not God isolate some of those 
who died prematurely or suffered unjustly and allow them to 
enjoy a little more happiness without thereby eliminating 
the risks that were involved in bringing about the injus­
tices? It would remain eternally true that risks had been 
taken and that tragedy occurred. God's redeeming action 
might be interpreted simply as a more complete revelation of 
his own love before the final (not the earthly) death of the 
individual. This view has the advantage of permitting more 
good to come to those who have suffered unjustly without 
denying that a greater amount of good could have been 
achieved had the suffering never occurred. Such a view of 
the afterlife differs from traditional views in that the 
individual is not born into another social world. The indi­
vidual is related only to God after death, who reveals him­
self in more fullness to the survivor. But this view is 
like the traditional view in that a final chapter is, so to 
speak, added to the individual's life. The individual's
^^Cebes, in Plato's Phaedo suggests this, 87b-88c.
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life then resembles more a completed work than a half 
2 3written text. Thus, I do not find the notion of a limited 
immortality with a limited compensation for injustices ob­
viously incompatible with Hartshorne's metaphysics. Without 
denying the reality of creaturely freedom, this is all any 
theist could reasonably ask. Since traditional theism can 
provide no more than neoclassical theism, the latter is to 
be preferred, insofar as it allows for a meaningful concept 
of service to God.
If it is a good thing to contribute to the divine 
life then the divine life must be good. Thus, Hartshorne's 
moral argument, combined with the other arguments in his 
cumulative case, gives reason to believe in a good, all- 
powerful, all-knowing, and necessary being. There are, to 
be sure, problems in construing God's goodness as a form of 
moral goodness. As Ninian Smart argues, an agent who infal­
libly chooses the good and faces no temptation for evil is 
not clearly a moral a g e n t . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it is not a mis­
use of the concept of goodness to call such an agent good. 
God is man's ultimate good in the sense of being the most 
adequate fulfillment of his desires. As Hartshorne says.
23Hartshorne compares a person's life with a book in 
LP 250. I have taken the analogy in a direction of which 
Hartshorne might disapprove.
^^Ninian Smart, "Omnipotence, Evil and Supermen," in 
God and Evil, Nelson Pike, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 103-112. Hartshorne is also aware 
of the problem of applying ethical categories to God. See 
CS 309-310.
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"It is not my death, but God's that would make my life a
mere absurdity. The value of a human life is, then, its
contribution to the divine life. Hartshorne expresses the
central idea of the moral argument.
Unchangeably right and adequate is his manner of changing 
in and with all things, and unchangeably immortal are all 
changes, once they have occured, in the never darkened 
expanse of his memory, the treasure house of all fact and 
attained value. (MVG 298).
This brings us to the frontiers of the aesthetic argument
for God's existence, wherein we might catch a glimpse of the
grandeur of God's eternal vision.
7 SCharles Hartshorne, "Philosophy After Fifty Years," 
in Mid-Twentieth Century American Philosophy: Personal




The aesthetic argument is the last of the theistic 
proofs in the global argument. It is also the argument 
least often mentioned in Hartshorne's work. This is not to 
say that Hartshorne has been silent on the relation between 
God and beauty. Entire chapters are devoted to the topic in 
early works.^ But it is not until A Natural Theology for 
Our Time (1967] and Creative Synthesis (1970] that the con­
cept of beauty is used as a way to prove God's existence.
In one respect, this is surprising. For Hartshorne has al­
ways maintained an active interest in aesthetics. Aesthetic 
principles play a central role in both The Philosophy and
Psychology of Sensation and Born to Sing (these being the
2least metaphysical of Hartshorne's books).
^See OD, section 12, and MVG, Chapter VI.
2Charles Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology 
of Sensation (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1968 ;
first published by University of Chicago Press, 1934); Born 
to Sing, An Interpretation and World Survey of Bird Song 
^Bloomington, Indiana; University of Indiana Press, 1973).
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On the other hand, the absence of the aesthetic ar­
gument in most of Hartshorne's work is not so surprising.
For in many ways, the aesthetic proof is simply a variation 
on themes running through the other proofs, especially the 
epistemic. With only minor variations, the arguments sup­
porting the premises of the epistemic argument also support 
the premises of the aesthetic argument. There is, however, 
enough novelty in the aesthetic proof to warrant separating 
it from the other arguments. Yet another facet of the prob­
lem of divine reality is revealed in this argument from 
beauty. The argument runs as follows:
A1 There is no beauty of the world as a facto)
who 1e .
A 2 There is a beauty of the world as a whole, but no 
one enjoys it.
A3 There is a beauty of the world as a whole, but only 
nondivine beings enjoy it.
T There is a beauty of the world as a whole and God 
alone adequately enjoys it. (£S 287).
It is significant that Hartshorne speaks of the world as a 
de facto whole. Since he adopts the process view of time, 
according to which only the past is fully determinate, 
Hartshorne denies that the world is a completed fact. The 
world is constantly changing. At any moment, "the world" 
refers to a different totality. Yesterday's world did not 
include today's experiences and today's world does not in­
clude tomorrow's experiences, except as possibilities. "The 
creative view of process . . . does not allow the concept of 
'all events’ as a final totality." 98). Thus, if there
is a beauty of the world it is dynamic, more akin to the
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beauty of a dance or a drama than a painting or a sculpture 
Cl am reminded of the Hindu view of creation as the dance 
of Siva).
The world, as a whole, may lack beauty for two rea­
sons, (1) because the concept of beauty lacks objective ref­
erence, or (2) because the universe is, as a matter of fact, 
not beautiful, that is, either it lacks something that would 
make it beautiful or possesses some property positively in­
compatible with beauty. In his brief treatment of A 1 , 
Hartshorne deals only with the second point. But many things 
he says elsewhere make clear how he would respond to the 
first point. Let us discuss each question in turn.
The position sometimes called aesthetic subjectivism 
is the view that qualities such as beauty have no objective 
foundation. It is not that objects have some property called 
beauty independent of our perception; rather, it is our per­
ception that the object is beautiful which accounts for the 
object's beauty. "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" is 
a popular expression of subjectivism (perhaps more accurately, 
"Beauty is merely in the eye of the beholder"). The clearest 
example of aesthetic subjectivism is in the philosophy of 
logical positivism where questions of morality and aesthetics 
are reduced to matters of personal or societal taste or emo­
tion.^ Subtler versions of subjectivism have been developed.
^A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: 
Dover Pub., 1946).
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but all of them share the contention that beauty is some­
thing we put in the world, not something we discover there.^ 
If subjectivism is true then there could not be an objective 
beauty of the world as a whole.
Hartshorne's earliest statements on the issue reveal 
a clear rejection of subjectivism. "Aesthetic experience is 
not a mere subjective reaction but implies worth in the ob­
ject . . . "  (OD 233]. Later he would argue against what he 
called "the annex view of value"--namely, that value is "an­
nexed" onto bare sensations.  ̂ For Hartshorne, aesthetic sub­
jectivism is a mistake since aesthetic value is essential to 
all experience. "Absolute aesthetic failure simply means no 
experience at all." (CS 304). If experience is real, then 
so is value. Indeed, the becoming of a new experience is 
the production of new value. But then it is misleading and 
false to call value merely subjective. While it is true 
that the value is in the subject, the subject in turn becomes 
an object for other subjects. Thus, value is an objective 
quality. This is manifestly true when the objects in ques­
tion are other human individuals. The love that I feel for 
my mother is felt by her as an objective fact. There is a
See John Hosper's article in the Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Volume I, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: Collier-
Macmillan, 1967), "Aesthetics, Problems of," pp. 52-55. For 
an elegant defense of subjectivism see Carlton Berenda's 
World Visions and the Image of Man (New York: Vantage Press,
1965).
^Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensa­
tion , p. 94.
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similar feeling of the objectivity of value even in our ex­
perience of so called 'inanimate' nature. It is no accident 
that thunder is felt as threatening or that sunshine is felt 
as gay. Of course, we can condition ourselves to ignore or 
alter our feelings towards things. But this is not good 
evidence for subjectivism. For the alteration in feeling 
itself presupposes an element of stubborn fact. There is a 
kind of heroism in overcoming a fear of thunder, and an ele­
ment of pathetic tragedy in becoming blinded to the gaiety 
of sunshine.
The fact of disagreement on aesthetic matters is
sometimes taken as an argument against the objectivity of
aesthetic value.° But the argument is particularly weak.
Since when did disagreement imply that questions of truth
are not at stake? Furthermore, disagreements are balanced
by general uniformities of opinion. As Hartshorne says,
[the value of] a flaming sunset, a rose with its color 
and odor, or the blue sky, are obvious facts. A man 
who questioned many of these judgments in genuine hon­
esty would hardly be thought sane--if his sense organs 
were thought to be healthy. (OD 234) .
The same points apply to disagreements between cultures. 
Indeed, if there were not some common ground for aesthetic 
taste, how could one make sense of the influence of one cul­
ture upon another? A sharing of values implies a common 
ground, just as exchange of currency implies a global
For a detailed critique of this argument see Francis 
J. Kovach, "The Disagreement-Argument and Aesthetic Subjec­
tivism," The New Scholasticism, 53, 1 (Winter 1979), pp. 22- 
41.
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standard. Thus, the disagreements that exist between cul­
tures are compatible with aesthetic objectivism. On the 
other hand, the tremendous level of shared opinion remains 
an embarrassment to aesthetic subjectivism.
If it is not because beauty is merely subjective 
that the world as a whole is not beautiful, perhaps it is 
because the world lacks something that would make it beau­
tiful, or possesses a quality incompatible with beauty.
That the world has the necessary conditions for being beau­
tiful seems clear enough. If anything is agreed on in phi­
losophy, it is that beauty is somehow a proper balance be­
tween unity and variety. Kartshorne characterizes this as 
"coherent diversity."^ The repetition of a musical chord 
is monotonous whereas the random sound of notes is chaotic. 
Neither are beautiful. But combine the notes and chords 
into a melody and something beautiful can emerge. The world 
has the necessary components of unity and variety.
Is the universe as a whole beautiful? Certainly it con­
tains more contrasts than anything else, for all con­
trasts fall within it. And it does have unity. Physics 
discovers the same kinds of matter, tlie same laws, even 
in the most distant heavenly bodies . . . ÇMVG 213).
In light of these considerations we can at least say that 
the world has aesthetic value. But it does not follow from 
a thing having aesthetic value that it is beautiful. A sim­
ple melody has aesthetic value, but it need not be beautiful.
7Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensa­
tion, p. 159.
193
Hartshorne says "Beauty in the emphatic sense is a balance 
of unity and variety." (CS 304).^ Does the universe have 
a proper balance of unity and diversity?
The many instances of suffering may be taken as evi­
dence against the beauty of the world. Does not the enor­
mous amount of suffering imply an insufficient unity in the 
universe? Several points need to be made in reference to 
suffering. First, since the beauty of the world as a whole 
is the point at issue, all of the joy, ecstasy, gaiety and 
happiness in the universe count as heavily as all of the suf­
fering, pain and misery. It is as true that the suffering 
of a starving child counts against the world's beauty as 
that the saintliness of a Mother Theresa counts for it. If 
theists sometimes seem too callous toward suffering, athe­
ists sometimes seem too insensitive to the beauty in the 
world. Even taking a simplistic approach to the problem by 
weighing the number of evil things against the number of 
good things, it is by no means obvious that the evil out­
balances the good. As anyone who takes the trouble to look 
will see, there is a great deal of good about the world.
The second point about suffering is that, in itself, 
it is not incompatible with beauty. The beautiful can be
Hartshorne makes a similar point elsewhere, "All 
aesthetic value is either beauty or not too extreme devia­
tion from it in one of the four directions: toward mere
chaos or lifeless order; toward negligible complexity and 
intensity or baffling complexity, unattainable intensity." 
Born to Sing, p. 8.
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tragic as well as sublime. Victor Hugo's Quasimodo is a 
tragic figure of great beauty. Even the atheistic existen­
tialists do not appear to deny that there is a beauty in the 
defiance of an absurd universe.
The final point about suffering concerns the moral 
argument. If the moral argument is sound, then the notion 
of the "sum of suffering" is intelligible only on theistic 
grounds. To deny the world's beauty on the basis that it 
contains a great deal of suffering implys a theistic meta­
physic. The atheist would be caught in the dilemma: either
suffering does not count against the world's beauty or it 
does. In case of the latter, God exists. In light of these 
considerations, an appeal to suffering as evidence against 
the world's beauty is, at best, problematic and at worst, a 
paradox.
Is the world as a whole beautiful? Hartshorne ar­
gues that if it were not beautiful,
the world would be either chaos or a mere monotony. 
Neither is possible, the first for the same reason as 
holds against [the claim that there is no cosmic or­
der], the second for the reason that order implies a 
contrasting element of disorder . . . (CS 289-290].
We have already seen that between the extremes of chaos (or
sheer diversity) and monotony (sheer unity) there are a
variety of aesthetic values, not all of which are beautiful.
Beauty is a proper balance between unity and diversity. As
it stands, Hartshorne's argument proves only that the world
has aesthetic value, not that it is beautiful. How might
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the argument be supplemented?
If the aesthetic argument is to be a priori, then 
it must not simply be a contingent fact that the world as a 
whole is beautiful, it must be a necessary truth. This fact 
provides the clue to how Hartshorne's argument against A1 
must be supplemented. Vie have already seen that it is a 
necessary truth that something exists (cosmological argu­
ment) and that there is a cosmic order (design argument).
It should also be evident by now that it is necessarily true 
that the world has aesthetic value. For if reality is de­
fined in terms of experience and experience is essentially 
aesthetic then, if the world is real, it has aesthetic value. 
Concerning necessary truths Hartshorne says,
With metaphysical or a priori and necessary statements, 
it is impossible that these statements could be true 
and yet also have negative value in any reasonable 
sense. Contingent facts can be regrettable, but this 
may not be said of necessary truths. For to say "re­
grettable" is to say that it would have been better 
had they not obtained, and this makes sense only if the 
truths are contingent.®
If this is true then the aesthetic value of the world cannot 
be regrettable; it cannot be merely silly, ugly, ridiculous, 
commonplace or even pretty since these can always be regret­
table. The world's value must consist in an ideal balance 
between unity and diversity--the aesthetic value of the world 
must be beauty.
^Charles Hartshorne, "Twelve Elements of My Philos­
ophy," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5, 1 (Spring
1974), p. 12.
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A necessary truth can only be regrettable as long
as one remains blind to its necessity. There is still a
question, however, how the nonregrettableness of necessary
truths implies their beauty. C. S. Lewis seems to have
denied this implication.
When once one has dropped the absurd notion that real­
ity is an arbitrary alternative to "nothing," one gives 
up being a pessimist (or even an optimist). There is 
no sense in blaming or praising the Whole, nor, indeed, 
in saying anything about it.^"
Lewis's view is that the necessary aspect of things is value-
neutral. It can be neither cause for remorse nor cause for
rejoicing--it simply is.
Hartshorne denies that indifference is a possible 
response to the necessary. To be indifferent to something 
is to fail to find any good in it. But the minute we think 
about something we are not totally indifferent to it, we 
find something that catches our interest even if but for a 
moment. Thus, Hartshorne claims that the necessary cannot 
be viewed,
with mere indifference, for the act of taking note of a 
thing must, like every act, be motivated by some good.
The utterly indifferent is what we fail to note at all; 
and when we do note it, absolute indifference has been 
replaced by some valuation, positive, negative or both.^
If, as we have argued, a negative attitude is not appropriate
S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1955), p. 204.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "Is God's Existence a State of 
Affairs?" in Faith and the Philosophers, edited by John 
Hick (New YorFi St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 28.
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toward the necessary, and if indifference is not possible, 
then only a positive evaluation of the necessary is appro­
priate. We say "appropriate" advisedly. For there have 
been those who, if they have not been indifferent to the 
necessary, have adopted a negative attitude towards it-- 
Schopenhauer being the best example. But if Hartshorne's 
argument is sound, then this is confused thinking. It is 
possible to be repulsed, or feel indifference for the nec­
essary only so long as one does not recognize it for what 
it is. The only appropriate evaluation of the necessary is 
positive. Total indifference is impossible. And if, as al­
ready argued, only the beautiful can be nonregrettable, then 
the necessary must be beautiful.
If the necessary aspect of things is beautiful, does 
it follow that the world as a ^  facto whole is beautiful? 
According to Hartshorne's metaphysics, the world that actu­
ally exists--that is, the current "cosmic epoch"--is not 
necessary. All that is necessary is that some world or other 
exists. One must ask whether the beauty of the necessary as­
pect of the world allows us to infer the beauty of the world 
as it actually exists. A parallel with the ontological argu­
ment is instructive in answering this question.
A common criticism of the ontological argument is 
that an abstract property such as perfection is on a differ­
ent logical level than an actually existing individual. One 
cannot infer from a universal that the universal has an
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instance, or is exemplified in some concrete particular. 
Hartshorne's answer to this problem is to claim that the 
ontological argument can only prove that perfection is some­
how exemplified, not that it is exemplified in this or that 
particular way. With ordinary individuals there is a double 
element of contingency. Whether I exist now as hearing the 
chimes on the porch or as listening to the parakeet's chirps 
is a contingent matter. But it is also contingent that I 
exist. In the case of God, Hartshorne claims, only the for­
mer element of contingency applies. It is not contingent 
that perfection is somehow exemplified. But the particular 
way in which it happens to be exemplified is contingent.
The point is that there are a variety of ways or states in 
which God can exist. One of God's possible states is know­
ing me hearing the chimes. Another is knowing me listening 
to the parakeet. Yet another is knowing that I do not exist. 
There is nothing necessary about any of these states.
A similar distinction is applicable to the beauty
of the world. It is necessarily true that the world is
beautiful. But there are a variety of ways in which beauty 
can be exemplified. Representing possible world states (or 
cosmic epochs) as Bĵ , B 2 , B 3 , . . . B% we can say that all 
of them are beautiful. Furthermore, since it is necessary 
that something exists,one or another of B^, . . . B^ will 
be exemplified at any given time. Thus, there will always
be a beauty of the world as a de facto whole. Since our
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own world is among the class . . . Bji, it follows that
the actual world, as a whole, is beautiful.
Having established that the world as a d£ facto 
whole is beautiful, it is a short step to God's existence. 
Aside from the arguments against A2 and A3 that Hartshorne 
mentions, there are other considerations. The same argu­
ments that tell against A1 and A2 of the epistemic argument 
(chapter VII), refute A2 and A3 of the aesthetic argument.
A1 of the epistemic argument says that reality in 
no way depends upon knowledge. A2 of the aesthetic argument 
says that there is a beauty of the world but no one enjoys 
it. If, as we have argued, beauty is an objective quality, 
then to say that there is a beauty that no one enjoys is to 
say there is a reality that is not known or experienced.
This can mean one of two things, either (1) the world’s 
beauty could be known but is not, as a matter of contingent 
fact, known, or (2 ) the world's beauty could not, in prin­
ciple, be known. (2 ) is vulnerable to the objection that 
the only meaning that can be given to the concept of reality 
is agreement between concepts and percepts. There could be 
no unexperiencable reality. (1 ) is subject to the objection 
that the only possible being who could adequately appreciate 
the world’s beauty is God. Thus, to say the world's beauty 
could be known is to say it could be known by God. This is 
to admit that God's existence is possible. And, by Anselm's 
principle, the possibility of God's existence implies that
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God exists.
There is also an obvious parallel between A2 of the 
epistemic argument and A3 of the aesthetic argument. Both 
involve the claim that reality is measured by human or non­
divine experience. But just as there is more to reality 
than is humanly knowable, so the world has more beauty than 
any human (or group of humans) could enjoy. Hartshorne 
says.
Beauty as a value is actualized only in experience. 
However, the concrete beauty of the cosmos . . . could 
not be adequately appreciated by our fragmentary kind 
of perception and thought. There can then be an all- 
inclusive beauty only if there be an all-inclusive ap­
preciation of beauty . . . (OT 15).
The world's treasures are inexhaustible. The process of 
scientific discovery testifies to this fact. Once it was 
felt that it was only a matter of time before the methods 
of science would uncover the whole truth about the world.
The actual process of scientific discovery has given the lie 
to such cognitive megalomania. No sooner is one puzzle 
solved than ten others seem to take its place. If in some 
respects the world is like a jigsaw puzzle which scientists 
carefully piece together, in other respects, it is more like 
Hydra, the creature of Greek mythology who grew two heads 
for every one that was severed. With every scientific dis­
covery, something of the beauty of the world is found--and 
(what is important for our purposes), we catch a glimpse of 
its limitless riches.
The arguments Hartshorne offers against A2 and A3
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(of the aesthetic argument) are also persuasive. In connec­
tion with A2--that the beauty of the world is not enjoyed-- 
Hartshorne argues that to have the idea of the beauty of the 
world is already to enjoy something of its beauty. "There 
is no experience and no thought absolutely without aesthetic 
fulfillment." (CS 290). This is not to say that the mere 
thought of the world's beauty is enough to evoke an adequate 
appreciation of that beauty. But the thought is not about 
nothing. If a thought is an experience and if experience 
always involves some aesthetic value then the thought that 
the world i-s beautiful is not without an aesthetic value of 
its own--however slight that may be.
Against the view that only nondivine beings enjoy
the beauty of the world (A3), Hartshorne argues,
Our enjoyment . . .  is utterly disproportionate to the 
beauty in question. This disproportion would be an 
absolutely basic flaw in reality, such as never could 
be eliminated. It must always have obtained, and it 
could not be merely contingent, but must rather be an 
eternally necessary yet ugly aspect of things. Always 
God ought to have existed to enjoy his creation, and 
always he failed to exist. (CS 290).
One might argue that, although it is a flaw in reality that 
the world's beauty is enjoyed only by nondivine individuals, 
the flaw is epistemological, not aesthetic. In other words, 
if God does not exist to enjoy the beauty of the world, it 
is simply a fact, not perforce an ugly fact. This argument 
is mistaken. Ordinarily we consider it a good thing if 
something beautiful is appreciated; and we consider it re­
grettable if beauty goes unappreciated. Thus, the dispro-
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portion between enjoyment and beauty which would obtain if 
God did not exist would not be a merely neutral fact--it 
would be an eternally regrettable flaw in the nature of 
things. We have already seen that the necessary aspect of 
things must be beautiful. An eternal, and therefore neces­
sary, flaw in reality is, thus, a contradiction in terras.
An aspect of the nature of God highlighted by the 
aesthetic argument is the depth and sensitivity involved in 
omniscience. A being capable of an adequate appreciation 
of the world's beauty would have to be omniscient since no 
part of reality could escape its gaze. But the being would 
also have to possess a level of sensitivity to events far 
beyond our imagination to conceive. We know that nondivine 
appreciation of beauty requires a degree of attentiveness 
that surpasses ordinary practical modes of cognition. To 
appreciate a painting as more than a thing that covers the 
wall, it is necessary to allow one's consciousness to focus 
specifically on the painting, to see the various shades of 
colors, the contrasts, the geometrical patterns, the hidden 
meanings. The painting becomes more than pigments on canvas 
--it is an aesthetic object. If we now take the world as a 
whole as God’s aesthetic object, and magnify what in us is 
appreciation of beauty, we can understand something of the 
complexity and subtlety of the divine awareness. Further­
more, if in knowing beauty we contain part of the beautiful 
within ourselves, then God, who alone adequately beholds the
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beauty of the world, must be the supremely beautiful object 
for our own awareness. The aesthetic argument, therefore, 
can augment not only our understanding of omniscience but 
it can deepen our concept of the divine goodness.
This concludes our study of the aesthetic proof.
We have also reached the last of the elements of the global 
argument. We have still to tie together the loose ends that 
remain. This is a topic for our concluding chapter.
CHAPTER X
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL ARGUMENT
The global argument is an a priori cumulative case 
for God's existence. The discussion thus far, however, has 
focused primarily on individual proofs without much atten­
tion to the cumulative nature of the arguments. Furthermore, 
the discussion has largely been supportive of Hartshorne's 
position. But, as Hartshorne acknowledges, there are prob­
lems. Some of these problems have been noted during the 
course of our discussion. But other problems are broader, 
touching on issues that go beyond any of the arguments taken 
individually. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is 
twofold. First, I wish to tie together the loose ends of 
the previous chapters so as to gain a perspective on the 
global argument as a whole. Second, I will indicate what, 
to my mind, is the weakest point in Hartshorne's position.
To end on a positive note, I conclude with some reflections 
on the possible future of philosophical theology in light of 
Hartshorne's contributions to the field.
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I have already said some things about the intercon­
nections among the various arguments. Let me reiterate and 
expand on these comments. Perhaps the most important--at 
any rate, most obvious--point is that all of the arguments 
depend on the ontological argument for their soundness. As 
we have seen, Hartshorne believes that the importance of the 
ontological argument is that it demonstrates that God's ex­
istence is either logically necessary or logically impossible. 
A contingently existing God is a contradiction since perfec­
tion of existence implies necessity of existence. Thus, if 
any of the other arguments only attempted to prove the exis­
tence of a contingently existing being, the argument(s) could 
not be successful. No sound argument can have a false con­
clusion. If God cannot exist contingently, then no argument 
purporting to prove the existence of such a God could be 
sound. This is the sense in which all theistic arguments 
stand or fall with the success of the ontological proof.
The major weakness Hartshorne sees in the ontologi­
cal argument is the assumption that it is possible for a 
logically necessary being to exist. This is the point at 
which the other proofs can buttress the ontological argument. 
The cosmological argument is most important in this connec­
tion since it demonstrates the inconceivability of absolute 
nonbeing. Since nonbeing is inconceivable and since no in­
dividual or group of individuals existing contingently can 
account for the necessity of existence, there must be at
206
least one individual who exists necessarily. Thus, if there 
are contingent beings it is possible that there is a neces­
sary being.
The weakness of the cosmological argument is that 
it does not specify what attributes a necessary being might 
have. In our discussion of the cosmological proof the prob­
lem of Ahriman, the evil deity, was raised. The moral argu­
ment is especially helpful in seeing the absurdity conceiled 
in the notion that God is evil. If the moral argument is 
sound, then, any conceivable nondivine individual would re­
quire a greater reality to which its life could contribute.
.A.n evil God could not, in principle, be the ground of mean­
ing in human life. Thus, if God exists, he is good.
By clarifying the concept of omnipotence the design 
argument is also relevant to the question of God's goodness. 
Since evil is a nearly inevitable result of creaturely free­
dom, the notion that God orders the world does not entail 
that he could prevent every instance of suffering. Any con­
ceivable world would contain a certain amount of disorder 
and evil. Thus, the existence of suffering in the world is 
no reflection on God's goodness. Furthermore, it is not 
clear why an evil deity would be required to explain cosmic 
order. If, as Hartshorne argues, God includes the world in 
his being, much as the mind includes the body, then God could 
accomplish the goal of creating suffering in the world only 
by harming himself. God could not be a sadist without also
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being a masochist.
The epistemic and aesthetic arguments also contrib­
ute to an understanding of the necessary being of the cos­
mological argument. The epistemic argument shows that the 
necessary being is omniscient. Reality cannot be simply un­
knowable. Since all nondivine knowledge is imperfect, there 
must be one whose knowledge adequately conforms to the real. 
Such a being is, by definition, omniscient. The aesthetic 
argument serves to sharpen the concept of a necessary being 
even further by demonstrating that the necessary aspect of 
things must be beautiful.
A deficiency of the global argument is that it does 
not rule out the possibility that there is more than one 
necessary being. To some extent, the design argument ad­
dresses the question of polytheism. There could not, in 
principle, be more than one cosmic ordering power. Thus, 
there is only one omnipotent being. The question, however, 
is whether the omnipotent being is the only necessary be­
ing. The design argument does not adequately deal with this 
question.
Hartshorne is not without an answer to the problem 
of polytheism. According to Hartshorne, "God is the one 
individual conceivable a priori." (DR 31). Ordinary or 
nondivine individuals are not individuated by concepts 
alone. As Hartshorne says, "No nondivine individual what­
ever can be exhausted in a concept or definition." (NT
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130).^ Hartshorne's claim can be proven in two ways. First, 
the concepts that apply to any given individual might have 
applied to some other individual. Thus, the cluster of con­
cepts that, in the actual world, refer to Socrates--being 
the teacher of Plato, snubnosed, etc.--could, in some other 
conceivable state of affairs have referred to someone else. 
This is not to say that Socrates might not have been 
Socrates; rather, it is to say that the properties which 
Socrates actually possessed might have been possessed by 
someone else. A second proof of Hartshorne's contention is 
that any nondivine individual might have had properties 
other than what he actually has. Socrates could have been 
born without a snubnose, he could have failed to meet Plato,
and so forth. Thus, no nondivine individual can be indi-
2viduated by concepts alone.
Hartshorne is careful to distinguish the capacity 
of a concept to individuate, from its capacity to particu­
larize or concretize. A concept individuates an individual 
if the concept could not, in principle, refer to any other 
individual. 'Man' does not individuate Socrates since there 
are other men besides Socrates. A concept particularizes an 
individual if it is capable of exhausting the qualitative 
aspects of the individual. According to Hartshorne, no con­
cept is capable of particularizing an individual. The qual­
itative side of a person always contains more than could be 
expressed in any language. One is reminded of Whitehead's 
thought that mothers ponder many things in their hearts 
which their lips cannot express.
2Hartshorne seems to be in substantial agreement 
with the theory of reference developed by Kripke, Donnellan, 
Putnam, and others, see Steven P. Schwartz, ed.. Naming, 
Necessity and Natural Kinds (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1977]! Where Hartshorne would disagree 
with the new theory of reference is in the theory's apparent
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God is the one exception to the otherwise applicable 
rule that individuality is not specifiable a priori. The 
reason that God must be an exception to the rule is that he 
is the only individual with strictly universal functions.
He is the one who, as all-powerful, all-knowing, and all- 
loving, orders, knows, and loves the world. He is, in 
Hartshorne's words, all-inclusive. Nothing can exist out­
side the being of God. Hartshorne defines inclusion as fol­
lows; X includes Y if X and Y together are no more than X 
alone, that is, X includes Y if (X + Y) = X.^ From this 
definition, it is easy to prove that there could be no more 
than one God. Let X and Y be two all-inclusive beings. It 
follows that X and Y must include each other. Thus, (X + Y) 
= X and (X + Y) = Y; ergo, X = Y. The two all-inclusive be­
ings are really the same being. God, as the all- inclusive 
being, is unique. There could not be more than one God.
Hartshorne's argument might be questioned on the 
grounds that it does not prove that there could not be more 
than one necessary being. All that is proved is that the 
all-inclusive reality must be unique. This counter-argument
implication that no individual can be specified by concepts 
alone. Hartshorne would say that God is the one exception 
to this rule. Kripke seems to see this possibility when he 
wonders whether 'God' is a name or a description, cf. Saul 
A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1980), pp. 26-27.
^Charles Hartshorne, "Synthesis as Polydyadic Inclu­
sion: A Reply to Sessions' 'Charles Hartshorne and Third-
ness'," Southern Journal of Philosophy 14, 2 (Summer 1976) , 
p. 247.
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misses the point. Hartshorne rightly identifies God with 
the all-inclusive reality. If there could be only one all- 
inclusive reality then there could be only one God. It is 
no objection to say that there might be beings, besides God, 
that exist necessarily. The point is that these beings 
would not be all- inclusive and thus would not be God. There­
fore, the existence of many necessary beings does not pose a 
threat to monotheism.
Although the existence of a multiplicity of necessary 
beings does not provide a legitimate objection to monotheism, 
there are arguments which prove that the existence of more 
than one necessary being is an absurd notion. Duns Scotus 
has shown most clearly the problem of thinking there could 
be more than one necessary being.^ To admit that more than 
one necessary being exists is to admit that an infinite num­
ber of necessary beings exist. Any concept admits of an in­
finite number of possible instantiations. No matter how 
many men exist, for example, there could always be more men. 
The concept of man in no way limits the number of men that 
could exist. Similarly, if there could be more than one 
nondivine necessary being, then there is no limit to the 
number that could exist. The problem is that, in the case 
of a necessary being, its mere possibility is enough to en­
sure its actual existence. The ontological argument shows
John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, Allan 
Wolter, trans. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Pub., 1962),
p . 94.
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that the concept of a nonexistent necessary being whose 
existence is logically possible is incoherent. Thus, if 
there could be an infinite number of necessary beings, these 
beings must exist. Democritus-might have viewed this con­
clusion as a welcome addition to his atomism. The concept, 
however, of an infinite number of actually existing nondi­
vine necessary beings is not without its problems. We have
already seen, in chapter V, that the concept of the actual
infinite, if not contradictory, is paradoxical. Thus, when 
faced with the choice between one necessary being and an 
infinite number of necessary beings, one should opt for the
former since it involves the least paradox.
Prima facie, there is a tension between our rejec­
tion of the actual infinite in the above argument and our 
acceptance of the actual infinite in chapter V. In truth 
there is no problem in this strategy. The differences be­
tween the two cases are important. The argument of chapter 
V has to do with the concept of an actually infinite series 
of events in time. The argument against the existence of 
an infinity of necessary beings has to do with the simulta­
neous existence of an actual infinite. It may be the case, 
as Hartshorne suggests, that problems attending the concept 
of an infinite temporal series are less severe than problems 
in the concept of an infinite number of beings existing 
simultaneously (CS 126).
The most important difference between the arguments
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of chapter V and the argument against an infinity of neces­
sary beings lies in the use of the principle of least para­
dox. In chapter V we were faced with two equally paradoxi­
cal positions: either there was a first moment of time or
there was not. Neither position is free of paradoxical and 
counter-intuitive consequences. Given this stalemate, the 
problem had to be settled, at least for the present, by other 
considerations. Thus, we argued that, if God knows himself, 
he could never have been without some world or other. The 
problem of the existence of an infinite number of necessary 
beings is different. The existence of an infinity of neces­
sary beings is paradoxical. But the alternative under con­
sideration- -that there is only one necessary being--is not 
obviously paradoxical. Unlike the alternatives of chapter 
V, both of which involve paradoxes, the alternative to an 
infinity of necessary beings is unproblematic. The princi­
ple of least paradox dictates that the least paradoxical 
position be accepted. It is more reasonable to believe that 
there could be only one necessary being. Thus, there is no 
problem of our acceptance of the actual infinite in chapter 
V and our rejection of the actual infinite in the present 
context.
It should be noted that the existence of one neces­
sary being is not the only alternative to the existence of 
an infinite number of necessary beings. One may choose to 
believe there are no necessary beings. This simply entails
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the denial of theism. The last six chapters have been a 
concerted attempt to show that that denial is not reason­
able.
The various components of the global argument tend 
to support one another. With the arguments for God's 
unicity, Hartshorne's cumulative case takes on additional 
force. There are, however, soft spots in Hartshorne's 
chain of reasoning that should be noted. The soft spots 
are called 'soft' not because I believe Hartshorne's ediface 
is likely to crumble in these areas but because, in the 
present work, space did not permit the detailed defense that 
some of Hartshorne's doctrines require. Let me indicate 
some of these soft areas.
One of the central pillars of the ontological argu­
ment is the theory of temporal possibility. According to 
this theory, modal distinctions are finally to be understood 
as temporal distinctions. That is possible which could have 
arisen in the past or will be capable of arising in the fu­
ture. It is to Hartshorne's credit to have seen so clearly 
that, without the theory of temporal possibility, the onto­
logical argument is a failure. If God's existence is logi­
cally possible without being really possible, then the in­
ference from "possibly God exists" to "necessarily God 
exists" is invalid. This is the point of Plantinga's and 
Hick's criticism of the ontological argument discussed in 
chapter IV. Thus, those who find the theory of temporal
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possibility unacceptable are unlikely to value the ontolog­
ical argument very highly.
Several reasons can be adduced for denying the theory 
of temporal possibility. The most obvious argument, however, 
is that some disciplines seem, to some thinkers, to require 
that the logically possible is radically distinct from the 
really possible. Craig points out that many mathematicians 
are willing to talk about the abstract possibility of infi­
nite sets but shy away from the belief that these ideas could 
ever find application in the real world.^ It may be that no 
logical inconsistency is involved in the notion of an infi­
nite set but that there could never be, in the world of space 
and time, an infinite set of objects [existing either simul­
taneously or successively). If this were true, not only 
would the ontological argument be affected, the cosmological 
argument would suffer as well. For Hartshorne, existence 
(God's included) is essentially temporal. If Craig’s con­
tention is correct then the past cannot be infinite. Thus, 
if God exists then he is capable of existence without time. 
Although Hartshorne's argument against the idea of timeless 
existence are, to my mind, convincing, Craig's point of view 
cannot be dismissed lightly. As noted in chapter V, 
Hartshorne admits that he is perplexed by the idea of the 
actual infinite.
^William Lane Craig, The Kalâm Cosmological Argu­
ment (New York: Barnes § Noble, 1979), pp. 69-71.
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Another point at which the global argument requires 
further support is in the doctrine that becoming is onto- 
logically more basic than being. The design argument is 
founded on the principle that the natural order is the su­
preme instance of social order. Not everyone is comfortable 
with this panpsychist view of reality. Although I cannot 
count myself among their number--panpsychism always seemed 
to me to be too beautiful to be false--it is understandable 
why so many have rejected it. Although the objection is not 
decisive, panpsychism has never fared well with common 
sense.^ On a more serious level, the social view of reality 
occasions several objections, not least of v;hich is how the 
language describing human activity can legitimately be ex­
tended so as to encompass nonhuman modes of becoming. One 
way of putting the objection is to ask of what use even the 
most extended psychology can be to physics. These are dif­
ficult questions whose answers require more than the cursory 
treatment given them in chapter VI.
One of the most interesting challenges to 
Hartshorne's global argument arises from the allegation that 
neoclassical theism is incompatible with current physics.
The charge is particularly interesting in light of the fact 
that Hartshorne has continuously waged war against the idea
A good friend tells me he finds it difficult to 
present the idea of panpsychism to his classes without mak­
ing it sound as though the world were composed of a bunch 
of smiley faces.
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that God's existence is an empirical question. Of all of 
the challenges to the global argument this is the most po ­
tentially damaging since it threatens not only the argument 
for God's existence but the entire metaphysical enterprise 
as Hartshorne defines it. It behoves us to look at the 
problem in more detail.
Process philosophers have, for some time, been aware 
of the problems relativity physics poses for God, as neo- 
classically conceived.^ According to recent physics, there 
is no absolute meaning to simultaneity. If A is simultan­
eous with B and B is simultaneous with C, it does not neces­
sarily follow that A is simultaneous with C . The simulta­
neity relation is not transitive. The meaning of simulta­
neity (and thus, time) is always fixed by reference to some 
co-ordinate system. Thus, contrary to the Newtonian picture 
of time as an absolute frame of reference in terms of which 
any event can be located, Einsteinian physics teaches a rela- 
tivistic theory of time. As Einstein says.
Every reference body (co-ordinate system) has its own 
particular time; unless we are told the reference-body 
to which the statement of time refers, there is no 
meaning in a statement of the time of an event.°
The consequence of this view is that from one reference
frame, x, two events, A and B, may be successive, while
''john T. Wilcox, "A Question from Physics for Cer­
tain Theists," Journal of Religion 41, 1 (Oct. 1961), pn. 
293-300.
^Albert Einstein, Relativity (New York; Crown Pub., 
1961), p. 26.
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from another reference frame, y, A and B may be simultaneous. 
Since there is no meaning to time independent of a reference 
frame, the question whether A and B are really simultaneous 
has no meaning.
Several interrelated problems for neoclassical the­
ism are occasioned by Einstein's views. According to 
Hartshorne, God is a temporal being. Does this not mean 
that God is subject to the same temporal limitations as 
other things? God is not, of course, subject to birth or 
death. But if, like other beings, he exists in time, then 
some meaning must be given to the concept of divine tempo­
rality. Relativity physics does not appear to permit us to 
fix the meaning of the divine time apart from some frame of 
reference within the space-time continuum. One hypothesis 
is that God occupies some privileged frame of reference 
within the world which enables him to know which events are 
really simultaneous and which are not. This hypothesis is 
contrary to Einstein's teaching that there is no meaning to 
the question of which events are really simultaneous. The 
hypothesis also seems to compromise the concept of God's 
omnipresence. But if we allow that God is present in every 
co-ordinate system then the concept of God's individuality 
becomes problematic. As Hartshorne says.
If God here now is not the same concrete unit of real­
ity as God somewhere else 'now', then the simple anal­
ogy with human consciousness as a single linear suc­
cession of states collapses. (CS 124).
The answer that is given to these questions is going to
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involve a more complex view of God (or relativity physics) 
than we now have.
A variation on the problem of God's individuality 
is the problem of how the concept of "God's time" can be 
given meaning. Hartshorne does an admirable job of stat­
ing this objection.
. . . there seems no way to divide the cosmic process 
as a whole into past and future. Yet if neoclassical 
theism is right, it seems there must, for God at least, 
be a way. What is God's 'frame of reference', if there 
is no objectively right frame of reference for the cut 
between past and future? (OT 93).
If there is something like a divine time, then it is not
the time of relativity theory. God's past and future would
not be a time that is available for the physicist to study.
I have purposefully avoided going into great detail 
describing the encounter of relativity physics with neo­
classical theism. We are not so much interested in the 
ways some philosophers have tried to demonstrate the com­
patibility of physics and process theism as with the fact 
that such a controversy could ever arise. According to 
Hartshorne, metaphysical questions are completely a priori. 
No amount of empirical investigation can ever answer a 
truly metaphysical question. The reason for this is that 
metaphysics, according to Hartshorne, deals with the most 
generic features of reality. The metaphysician is not so 
much concerned with what is true in the actual world as he 
is with what is true in any possible world. Yet, if this 
is true, and if the theistic question is, as Hartshorne
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maintains, metaphysical, then there should never have been 
any question about whether relativity physics is compatible 
with neoclassical theism. If relativity physics conflicts 
with theism then so does every other conceivable cosmologi­
cal theory.
Hartshorne recognizes this difficulty and suggests
that the conflict between his theism and relativity physics
is only apparent.
Unless some sort of physical relativity is compatible 
with deity, theism cannot even be logically possible-- 
such would be my guess as to the logic of the matter.
In that case, the observational facts are wholly neu­
tral, as I hold they really must be. (OT 94).
The question, says Hartshorne, is whether physics can be
expected to "give us the deep truth about time as it would
appear to a non-localized observer." (CS 125). If
Hartshorne is to be true to his metaphysical principles he
must deny that physics has the final word.
Despite his insistence on the independence of phys­
ics and metaphysics, Hartshorne takes the findings of phys­
ics quite seriously. The most recent developments in the 
debate over relativity theory and Hartshorne's concept of 
God bear this out. Basing his theory on the work in quan­
tum physics of J. S. Bell, Henry P. Stapp argues for a re­
vised view of space-time according to which events may in­
fluence each other even though there is not enough time 
for a light signal to pass between them. The symmetrical 
independence of contemporaries taught by relativity theory
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gwould, then, have to be qualified. The importance of this 
view, as Hartshorne sees, is to dissolve the problem of 
showing a compatibility between divine time and the time of 
which relativity theory speaks. There is only one world- 
line and this world-line can be identified with God's tem­
poral reference frame, even if, for the purposes of rela­
tivity theory, such a world-line is not available to any 
localized observer. Hartshorne expresses relief at having 
had the philosophical burden of relativity physics lifted 
from his shoulders.
For decades I have suffered philosophically from [the 
seeming necessity that contemporaries are mutually in­
dependent] . Now, may Allah bless him, Bell has done 
away, it seems, with the problem.10
Not everyone agrees that the challenges to neoclassical
theism from physics are dispelled by Stapp's arguments. The
assumptions upon which Stapp founds his theory are themselves
problematic.^^ The question of the relationship between
Hartshorne's theism and relativity physics is still open.
The tantalizing question remains: If physics and
metaphysics are, as Hartshorne maintains, autonomous
gHenry Peirce Stapp, "Quantum Mechanics, Local 
Causality, and Process Philosophy," edited by William B. 
Jones, Process Studies 7, 3 (Fall 1977), pp. 173-182.
^^Charles Hartshorne, "Bell's Theorem and Stapp's 
Revised View of Space-Time," Process Studies 7, 3 (Fall 
1977), p. 185.
^^William B. Jones, "Bell's Theorem, H. P. Stapp, 
and Process Theism," Process Studies 7, 4 (Winter 1977), 
pp. 250-261.
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disciplines, why is there an apparent conflict between rela­
tivity theory and neoclassical theism? The eagerness with 
which Hartshorne embraces Stapp's views as freeing neoclas­
sical theism from the bonds of relativity theory does not 
square well with the claim that empirical issues can have 
no relevance for settling metaphysical problems. The very 
idea that a theory in physics could either pose a threat to, 
or vindicate, Hartshorne's theism suggests that there is a 
more intimate relationship between metaphysics and the em­
pirical sciences than Hartshorne is willing to allow. It 
is this possibility which we must now explore.
Since metaphysics deals with what is true in every 
possible world, it is appropriate to call metaphysical is­
sues conceptual. Furthermore, since a metaphysical truth 
could not, in any genuinely conceivable state of affairs, 
be false, metaphysical truths must be, as Hartshorne main­
tains, independent of anything that could be found by an 
empirical investigation. The problem arises when we try to 
give content to the notion of independence. Conceptual is­
sues are never so well defined as might be desired. Very 
often, what appears to be logically possible is shown to be 
logically impossible by a consideration of the empirical 
facts. The example used in chapter IV is a case in point. 
William Rowe takes the possibility of the existence of an 
eternal star as a counter-example to the claim that an eter­
nal being cannot be contingent. The empirical facts about
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the internal composition and structure of stars, however, 
show that Rowe's claim is dubious. Rowe's eternal star 
could have none of the essential characteristics of stars 
as we know them. Thus, even if we were to discover some­
thing that had some of the superficial features of stars-- 
for example, lighting up the night sky--but shared none of 
the essential features of stars, the thing we had discovered 
would not be a star. Thus, it is not clear that an eternal 
star is a star at all.
Other examples of the mutual relevance of empirical
science and metaphysics are available. Although in this
work, we have taken a stand against the traditional doctrine
of creation ex nihilo, the problem of the world's creation
provides an excellent example of how empirical and conceptual
issues can dovetail. Kant objected to the idea that time
began with the creation of the world on the grounds that it
is always possible to imagine a moment before the creation
of the world. There are, of course, purely philosophical
12answers to this position. But discoveries in physics are 
also relevant to refuting Kant's argument. According to 
current cosmology, time and space are a function of the den­
sity of matter. The more dense matter becomes, the more 
contracted space and time become. If, as some scientists
12Thomas Aquinas argues that the time before the 
creation of the world is only an imaginary time. See Summa 
Contra Gentiles, Book II, Anton G. Pegis, trans. (New York : 
Image, 1955), 36, 1126.
223
believe, the universe, as we know it, began from a state of
infinite density, then space and time would have been infi­
nitely contracted. Thus, prior to the "big bang" there 
would be no time as we understand the word.
. . . the universe began from a state of infinite den­
sity. . . Space and time were created in that event 
and so was all the matter in the universe. It is not 
meaningful to ask what happened before the big bang; 
it is somewhat like asking what is north of the North 
Pole.13
Thus, Kant's conceptual objection to the idea of a beginning 
of time is refuted by current cosmological theory. This is 
not to say that all objections to the doctrine of creation
ex nihilo are shown to be false. But Kant's argument surely 
cannot be taken as conclusive in light of the empirical 
evidence.
The discoveries made in the empirical sciences are 
not irrelevant to metaphysical issues. The important ques­
tion this raises for Hartshorne's position is whether the 
existence of God is, after all, an empirical question. Let 
us suppose, for example, that physicists came to adopt the 
views of Lawrence Sklar who, by interpreting Minkowski 
spacetime in a literalistic way, asserts that future events 
"have determinate reality" and that future objects are 
"real existents. Were this view to become the dominant
J. Richard Gott III, James E. Gunn, David N.
Schramm, and Beatrice M. Tinsley, "Will the Universe Expand 
Forever?" Scientific American (March 1976), p. 65.
^^Lawrence Sklar, Space, Time and Spacetime (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974), p. 274. I am indebted
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trend in physics, it would constitute a formidable barrier 
to Hartshorne's philosophy according to which the future is 
partly indeterminate, even for God. Hartshorne makes clear 
that his views on the nature of creativity lead him to re­
ject any interpretation of relativity theory which would 
deny the reality of becoming (CS 125). My own beliefs about 
the possibility of freedom lead me to side with Hartshorne 
on this i s s u e . T h e  point, however, is that what we be­
lieve about such fundamental concepts as time, space, cause, 
deity, etc., is profoundly influenced by the findings of the 
empirical sciences. The philosopher cannot ignore the find­
ings of scientists, especially those findings which become 
well entrenched in scientific theories.
Despite the fact that empirical discoveries seem to 
have a bearing on metaphysical problems, it would be hasty 
to conclude that God's existence is an empirical question.
The discoveries of empirical science may be relevant to meta­
physical questions without being able to settle those ques­
tions .
We have already touched on the problem of creation 
ex nihilo . Modern physics demonstrates that the Kantian 
argument against a beginning of time is inconclusive.
to Craig's The Kalàm Cosmological Argument, p. 107, for this 
phrasing.
^^Donald Wayne Viney, "Freedom and Responsibility;
A Whiteheadian Perspective," unpublished Master's thesis. 
University of Oklahoma, 1979, Chapter II.
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Nevertheless, physicists have not proved that there was ever 
a 'time' when the universe did not exist. Temporality, as 
it is available to physics, may have begun with the big bang. 
The qualification "as it is available to physics" is impor­
tant. If there is, as Hartshorne claims, a divine time, 
there is no necessity that it should be available to physi­
cists. Indeed, considerations internal to physics might 
suggest this conclusion. Some scientists believe that there 
might have been more than one big bang explosion in the 
past.^^ If this is so, and if the big bang marks the begin­
ning of a universe's time, then time must have had several 
beginnings. The 'divine time' might, then, be the only mea­
sure of the sequence of universes. These considerations are 
admittedly speculative. The important thing is that they do 
not exceed the bounds of what it is reasonable to believe is 
really possible. Science, therefore, does not answer the 
question of creation ex nihilo, although it may shed light 
on the problem.
Similarly, science is not irrelevant to the question 
of divine existence. Neoclassical theism's encounter with 
relativity physics is enough to prove this much. But to
If the so-called oscillating model of the universe 
is true then there would be a series of big bang explosions. 
The issue, apparently still alive in physics, is whether the 
average density of the universe is great enough to cause the 
universe to collapse back on itself. For a discussion of 
this problem geared to the lay audience see Issac Asimov, 
"The Very Large Lion and the Very Small Mouse," Omni (August 
1981), pp. 79-83, 108. .
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claim that science might prove or disprove the existence of 
God is going too far. I agree with Hartshorne that the 
question of God's existence is a priori. Anselm's ontologi­
cal argument stands as a reminder of the inadequacy of any 
merely empirical approach to God's existence. One must dis­
tinguish, however, the bare fact (if it is a fact) that God 
exists and the particular manner in which we conceive of 
that existence. A particular concept of God may be shown 
to be inconsistent with empirically discoverable facts.
This is not a proof that God does not exist. It is only 
proof that one conception of the divine existence is inade­
quate .
It should be noted that the distinction between 
God's existence and our concepts of God is not the same dis­
tinction as Hartshorne draws between God's existence and 
actuality. The existence/actuality distinction is part of 
Hartshorne's concept of God. But there are other concepts 
of God. One may argue that Hartshorne's concept of God is 
the most consistent, religiously adequate, etc., while recog­
nizing that there are other candidates for these honors.
It is to the credit of some process philosophers 
that they have insisted on making the distinction between 
our concepts of God and God's existence. A maze of confu­
sion arises from conflating this distinction. For example, 
Flew's God and Philosophy is a sustained attack of God as 
classically conceived. In disposing of the classical concept
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of God, however. Flew believed himself to have proved more 
than what his arguments actually showed. He concluded to 
the nonexistence of God. He should have concluded only to 
the nonexistence of God as classically conceived.
Some forms of the problem of evil also provide good 
examples of the danger of conflating the distinction between 
our concepts of God and God's existence. We are told, for 
example, that there is no good reason to believe that God 
exists since God would not allow children to die of terrible 
diseases. A response to this argument, that is too often 
ignored, is that the God whose existence these facts dis­
prove is not the only God that is conceivable. We have seen 
in chapter VI that Hartshorne's concept of God does not en­
tail that God prevents (or could prevent) every occurrence 
of moral or natural evil. Therefore, it does not follow 
from the inadequacy of any particular concept of God that 
there are no adequate conceptions of the divine existence.
My position, therefore, is that Hartshorne is cor­
rect in his belief that the existence of God is not an em­
pirical question; but that he is wrong in thinking that sci­
ence cannot discredit a particular concept of God, his own 
included. This is not to say that I believe science has 
discredited neoclassical theism. With some qualifications--
17 Schubert Ogden makes this point in his review of 
Flew's book, "God and Philosophy: A Discussion With Antony 
Flew," Journal of Religion, 48, 2 (April 1968), pp. 161- 
181.
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some of which I have introduced in the course of the present 
work--Hartshorne's concept of God is the only form of theism 
I can accept. From my layman's knowledge, no one has con­
clusively shown that either relativity theory or quantum 
mechanics is incompatible with neoclassical theism. Never­
theless, I am willing to admit that such an incompatibility 
is possible. In that case, neoclassicism.would either have 
to be revised or abandoned in favor of some other, as yet 
unimagined, form of theism. The problem is that any claim 
that such-and-such is genuinely conceivable cannot be di­
vorced from empirical considerations. Scientific discoveries 
may lead us to believe that what we thought was conceivable 
is, in fact, a meaningless conjunction of concepts. Thus, 
it is the task of every theist who is concerned that his or 
her view of God is (more or less) correct, to show that the 
concept of God in question is compatible with the facts un­
earthed by science.
Hartshorne says that the only God with whom empiri­
cally discoverable facts could be incompatible is an idol 
or a fetish (C£ 30). In this, I agree with Hartshorne. The 
relation between science and metaphysics for which I have 
argued suggests that one task of science is to aid the meta­
physician in unmasking idolotrous concepts of God. More 
generally, the importance of science for metaphysics is that 
we do not know a priori, where empirical questions end and 
where conceptual questions begin. As already noted, a
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concept may appear to be genuinely conceivable but on closer 
inspection be shown to harbor an inconsistency.
Much has been said about the relevance of science 
for metaphysics; but it is equally true that metaphysics 
has relevance for science. We have already seen a possible 
example of this in the concept of divine time as being the 
measure of time between big bangs. Hartshorne suggests 
another example when he says that relativity is not com­
pletely an empirical issue.
Einstein's formula could be falsified ; but the degree 
of relativity is one thing, the question of relativity 
or no relativity is another. (C^ 124).
Thus, metaphysicians may have important things to say to
physicists about physics. This is precisely the situation
one would expect if empirical and conceptual issues are not
always clearly distinguishable.
An objection to the position for which I have argued 
is that it makes the falsification of the hypothesis that 
God exists impossible. If one can believe that God exists 
no matter what science discovers then it appears that the 
existence of God is not really an issue for rational dis­
course but, rather, a matter of blind faith. The problem 
with this objection is that it makes it appear as though the 
theist can never be under a rational compulsion to abandon 
belief in God. But this is not a consequence of the view 
that empirical science cannot disprove the existence of God. 
There are other considerations, besides empirical science.
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relevant to evaluating the concept of God. If the theist 
became convinced, for example, that there is a contradic­
tion in the very concept of a logically necessary being he 
might decide not to believe in God. In other words, one 
might come to the conclusion that there are no legitimate 
concepts of God nor that there are likely to be any. In 
that case, one would be denying not only that a particular 
concept of God is not instantiated but that God does not 
exist, that is, no concept of God could be instantiated.
If a theist became an atheist for this reason,his decision 
to be an atheist would be regarded as a failure of faith by
other theists. This fact simply demonstrates that a deci­
sion can be both rational and a failure of faith. It is by
no means obvious that the requirements of faith are also the
requirements of rationality. Pascal's statement that "the 
heart has its reasons which reason does not know" is too
little appreciated in current discussions of philosophy of
, . . 18 religion.
Ideally, faith should be supplemented by a rational 
account. The proofs for God's existence are an attempt to 
provide such an account. To the extent that they are suc­
cessful, reason is the ally of faith. Success is measured
Blaise Pascal, Pensées and The Provincial Letters, 
translated by W. F. Trotter and Thomas M'Crie (New York : 
Modern Library, 1941), p. 95, number 277. An excellent dis­
cussion of the nature of faith is found in James L. Muyskens, 
The Sufficiency of Hope (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press’̂ 197 9) .
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by a variety of factors including the consistency of the 
concept of God, the validity and soundness of the arguments, 
the degree to which the God that is being proved resembles 
God as understood by the religious community, and compati­
bility with the scientifically discovered facts. The scope 
of the present work has prohibited an extensive discussion 
of the empirical issues. Also, except for a few remarks in 
chapter III, scant attention has been paid to the question 
of whether neoclassical theism captures the essential things 
religious people believe about God. On both of these issues 
let me simply register my opinion that I am optimistic that 
neither will produce serious objections to Hartshorne's the­
ism. This dissertation has primarily focused on the ques­
tions of consistency, validity and soundness. Again, the 
verdict is positive. The major weakness of the global argu­
ment is the insufficient attention paid to the empirical 
issues. Contrary to Hartshorne's belief, his theism is not 
above a reproach based on the findings of science. I have 
argued that this fact does not make the existence of God an 
empirical question. Scientific discoveries can only lead 
to the revision of one's concept of God.
Hartshorne has done more to advance the case of a 
process view of God than any other individual. Some phi­
losophers deal with Hartshorne's theism by the method of
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convenient ignorance. Although much of his major work was 
done by 1962, there is no evidence that the authors of what 
many considered to be major texts in the philosophy of reli­
gion published after 1962 had opened any of Hartshorne's 
b o o k s . T h e r e  is evidence, however, that neoclassical 
theism is beginning to have an impact on philosophical 
thinking about God. Within the process tradition the names 
of Schubert Ogden, John Cobb, David Ray Griffin, and Lewis 
Ford stand out. Other attempts to come to terms with 
Hartshorne's theism can be found. For all of its weaknesses. 
Madden and Hare's Evil and the Concept of God was the first 
book to include a treatment of Hartshorne's theodicy. David 
Burrell's Aquinas, God and Action, and more recently 
Bonansea's God and Atheism, are representative of a growing 
number of traditional theists who have entered into a dia­
logue with Hartshorne's ideas. Some of the more novel and 
interesting criticisms of neoclassical theism come from the 
pen of Robert N e v i l l e . S o m e  of those who do not accept
See for example, Wallace I. Matson, The Existence 
of God (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1965);
Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 1966);
Steven M. Cahn, ed., Philosophy of Religion (New York:
Harper 5 Row, 1970); Kai Nielsen, Contemporary Critiques of 
Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1971); Richard Swinburne, The
Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).
^^Examples of work within the process tradition in­
clude Schubert M. Ogden, The Reality of God (New York:
Harper 6 Row, 1963); John B. Cobb J r ., A Christian Natural 
Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Pressl 1965); David Ray
Griffin, God, Power and Evil : A Process Theodicy (Philadel­
phia: Westminster Press, 1976); Lewis S. Ford, The Lure of
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Hartshorne's concept of God nevertheless show evidence of 
being influenced by the general themes Hartshorne has pro­
moted. Swinburne, Craig and Shepherd, for example, all 
admit that there is a temporal aspect of d e i t y . T h u s ,  
there are signs that process theism will be taken more 
seriously than it has in the past.
My own belief is that neoclassical theism will be 
at the center of philosophical and theological ferment in 
the future. The reason is that it is alone among theistic 
alternatives capable of providing a basis for fruitful dia­
logue between competing philosophical and religious tradi­
tions. The dipolar concept of God is an attempt to meet 
the demands of both absolutists and relativists. In this 
it attempts to incorporate what is valid in a variety of 
religious and philosophical traditions.
The dialogue with other religious traditions may 
also be aided by a study of movements similar to process
God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978). Other works
cited are, Edward Madden and Peter Hare, Evil and the Con­
cept of God (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas
Pub., 1968); David B. Burrell, Aquinas, God and Action 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1979), pp. 78-79; Bernardino M. Bonansea, God and Atheism 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University Press of Amer-
ica, 1979); Robert Neville's books are God the Creator 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), and Creativ­
ity and God : A Challenge to Process Theology (New York :
Seabury, 1980).
21Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 220-221; William Lane Craig, The 
Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 152; John J. Shepherd, Expe­
rience, Inference and God (London: Macmillan, 1975), pi lT8.
Only Shepherd acknowledges a debt to Hartshorne.
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philosophy in those traditions. The thought of Sri 
Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin comes to mind in this con­
nection. In their own ways they were process thinkers.
Process theism also provides a common ground between 
rationalistic metaphysics and mysticism. The fact that 
Hartshorne attempts to prove the existence of God does not 
mean that he has ignored the legitimate claim of the mys­
tics that God's reality is an inexhaustible mystery. Meta­
physics, at best, deals with a very limited aspect of the 
divine reality, namely, its abstract essence. But the mys­
tery of God is not in his abstract essence but in his con-
9 %Crete a c t u a l i t y . “
It is not uncommon for the admirers of a tradition 
to over-rate its significance. History alone will deter­
mine whether noeclassical theism's influence will be that 
of a sizable wave or merely a ripple in the ocean of philo­
sophical theology. At the risk, therefore, of being ac­
cused of an overstatement, I quote with approval Ogden's 
claim that through the work of Whitehead and Hartshorne,
. . . the ancient problems of philosophy have received 
a new, thoroughly modern treatment, which in its scope
7 7“"Sri Aurobindo, The Life Divine in two volumes 
(Pondicherry, India: All India Press, 1973); Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin, Le Phénomène Humain (Paris: Editions
de Seuil, 1955) .
2 3Charles Hartshorne, "Mysticism and Rationalistic 
Metaphysics," Monist 59, 4 (Oct. 1976), pp. 463-469.
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and depth easily rivals the so-called philosophie 
perennis.24
Whether philosophers and theologians will give neoclassicism 
the attention I feel that it deserves is for history to de­
cide.
^^Ogden, The Reality of God, p. 56.
HISTORICAL NOTE
If for no more than biographical and historical rea­
sons, the reader may be interested to know how this disser­
tation came to be written. The story is important not be­
cause I am in it, but because any contact with great men is 
worth recording.
I first saw Charles Hartshorne in April 1976, at a 
philosophy conference in Denver, Colorado, where he was de­
livering a paper on Nhitehead and Buddhism. The paper was 
wasted on my undergraduate mind; and perhaps because of the 
topic, the misconception that Hartshorne's philosophy is, 
as someone has said, "Whitehead plus the Ontological Argu­
ment," was reinforced.
Four years later, in November 1979, my philosophical 
curiosity was aroused when, through a piece of good fortune, 
I had lunch with Professor Hartshorne. The story is worth 
recounting if only because it so well exemplifies one of the 
hallmarks of neoclassical metaphysics--chance. The occasion 
was the annual meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical So­
ciety in Austin, Texas. Dr. Peter Hutcheson and I had gone
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searching for a place to eat. After an exasperating hour 
of hunting for a parking place in downtown Austin, we re­
turned to the convention center only to find most of those 
attending the conference eating in the cafeteria. The irony 
of the situation was that we had left the convention center 
precisely to avoid cafeteria food. By chance, the only 
seating available was adjacent to the table at which Dr. 
Hartshorne was eating. Several minutes later, Hartshorne's 
party left, leaving the eighty-two year old philosopher 
alone. Seeing the empty chairs around our table, he asked 
to finish his meal in our company. For the next forty-five 
minutes Dr. Hartshorne entertained us with philosophical re­
marks interspersed with humorous anecdotes.
This serendipitous encounter proved decisive. With­
in three or four months I had read the bulk of the 
Hartshornean corpus. When the time came to choose a disser­
tation topic in December 1980, Hartshorne's thought was the 
obvious choice. Unbeknownst to me. Dr. Robert Shahan, then 
chairman of the philosophy department at the University of 
Oklahoma, sent my proposal to Dr. Hartshorne. One thing led 
to another until, to my delighted astonishment, Dr. 
Hartshorne had agreed to be a member of my dissertation com­
mittee. In February 1981, Dr. Hartshorne visited Norman, 
on which occasion there was ample time to discuss my 
proj ect.
The dissertation was written over the next year and
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a half. During that time, and despite a rather lengthy ill­
ness of his wife. Dr. Hartshorne aided me with prompt re­
plies to my letters and words of encouragement. The unique 
mixture of professionalism and friendship in Dr. Hartshorne's 
correspondence was the needed impetus to see this work 
through to its completion in April 198 2.
Working with Dr. Hartshorne was instructive not sim­
ply on a philosophical level, but at a personal level as 
well. Too often, in the study of a philosophy, we forget 
that behind the philosophy is a person--a person who, in 
creating their philosophy, has created something of their 
own character. My unique privilege was to have caught a 
glimpse of the vision that animates this man through more 
than a mere acquaintance with his written work. For this I 
will always be thankful.
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